FUNDAMENTALS OF DEBATE

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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF DEBATE

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BY

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A

TO

THE MANY EMINENT GRADUATES

OF

THE CLIOSOPHIC AND AMERICAN WHIG SOCIETIES

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PREFACE

As a teacher of argument and debate for more than a generation, I have long been convinced that these subjects are not so much an applied logic as an applied psychologic; that, indeed, there are other powers of the mind than the purely logical which are fundamental, and that the principles governing them are capable of a more thoroughly scientific exposition than has appeared in our manuals. I have thus endeavored to write a modern text-book on debating, grounded on psychology as well as on logic, and to set forth principles and methods tested by actual experience.

I have presented the material which I believe to be necessary to a full understanding of argument and debate in two parts, Logical Organization and The Presentation. In considering Logical Organization, I have retained the conventional view-point, dealing with Briefs and Brief-making, Argument, and Evidence, and have endeavored to weld them into a whole. Highly valuable to the student as the conventional stress upon the pure logic of the subject is, it has been found by the writer to be utterly inadequate even when followed later by a treatment of Persuasion.

The unique feature of the present text lies in the fact that it recognizes more fully than has hitherto been the case in text-books on argument the function of imagination in reasoning; that the unconscious association

of images in the mind leads to new ideas and progress, and that, in presenting our ideas after they have been logically organized, they must be imaged suggestively on the minds of the audience. Part II, therefore, explains the elemental nature of Imagination, and treats the subject of what is usually called the Presentation as Imaginative Suggestion. Whenever this view-point and conception have been presented in the classroom, they have aroused interest by supplementing the formalism of the older treatises and by opening new avenues of thought and suggesting original ways of approach. For, after all, the debater and student of English composition in general should be free to act on his own initiative, to express his own individuality.

All students in this field will gladly acknowledge their indebtedness to the pioneer work of Professor George P. Baker, of Harvard, author of "The Principles of Argumentation" (1895), and also to Professor Walter Dill Scott, author of "The Psychology of Public Speaking" (1910).

I wish to express my especial obligation to Professor Howard C. Warren, of Princeton University, for his helpful criticism of the psychological foundations. To Doctor Theodore W. Hunt, for many years head of the English Department, now Professor Emeritus, I wish also to express my appreciation for his interest and encouragement.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, June, 1918.

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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF DEBATE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

The Fundamentals of Debate

On turning to the dictionary you will find that the word "debate" formerly meant "strife, contention." For example, Robert of Gloucester says in the thirteenth century—"in the days of Trinity next ensuing was a great debate and in that murder there were slain fourscore." Sir Walter Scott uses the term as applied to physical contest:

> "But question fierce and proud reply
> Gave signal soon of dire debate."

The term is applied usually to intellectual disputes; its field is not actually but figuratively a battle-ground. Its province is coextensive with the whole domain of thought. Wherever there are propositions in dispute, ideas attacked and defended, there is debate. In law before the court, in theology before the synod, in politics on the stump or in Congress—indeed, in almost all scientific, philosophic, or popular speeches and writings. Its instruments are not swords, shields, or arrows but arguments. The arms of the contest are intellectual ones,

the contest one of reasons. According to the present use of the word, if *A* by chance meets *B* and makes an assertion which is denied by *B*, whereupon *A* offers reasons for his belief which are met by contrary reasons from *B*, there is debate. "A thesis is set down; you attack, I defend it; you insist, I reply; you deny, I prove; you distinguish, I destroy your distinctions; my replies balance or overturn your objections—such is debate." You assert your intention of pursuing a certain line of action, I reason with you to do the opposite—such is debate.

Debating is not confined to formal tribunals. The college student arguing upon the prospects of a baseball championship is as much a debater as the disputant in an intercollegiate contest. An amusing controversy showing the origin and conduct of a not uncommon type of debate may be found in Scott's "Antiquary" relating to the racial connection of the ancient Picts. Were they Teutons or Celts? Here we have assertion and denial, citation of authorities, pro and con, with distinctions, until as too often happens, the disputants lose their tempers, and Sir Arthur flounces out of the parlor in high dudgeon—

". . . Why, man, there was once a people called the Piks——"

"More properly *Picts*," interrupted the Baronet.

"I say the *Pikar*, *Pihar*, *Piochtar*, *Piaghter*, or *Peughtar*," vociferated Oldbuck; "they spoke a Gothic dialect——"

"Genuine Celtic," again asseverated the knight.

"Gothic! Gothic! I'll go to death upon it!" counter-asseverated the squire.

"Why, gentlemen," said Lovel, "I conceive that is a dispute which may be easily settled by philologists, if there are any remains of the language."

"There is but one word," said the Baronet, "but, in spite of Mr. Oldbuck's pertinacity, it is decisive of the question."

"Yes, in my favor," said Oldbuck; "Mr. Lovel, you shall be judge—I have the learned Pinkerton on my side."

"I, on mine, the indefatigable and erudite Chalmers. . . ."

"Truly, gentlemen," said Lovel, "before you muster your forces and overwhelm me with authorities, I should like to know the word in dispute."

"*Benval*," said both disputants at once.

"Which signifies *caput valli*," said Sir Arthur.

"The head of the wall," echoed Oldbuck.

There was a deep pause. "It is rather a narrow foundation to build a hypothesis upon," observed the arbiter.

"Not a whit, not a whit," said Oldbuck; "men fight best in a narrow ring—an inch is as good as a mile for a home-thrust."

"It is decidedly Celtic," said the Baronet; "every hill in the Highlands begins with *Ben*."

"But what say you to *Val*, Sir Arthur; is it not decidedly the Saxon *wall?*"

"It is the Roman *vallum*," said Sir Arthur; "the Picts borrowed that part of the word."

"No such thing; if they borrowed anything, it must have been your *Ben*, which they might have from the neighboring Britons of Strath Cluyd. . . ."

Debating generally originates from conflicting opinions. "You say we are sectional!" exclaimed Lincoln in his Cooper Institute address. "We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is upon you." The common mode of procedure, in starting an action at law, is for the plaintiff to file a paper which is followed by another paper from the defendant which is called an answer; at length, argument ensues, if not upon the general issue, upon special issues arising during the course of the trial, which are successively weighed, till the final issue emerges and is weighed and the case solved.

In formal debating contests, the questions discussed do not arise from conflicting opinions actually existing among the debaters themselves; the questions are chosen by joint agreement, or by one party to the discussion, and presented to the other for the choice of sides. The two sides are called, respectively, the affirmative and the negative, the former being that side which maintains the proposition (which may be negatively stated) and the latter the side which denies the proposition. The proposition is usually stated affirmatively.

Argument is the process of resolving differences of opinion by assertion and denial, followed by proof and counter-proof with distinctions. If the opponent is present and is heard, we call the argument a debate (*debatere*—to beat off). By it we aim to influence the opinions, beliefs, or actions of others. It thus presupposes the possibility at least of an opposing view, a difference of opinion. It presupposes also a knowledge of facts, an ability to correlate them, as well as the power to present them effectively. Viewed as an art, then, argument may be regarded as applying (1) the rules of evidence such as maintain in our courts of law, (2) the rules of reasoning such as exist in common sense or have been developed in text-books on logic, and (3) the principles of literary art and oratory or public speaking, at the basis of which we now know (4) must rest a sound psychology. This forms a large and varied background, from which the debater and the writer on debating must draw his material if he is to grasp his subject fully or treat it as a whole.

What are the facts? What happened? What was done? These are the first questions which the lawyer asks of his client. They are equally important for the

student of debate. The debater should be first of all the painstaking investigator. Even if the reasoning is valid, conclusions based on unsupported assertions may be entirely unwarranted. You say that we should grant the Philippine Islands complete independence within five years because they have shown themselves to be capable of self-government. But have they? What is the evidence in the case? On whose authority does it rest? Is he qualified to speak as an authority? If so, are his statements probable on their face, uncontradicted by others who have an equal right to be heard —and so on?

The legal rules of evidence are an important guide in any procedure in debating where the attempt is to resolve such issues of fact; for they have grown up through years of custom and practice, and though sometimes deeply embedded in legal subject-matter, have as a rule come to be recognized as a safe and just mode of procedure in general. The debater should know, for instance, such things as the difference between testimony and authority, hearsay and first-hand testimony, primary and secondary evidence, and the important rules governing the production of testimony in courts of law. The law of evidence, according to Stephen, is that part of procedure which with a view to ascertaining the individual rights and liabilities in particular cases decides: (1) What facts may and may not be proved. (2) What sort of evidence must be given of a fact which may be proved, and (3) by whom and in what manner the evidence must be produced by which any fact is to be proved.[1]

The facts being established as true, what do such

[1] James F. Stephen, "A Digest of the Law of Evidence," p. 6.

facts import with reference to the substantial things in doubt? To exactly what are they relevant? What is the nature of this relevancy—causal for example? Argumentative skill and the ability to think readily on one's feet should be based on an ability to reason soundly. The debater must know the nature of the relations existing between propositions, the ground of warrant for their assertion in an argument. Apprehension, judgment, and reasoning, according to Jevons,[1] form the chief parts of logical doctrine. Certainly, a debater must be able to perceive the truth, be wise and discriminating in his judgments, scrupulous and sensible in his inferences. Now, the proposition is the formal unit of argument, whether employed as a premise or a conclusion. It is regarded in logic as divisible into two parts called terms, and the process of formulating a proposition is the process of expressing some judgment between these terms. Grammatically, a proposition consists of a subject and a predicate, while mathematically it may be defined as an equation between two terms. Of course, the discovery, analysis, and arrangement of the material so as to appeal to the understanding involve, first and foremost, reasoning processes. The main and subordinate argument, heads and subheads, in the outline of a case are step-by-step processes—links in a chain of reasoning; and in fine, as a perfect brief shows, a debate is an organic, logical structure.

Since logic treats of the laws of reasoning, the rational groundwork of the art of debate may be found in systematic shape in the science of logic. Its study therefore, if properly conducted, should mean for the de-

[1] W. Stanley Jevons, "Elementary Lessons on Logic," p. 11.

bater not only stability of foundation but a real gain in argumentative skill. Speaking of Junius, Professor Goodrich says: "His mind, in early life, had clearly been subjected to the severest logical training. Composition, with him, was the creation of a system of thought, in which everything is made subordinate to a just order and sequence of ideas. One thought grows out of another in regular succession. His reasonings often take the form of a syllogism, though usually with the omission of one of the terms; and we never find him betrayed into that careless diffusion of style so common with those who are ignorant of the principles of logic. In this respect, the writing of Junius will amply repay the closest study and analysis. Let the young orator enter completely into the scope and design of the author. Let him watch the undercurrent of his thoughts and feelings. Let him observe how perfectly everything coincides to produce the desired impression —the statement of principles and the reference to facts, the shading of thought and the colorings of imagery. Let him take one of the more striking passages and remark the dexterous preparation by which each of its several parts is so shaped that the leading thoughts come forward to the best advantage—clear in all their relations, standing boldly out, unencumbered by secondary ideas, and thus fitted to strike the mind with full and undivided force. Such a study of Junius will prepare the young reader to enter into the logic of thought. It will lead to the formation of a severe intellectual taste, which is the best guard against the dangers of hasty composition, and the still greater dangers of extemporaneous speaking. Such speaking cannot be dispensed with. On the contrary, it is becoming more

and more essential to the success of public men in every part of public life." [1]

Debating means also the expression of ideas in speech or writing, and so must be classified as a species both of oratory and of literary composition. It is well for the college debater if he seeks to acquire the technic both of the finished speaker and of the literary artist. The distinguishing characteristics of debating as a type of expression seem to lie in its argumentative and in its dialogue character. Debating, however, is not only an expression of ideas, but a presentation of them to others; it is not only an appeal from reason to reason, but from one state of consciousness to another state of consciousness. The facts being known and their relations, the question arises: "How shall I present them?" The answer is that we may view logical reasoning and judgments as concepts, and image them suggestively within the experience of the persons addressed. Suggestion is the broadest term used for the process of conveying our ideas to others. Since objects and things, to which ideas refer, cannot always be present to the senses, we are in the habit of recalling them to consciousness by suggesting an image of our idea with its understood meanings and with its natural associations. Imagination or the image-making process is therefore a process of reducing general or abstract ideas to sense-perception. It has a basis in feeling as well as in memory, and furnishes the true method of gaining interest and attention, as well as of producing conviction and belief. Anterior to the association of ideas, be it remembered, is the association of images, with children, and with artists.

[1] C. A. Goodrich, "British Eloquence," p. 153.

Psychologically, therefore, debating is the art of the associative and suggestive or inhibiting imagination. The successful arguer will seek to remove all inhibitions, of whatever sort, which tend to interfere with the acceptance by another, at their proper weight and value, of the facts and logic of his case. He will also on his own part seek to interpose objections which tend to inhibit the case presented by his opponent. Psychology, the ultimate basis of argument, is the science of mental phenomena.

The media or symbols of imagery are words (written or spoken) and gesture (including facial expression). Their suggestions are carried by the physical vibrations of light and sound.

The same principle—adaptation—which causes the eye to close when blinded by light, which makes one man succeed and another fail in the race of life, defines the good debater as the man who does the right thing at the right time—and in the right way. Arguments are not absolute, but relative in character.

Constructive Thinking.—Logical rigor is essential for the foundation and structure of an argument, but it should not be so stressed in the teaching of debating as to interfere with the use and free play of the imaginative powers nor with their growth and development.

Creative ability is more or less present in all men. Fairy-tales and child myths find their counterpart among older people in the projection of business enterprises and idealistic plans in every sphere. Assuredly, the man who debates needs to develop his analytical and discriminating powers, but he will need more. I have before me a report of a committee on prison reform containing very detailed statements numbered from

one to twelve, and giving conclusions and recommendations as to facts and conditions. The preliminary data based on a personal inspection of the prisons was of course necessary to the making of sound recommendations, but the recommendations which were made presented a new view of prison reform and in fact a new prison. Thus, the data drawn from observation and experience were combined with new ideas in the minds of the reform committee. Moreover, in presenting their report to the assembly, they will defend their findings of things as they unfortunately are in connection with their recommendation as to what they would have them to be. Is it not clear from this illustration that any theory of argumentation which makes it one only of logical analysis and logical classification is partial and inadequate? Argument depends not only on past experience but on past experience plus creative thinking applied to the work at hand. Any other theory forced upon the undeveloped student tends to dull and deaden his imaginative powers at the very time they are longing for expression. The bird that does not learn to sing when it is young rarely learns at all. Argument should be taught as *both* analytic and synthetic, destructive and constructive, and with a full appreciation of its psychological and its logical basis.

Minds, Issues, and Audiences: Two Types.—There are indeed two types of minds: the one conservative and retrospective, the other progressive and prospective. The first type is guided by authority, habit, and imitation, the second by the constructive and destructive tendencies in the changing world about us. The one obeys fixed immutable, absolute, and dogmatic principles or laws; the other, knowing that conditions

are never identical except in purely scientific experiments, recognizes first of all the facts perceived and organizes them at once into a clear conception or judgment. It is naturally this second type—and it contains geniuses and leaders of thought and action—which sees the necessity and value of the argument from sign. For they see in it as nearly as can be had an approximation to the reasoning which they constantly employ and recognize as their own.

Just as there are two types of mind, there are two types of opinion over which differences may arise, and hence, two types of issues: issues of stability and issues of change. To the first class belong the issues adjudicated in law-courts, to the second the resolutions and bills adopted by parliamentary assemblies. The issues in academic debates are the issues of parliamentary bodies —issues of change. And since the democracies of the world are almost equally divided into great liberal and conservative parties, the sharpest division which we may make of audiences is also twofold: Those who look back before going forward, and those who go forward without looking back.

Persuasion.—Persuasion may be defined as an appeal for decision through logic and the emotional reactions to imagery. Psychologically, a speaker is related to his hearers as stimulus to reaction; logically, as cause to effect. The suggested images of objects which exist in the external world may be necessary to enable others to accept our ideas. Such images, moreover, may awaken in others pleasurable or unpleasurable feelings with regard to these ideas. Experience shows that in debating it is almost impossible at times to avoid either an expression of our own feelings or an appeal of some sort

to the feelings of others. The affirmative side, for instance, will make use of the emotions of approbation; the negative, those of disapprobation. A speaker appeals to the emotions legitimately, when he does so to overcome prejudice, to prevent fatigue, or otherwise to facilitate thinking. Such appeals are at times not only so instinctive as to be inevitable, but are essential to the end in view—decision. They may create sympathy or antagonism, suspense or surprise, desire, motive, or sheer determination of the will, but they should always leave reason enthroned and be supported by justice and right.

The Debater Himself.—As to the debater himself, he should be a man of individuality, should possess constructive as well as analytical powers and, without running into the fallacies of the persuasive orator, should always be able to give a personal touch which adds so much to human interest.

No mere formal study of the elements of debate will make a debater. No body of knowledge, no rules of thinking, no principles of expression or suggestion can take the place of the indefinable power of the speaker himself. There is in every great orator, every great debater, an individuality, a creative impulse which masters formal rules so thoroughly that the mechanical process—the technic—is lost in the earnest expression of ideas and beliefs. Facts, principles, illustrations, phrases, rhythm, even processes of thought are all transmuted by the alchemical power of the great artist, who knows, who thinks, who feels, who images not after a pattern. He combines what he gets from without with that which comes from within and in so doing transforms and turns into gold—true to reality, true to himself. Originality

or genius is fed by innumerable sources, most of which are too delicate, too subtle, too varied to be easily recognized, even by the man himself, at the time. In addition to formal rules, therefore, it is believed that the growth of such a power is to be encouraged in other ways, such as by (1) familiarity and association, with the speeches and writings of the great debaters and a careful study and analysis of their productions, and (2) by frequent practice in impromptu public speaking and debate—done under such circumstances and on such occasions as will arouse and command the highest psychological interest.

Plan of the Book

In one of his greatest speeches, Lincoln once said with rare simplicity and common sense: "If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it." The larger divisions of the subject as treated in this book are: (1) logical organization; and (2) presentation.

Under the term logical organization, we will consider *first*, briefs and brief-making, or the analysis and synthesis of a particular proof in a special skeletonized form with its special features; *second*, arguments, or the important types of associative processes which form the basis of logical inference and which have been designated with special names as arguments; *third*, evidence, or facts and opinions derived from others, as used in debating in comparison and contrast with the prescribed or customary use of evidence in courts of law.

We shall then perhaps be ready to consider the final topic of presenting our ideas in an argument before an

audience, or the subject of presentation. This will be shown to involve imaginative suggestion, including, as always, the need of adaptation to ends and circumstances. It involves further the viewing of our judgments and reasons as concepts, for the purpose of bringing them within local experience for recognition, comparison, and decision. The presentation is treated in chapters on imagination in argument, suggestion in argument, and the instruments of suggestion.

PART I

LOGICAL ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER II

BRIEFS AND BRIEF-MAKING

Need of a Plan.—In our moments of appreciation of any work of art, it is perhaps natural for us to think of it more for itself than as the product of a mind that had carefully planned and a hand that had skilfully executed. And yet we know that every worthy artistic product means skill both in designing and in execution. In these respects, the art of composition closely resembles the art of architecture. Just as the architect makes his drawings and specifications in advance of the construction of a building, so too the writer of any substantial work must give careful thought to the way his material is to be put together, what purpose it is to serve, and what impression it is to make when finished. The plan of an argumentative composition when carefully worked out and with appropriate details is called a brief; but a brief must follow certain elementary rules of construction. It does not consist merely of a few "speaking notes," but should be so full in material and so exact in statement and in suggestion of method as to be intelligible and convincing to another.

The Brief Defined.—The brief of an argument is the record of the analysis, classification, and arrangement of everything of importance which is necessary to the explanation of the issues and to the process of proof. It should disclose the material to be employed as evidence; it should indicate in the clearest fashion the method of the process; and it should be in the form of a series of propositions put together according to some plan and arranged in such a sequence as to produce a single and cumulative effect. It is analogous to the plans and specifications of the architect.

The Making of a Brief.—The elements of a good brief are a valuable subject-matter, a logical method, and an artistic form. Of these the first two are controlling; for aside from mere details of exterior adornment, the form of a brief is determined largely by its material and its structure. Here, again, the brief resembles a work of architecture; for the form of a building depends of course upon the material of which it is built and its mode of design and construction. Compare, for instance, the workman's "tool shanty" with the massive stone structure standing beside it. The material which is organized into a brief should be drawn not merely from a fund of general knowledge, but should be acquired by diligent reading and study. There is a value or force of argument in the subject-matter quite apart from the way such matter is put together. It was said of Burke, that one could hardly stop with him during a thunder-shower under an awning without being impressed with the idea that he was the most learned man in England. The brief-maker should endeavor to know everything of value pertaining to his subject; he should be saturated with his material.

I. The Process

The chief steps in the process of brief-making are: (1) Analysis, constructive and destructive; (2) Classification; (3) Arrangement.

1. **Analysis.**—The first step in brief-making is analysis, by which is meant the separation of everything pertaining to the subject into its component parts and isolating them for the purpose of studying (1) their truth and (2) their relations.

The unit of the brief is the proposition. It is not meant by this that a proposition is indivisible, for it can be separated into its terms; but rather that it is the necessary unit of any formal course of reasoning, as a premise or a conclusion. We cannot argue, for instance, from or to the single idea or term, war, but we may, however, argue from the proposition that war is an evil to the conclusion that, let us say, war should be abolished.

The first consideration then in the making of a brief on any subject is:

A complete analysis of the subject itself, involving:

A. An analysis of all the propositions necessary to sustain the side of the case which the brief-maker is attempting to establish.

B. A complete analysis of all the propositions which an opponent is obliged to establish in order to sustain his side of the case.

Just as it is necessary, in order to understand the complete workings of any mechanism, to take apart and examine its parts separately, so it is necessary to any

general mental conception of a subject to separate this conception into all the various steps of reasoning by which such mental conception is reached as a conclusion.

If you are obliged to establish either the affirmative or negative of any proposition, this analysis is necessary, in order that you may, *first*, ascertain the strength or weakness of the various propositions necessary in order to establish the conclusion which you are bound to prove; and *second*, see the proper relation which each proposition bears to the conclusion that you are bound to sustain and thus be in a position, when you reach the constructive part of the argument, to arrange the same in such relation with ease.

After you have thoroughly tested by analysis the strength of your own case, the same analytical test should be applied to your opponent's case, for the same reasons and this additional one: it is only by analysis that any latent defect in an opponent's structure can be determined; and such analysis, before proceeding with the brief, will make the brief-maker's work in this regard simply a matter of establishing the authority or evidence which proves the inherent defect, or in the event that such inherent defect is a *non sequitur*, or is otherwise illogically supported, then the brief-maker's constructive work will be merely a matter of exposing the fallacy discovered.

After this introductory work, the brief-maker is prepared to construct his brief, and his work is usually constructive or destructive.

2. **Classification.**—A second consideration in the making of a brief is classification, involving: (1) The classification of the propositions to be presented in sus-

taining the side of the case which the brief-maker is attempting to establish; (2) the classification of the propositions which an opponent is obliged to establish in order to sustain his side of the case.

Instead of writing down a short list of unassorted reasons or ill-digested bits of evidence, the brief-maker should attempt to synthetize his material, to reduce it to principles, to classify it; and so put it into the form of a few main headings or points, easy to understand and to remember, and which will give a view of his case as a whole. These main divisions, of course, must be so chosen that when properly supported they will form a proof of the case.

If an opponent's case is to be understood and answered most effectively it is equally necessary that the propositions essential to an *opponent's* case should be made clear and simple through this same process of classification.

After the main headings are formed, the brief should be filled in; that is, the other propositions studied as supporting reasons, should be put in a logical sequence, classified, when possible, and inserted in the brief in their proper places and series as subheadings.

ILLUSTRATION A

BODY OF PROOF

The removal of troops is necessary, because:

I. It will show the willingness of the English to treat amicably.

II. The resistance of the Americans was necessary.

III. The means of enforcing the measures of Parliament have failed.

IV. If Parliament tries by the aid of the army to enforce its measures the result will be bad.

V. The statement that "the union in America cannot last" is untrue.

VI. The statement that the Americans should be punished for illegal violence is untrue.

VII. This removal of the troops must precede any other step.

VIII. The views of Congress are moderate and reasonable.

IX. It is an old maxim that the first concession comes most freely from the superior.

X. While every policy urges withdrawal of the troops every danger warns the English from keeping to the old course.

In this illustration, it is apparent (1) that the points are too numerous. The mind cannot readily carry as many as ten reasons for accepting a conclusion. This is so, even where the sequences are obvious. But here, again (2), the sequences are not obvious. The mind is carried forward by *uneven* steps, with a resulting jolt to the attention. For instance, while the first reason offered to prove the need of removing the troops asserts clearly that "it will show the willingness of the English to treat amicably," the second asserting that "the resistance of the Americans was necessary" does not seem to come naturally after the first, and does not appear to be a reason at all for the necessity of removing the troops. To put it in another way, the two propositions do not belong in the same logical series. Any plan which is to form the synthesis of the materials into a logical proof must not be a mere enumeration or catalogue of points. The main points must be stated in an easy sequence, and so classified as to be few in number and easily comprehended.

ILLUSTRATION B

BODY OF PROOF

The measure proposing the immediate withdrawal of troops should be adopted, for:

I. Measures preparatory to peace and prosperity should be adopted.

II. This measure is preparatory to peace and prosperity, for:

A. This measure will be conciliatory, for:

1. It will show our willingness to treat amicably.

B. Only conciliatory measures are preparatory to peace and prosperity, for:

1. All other plans will fail, for:

a. Force is unwise.

b. Inaction will avail nothing.

c. Coercion is unwarranted.

2. The remaining plan, conciliation, will succeed if we withdraw the troops as a first step.

From illustration B it is apparent that classification involves two steps—co-ordination and subordination. For instance, since the main points of a brief are in a logical sequence, they should appear in the brief as co-ordinate. Then, for the next, or lower, order each main proposition should be supported by a minor proposition or sequence of propositions immediately subordinate to it. If there is a series of such minor propositions immediately subordinate to a main proposition, all such propositions should be co-ordinated in the brief. They must be classified as subordinate to the main proposition immediately above it and placed in sequence. This double process of co-ordination and subordination is continued in the other orders until the proof is complete. In this view, a brief is a regular series of parallel

and descending propositions by which the mind may, by natural and even stages, reach the main conclusion.

Illustration B is, of course, not an illustration of a complete proof of the case, but rather of a mode of classification through co-ordination and subordination. It will be noted, too, that the method of classification here employed for the headings I, II, and *A* and *B* consists (1) in laying down a general principle; (2) in making a particular statement which is included within the general principle.

There are various ways of classifying. The experienced debater is quick to perceive that his arguments, however diversified or complicated they may seem, are reducible to a few simple headings or categories, which may be stated in the form of a proposition. Some of the simple and most common methods may be indicated:

The plan proposed should be adopted, because:

1. It is necessary.
2. It is desirable.

1. It is sound in theory.
2. It will work well in practice.

1. It is sanctioned by authority.
2. It is sanctioned by reason.

It is demanded for (1) political reasons.
(2) social reasons.
(3) economic reasons.

Its effect will be good upon (1) the state.
(2) the nation.

1. There is need of a remedy for existing evils.
2. The plan proposed will remedy existing evils.
3. The plan proposed will remedy existing evils better than any other plan.

Such illustrations may be extended almost indefinitely. Those given are merely suggestive.

3. **Arrangement.**—A third consideration in the making of a brief is an arrangement for climax.

The grouping of the main divisions of a proof should be made not only in accord with some central idea, but these divisions should be arranged in such an order that there will be a growth of thought, an onward movement.

The most common or typical arrangement is that in which the main parts rise or grow successively in importance or force. There are variations from the type; but in all cases a composition should gain an increasing hold on the attention and interest of the audience. Indeed, there must be in the mind of the brief-maker, from the beginning and throughout, some general plan or mode of procedure so conceived and developed as to secure for the composition as a whole the highest cumulative effectiveness. Likewise it is desirable that whenever possible the subheadings should, also, be arranged in the order of climax.

We cannot reason without either progress or unity. We get nowhere, for instance, by repeating the sentence: "All men are mortal." If, however, after declaring that all men are mortal, we add simply that Mr. Jones is a man, we have taken a step forward which allows us to conclude that, therefore, Mr. Jones is mortal. We have done this, moreover, through the central or unifying idea that Mr. Jones is a man, that is, belongs to the class, man, known to be mortal. Further, where there

is a series of such arguments, and—as is usually the case—an option as to the order of arrangement, the brief-maker will invariably choose the order of climax as sanctioned by experience and by common sense. Take, for example, the *First Letter* in which Junius attacked the King and his ministry. When he was attempting to prove that "the true cause of our misfortunes lies in the distribution of the departments of state," there was no inevitable order, from a logical standpoint, in which all the heads of the departments must be taken up. Junius chose an order of climax. He began with the Duke of Grafton, first lord of the treasury, and Lord North, chancellor of the exchequer; then he took up, in turn, Hillsborough of the foreign department, Weymouth of the home department, Granby of the army, Hawke of the navy, and finally the powerful and able Lord Mansfield, head of the department of justice.

Without interfering with the logic of the case, the use of climax is grounded in sound principles of psychology which lie at the basis of art. Practically, this means that a climactic order is calculated to reach after the waning attention and interest of the reader or hearer at the time when he is becoming inattentive or disinterested, through fatigue.

II. The Result

The marks of a good brief, and therefore the ends to be striven for by the brief-maker, are: (1) Unity, (2) Logical sequence, (3) Proportion.

These principles are not only logical but æsthetic in their nature. They underlie, slightly modified (unity, continuity, proportion), the technic of such arts, for example, as architecture, sculpture, and painting. In

the text-books on English composition they are generally treated as the most important principles which can be laid down for writing "whole compositions," not only because they are regarded as essential marks of a good structure, but because when properly applied, they afford a certain literary delight. Thus, a finished argumentative composition, whose chief aim is conviction, may through skill in design and workmanship appeal also to the æsthetic sense.

1. **Unity.**—The first principle determining the form of the brief is unity. One dominant idea or related group of ideas will guide, direct, and centralize the attention of the mind and hold the interest. Such a structure strikes the mind with single, undivided, force. Every part adds to and helps to complete the whole. In his own mind the brief-maker has taken the machine apart by the analytical process which he has practised before starting work. By the machine I mean the material to be employed in the proof. This material has been not only separated into propositions but in some way grouped or classified. Now all these parts must be properly united; nothing must be left out. And when the structure is complete, it stands out as one complete whole, each integer present in the unit.

2. **Logical Sequence.**—The second principle determining the form of the brief is logical sequence. Often there are various ways in which the machine may be constructed so that it will work; hence, the best arrangement of the parts must be found. The value of a logical arrangement is that it is a step-by-step process in which each rung of the ladder appears in its proper place, making it possible for a reader to climb regularly and methodically to the top—the conclusion. This

logical sequence tends to make for clearness; it also makes the conclusion and the processes more easily retained in the memory. But particularly for the reader of a brief, it obviates the necessity of retracing one's steps and reading over again, several pages back, propositions which, if they had been placed in their proper order, would have been easily understood and retained.

3. **Proportion.**—The third principle governing form is proportion. This principle requires that space in the brief shall be allotted according to the needs of the proof. It necessitates cutting out and filling in; and requires careful attention and good judgment.

The object of a brief is to convince, and conviction is attained by a step-by-step process from one proposition to another. Now some of these steps require considerable support by the brief-maker before he can make it seem to another safe to stand upon them. Others require very little support for that purpose, and still others are axiomatic and require none.

A brief which does not give to each step its proper amount of support and no more, is necessarily out of proportion. Too much elucidation and proof of simple propositions is apt to tire the reader who has to climb the ladder, and might result, and often does in court cases, in a refusal to take the other steps and a return to the ground.

Too little elucidation leaves too much to the reasoning process of the reader; and in case his mental equipment or general knowledge is inadequate, he may regard his footing as unsafe, and refuse to proceed further.

What has been said in regard to the steps necessary to reach any conclusion is equally true when there are

several points to be established, when there are several ladders to climb. Frequently there are one or more ladders which it is much more important that the reader should climb than all the others which have been offered to him. A brief which gives more space and time to the unimportant than to these one or two important ladders is of course out of proportion. The most important propositions are apt to be those supported by arguments of greatest difficulty or complexity, of greatest force, or of greatest cogency.

In conclusion, it may be said that while much depends upon analysis, classification, arrangement, unity, sequence, and proportion, the fact must never be lost sight of that no finished brief-maker will stop there. The finesse of the art, of which all these things are the solid structure, is in making the brief so thoroughly readable, so happy in its selection of words and phrases, so clear in its expression, that it is a pleasure to read it, that it entertains while it elucidates, that it delights while it convinces, for the human element in all readers is such that intellectual delight will make the road to conviction much easier. A brief will be much more thoroughly read if it delights and entertains while it elucidates and convinces.

III. Process and Result

Unity.—The most important principle of structure is unity. This is true both from the standpoint of the process and the result. With a single exception, all the ideas hitherto mentioned as involved in brief-making (analysis, classification, logical sequence, and propor-

tion) are contributory to unity and the means of obtaining it. If, then, we inquire how unity is to be obtained, the answer is:

1. By the separating and combining process of analysis and classification, so that the various logical sequences, horizontal and perpendicular, lead the mind inevitably to one thing—the conclusion—no logical breaks, no disproportion; and

2. By an expression in language which adequately records the above unified mental conceptions. In argument or debate unity of thought fails without unity of expression.

a. It is perhaps a truism to say that all such conceptions should be expressed with clearness and precision. It is not, however, a truism but a truth to say that the brief-maker may use such apt and striking forms of expressions that they will easily arrest the attention and *stick* in the memory. Indeed a sharp, terse, and sometimes an antithetical statement will often so arrest the attention that it will remain in the memory long after the body of the proof has been forgotten.

b. But these conceptions must be expressed in language which will not only reveal themselves but which will also disclose their relations to other propositions; for, in a brief no proposition stands alone, each is related to another and to the whole. And always to show the relationships involved requires good workmanship. Indeed, where a number of conceptions are to be stated as in a brief, and stated of course successively, he is really an artist in language who can relate them all so aptly and in such a manner as to impress the reader with an idea of the whole. "Clear thinking," valuable

as it is, does not necessarily mean clear writing; for, good writing requires the work both of a good architect and a good carpenter.

There are a few formal rules of rhetoric, which are supposed to afford some help in giving expression to conceptions, which in the mind are properly classified, and stand in their proper sequence. They are:

(1) Parallel structure, or phrasing every one of a series of conceptions in any sequence in a similar form of language; (2) emphasizing the relation between propositions by *back references*, involving *repetitions* of phrases or ideas, the use of *this*, *that*, *these*, *those*, *the former*, *the latter*, *such a*, etc., (3) and joining propositions by the use of conjunctions—*because*, *for*, *since*, *but*, *moreover*, *and beside*, etc.

For an application of these rules the student is referred to the specimen brief on the *First Junius Letter* and the other briefs in this volume. He may, however, for himself apply them by taking, let us say, the six capital causes for the colonists' love of liberty in Burke's speech on conciliation, formulating the six causes enumerated, in carefully phrased propositions.

The following extract from Matthew Arnold's essay on "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time" will illustrate a dexterous use of these devices. A little study of the italicized words will show by what means the main proposition is here made to appear so closely related both to its supporting propositions in this paragraph and to the main proposition of the essay.

It is of the last importance that English *criticism* should clearly discern what rule for its course, in order to avail itself of the field now opening to it, and to produce fruit for the future, it ought to take. The rule may be summed up in one word—

disinterestedness. (1) And how is criticism to show *disinterestedness? By* keeping aloof from what is called "the practical view" of things; *by* resolutely following the law of its own nature, which is to be a *free play of the mind* on all subjects which it touches. *By* steadily refusing to lend itself to any of *those* ulterior, political, *practical* considerations about ideas, which plenty of people will be sure to attach to them, which perhaps ought often to be attached to them, which in this country at any rate are certain to be attached to them quite sufficiently, but which *criticism* has really nothing to do with. *Its business is, as I have said, simply to know the best that is known and thought in the world,* and by in its turn making this known, to create *a current of true and fresh ideas. Its business* is to do this with inflexible honesty, with due ability; but *its business* is to do no more, and to leave alone all questions of practical consequences and applications, questions which will never fail to have due prominence given to them. *Else criticism,* besides being really false to its own nature, merely continues in the old rut which it has hitherto followed in this country, and will certainly miss the chance now given to it. (2) For what is at present the bane of *criticism* in this country? It is that *practical* considerations cling to it and stifle it. It subserves interests not its own. *Our organs of criticism* are organs of men and parties having *practical* ends to serve, and with them those *practical* ends are the *first* thing and *the play of mind* the second; so much play of mind as is compatible with the prosecution of those *practical* ends is all that is wanted. *An organ* like the *Revue des Deux Mondes,* having for its main function to understand and utter *the best that is known and thought in the world,* existing, it may be said, as just *an organ,* for a *free play of the mind,* we have not. *But* we have the *Edinburgh Review,* existing as *an organ* of the old Whigs. . . . No *other criticism* will ever attain any real authority or make any real way toward its end—the creating *a current of true and fresh ideas.*

Climax.—It has been said that all the ideas previously mentioned as involved in brief-making (analysis, classification, logical sequence, and proportion), with a solitary exception, contribute to unity and are the means

of obtaining it. This exception is arrangement in the order of climax.

The term climax means either one of two things: (1) A mode of arrangement in which the parts grow or rise successively in importance or force, or (2) the final or last part of such an arrangement. It is either a ladder in which the rungs are strengthened as we ascend, or the top rung of such a ladder.

In making a brief, it is frequently not the sole desideratum that the propositions should be arranged in a logical sequence. There may be several modes of arrangement all of which are strictly logical, so that the brief-maker may have offered to him a choice of arrangements. He will then doubtless select the arrangement which he believes will be most effective.

Climax seems to be a perfectly natural process. Even in driving a nail, the last stroke is often the hardest. And as an informal discussion proceeds, it is apt to grow in warmth. Climax is an attempt either to overcome any possible lack of interest or fatigue as a discourse proceeds, or to make the final impression the strongest. Climax is generally recognized and employed in fiction, in the drama, and in the sonnet as well as in public speaking and debate.

Two Laws of Structure.—If unity consists in directing all parts naturally toward one thing—the conclusion—climax is a progressive unity. It looks not only toward a single but a cumulative effect. The process presupposes unity, presupposes progress. Indeed, Coleridge long ago expressed clearly the principles underlying the expression of thought in composition, when he said that the essential marks of method are "unity with a progression." Thus, it would appear that the

fundamental *Laws of Structure are two: Unity and Climax.*

IV. Rules for Brief-Making

The Three Main Parts of a Brief.—The propositions of a brief fall into three separate divisions; *first*, those which explain the issue; *second*, those which present evidence in proof of the issue; and *third*, those which sum up. The first set of propositions would constitute an Introduction, the second set a Body of Proof, and the third a Conclusion. These, then, make three main parts for a brief.

I. *The Introduction.*—The process employed in the introduction is entirely different from that used in the body of proof. The one is exposition; the other is argument. Its function is to explain whatever is necessary to an understanding of the issues. It must contain no matter of a disputable character. Given a question (carefully formulated), the problem is to lead the mind by natural sequence, through steps carefully marked, to a full understanding of the specific point or points in dispute. The great aim should be impartiality of attitude, clearness of expression, and orderliness of structure.

In the academic debates upon questions of public policy, the steps usually employed may be briefly indicated. *First*, the situation, including the origin of the question, is explained. *Second*, since any ambiguity in, or ignorance of, the exact meaning of an essential term may result in confusion, the next step is to define or expound all such terms. And *third*, since the discussion of apparently related and of admitted propositions would obscure the issue, it is necessary to eliminate

them. And finally, as a consequence of these three steps, the specific issue, or issues, may be stated in exact form. The introduction, then, consists of:

I. The situation, involving the origin of the question.

II. Definition of words, or exposition of phrases, contained in the statement of the question or to be employed in the discussion.

III. The elimination.
A. Of admitted propositions.
B. Of extraneous propositions.

IV. The formal statement of the specific issue, or issues.

II. *The Body or Brief Proper.*—The function of the body of a brief is to set forth formally for the inspection of another all the means and processes employed as the proof or compelling reason for accepting the main conclusion. It consists of the propositions to be proved and the subject-matter of their proof, each proposition stated in the form of reasons, and all the propositions so carefully correlated as readily to disclose the nature, relevancy, and force of each part of the proof, and the proof as a whole.

Rule I. The headings should be in the form of a declarative statement or proposition; not mere topics.

Rule II. The headings should read as reasons; the correct order being first, proposition; then, proof, and the correct connectives being *because*, *for*, *since*, etc.

Rule III. The headings should be carefully correlated and marked in order by appropriate symbols: I, II, III, etc.; *A*, *B*, *C*, etc.; 1, 2, 3, etc.; *a*, *b*, *c*, etc.; (1), (2), (3), etc.

Rule IV. The main headings should be statements,

carefully phrased to include the proof to follow; and they should be few in number.

Rule V. Each main heading should be elaborated or developed by subordinate headings until its truth is made apparent.

Rule VI. Refutation, if used at length, should be indicated by marking the proposition to which it applies with the word "Refutation," or it may appear in the brief in its proper place stated as the negative of the proposition to be refuted.

III. *The Conclusion.*—The function of the conclusion is to sum up. It consists usually of a restatement of the propositions used as main headings in the body of the proof.

It is sometimes possible, however, to vary the recapitulation from such an obvious process. As, for example, by drawing some inference from the main headings in combination; making some effective application of them; comparing them for the purpose of emphasizing one in particular as most important, or decisive in turning the scale; or illustrating them in relation to some underlying principle or course of reasoning. However varied the method, the purpose of the conclusion is always that of a summary.

SPECIMEN BRIEF

ON THE REMOVAL OF TROOPS[1]

Introduction

I. The Ministry have at length after long delay condescended to submit to this House news from America.

II. The present alarming state of America is due to the misadvice of the Ministry, for

A. It is based on misrepresentation.

[1] Drawn from Lord Chatham's address delivered in the House of Lords, January 20, 1775.

III. To rescue my unhappy country and his Majesty from the misadvice of his ministers I submit to him through this House "An address to his Majesty for the immediate removal of the troops from Boston."

IV. The crisis is so pressing and urgent as to admit of no delay.

V. My contention is not for indulgence but justice, for

A. I admit that obedience is properly due from America—an obedience limited, however, to our laws of trade and navigation, but

B. I contend that the property of the Americans must remain sacred—that is, taxable by their own consent given in their provincial assemblies.

VI. The specific issue is the restoration of peace and prosperity by the adoption of this measure proposing the immediate withdrawal of troops from Boston.

Argument

The measure proposing the immediate withdrawal of the troops from Boston should be adopted, because

I. Just measures preparatory to peace and prosperity should be adopted.

II. This just measure is preparatory to peace and prosperity, for

A. This measure, if adopted, will be conciliatory, for

1. It will show our willingness to treat amicably and equitably.

B. Conciliatory measures are preparatory to peace and prosperity, for

1. It is necessary to show our willingness to treat amicably and equitably, for

a. Your own declarations and doctrines have made American resistance necessary and will in future be as ineffective.

2. All other plans will fail, for

a. Force is unwise, for

(1). The army is held in contempt, and

(2). General Gage must not act.

(*a*). The first drop of blood means civil war.

(3). If reconciliation is attempted, it must be done immediately.

(4). If Parliament tries to enforce its measures by means of the army, the results will be bad, for

(*a*). If they were victorious, it would be over an embittered people, but

(*b*). The troops are not strong enough to resist the people, because of

Their numbers, their unity and courage, and their descent from people who left their native land to escape tyranny.

(5). It must fail, for it is an unjust persecution.

b. Inaction on the part of England will avail us nothing, for

(1). The assertion that the union in America cannot last is false, for

(*a*). The evidence of the so-called "commercial bodies" is unreliable, for

(*b*). They are not representative, and

(*c*). They are paid agents of the government.

(2). Even the evidence of the real commercial class would be untrustworthy, for

(*a*). The farming class represents the real strength of the country, and

(*b*). The American farmers are united for liberty, for

The testimony of Dr. Franklin upholds it.

c. Coercion is unwarranted, for

(1). Even if illegal violences have been committed in America, a policy of coercion should not be followed, for

(*a*). An opportunity for reconciliation should not be missed.

(*b*). A whole people should not be punished for the faults of a few.

(*c*). Such severity will arouse the unappeasable wrath of all the Colonies.

(*d*). Even if the army is victorious, it cannot control the great tracts of conquered country.

(*e*). Resistance to such measures ought to have been foreseen.

It is the animating principle of all men of English stock to resist taxation without the consent of the taxed.

(*f*). This resistance will become too strong to be overcome, for

The English Whigs will aid them, since the spirit that moves the Americans has always belonged to them.

The Irish will aid them, for they have always maintained the ideas the Americans support.

(*g*). England has a right only to regulate the commerce and navigation of the Americans, for

Their property is private, individual, and absolute.

(*h*). The means to oppose this united body is weak, for

A few regiments in America and 18,000 men at home must oppose 3,000,000 Americans, millions of Englishmen, and all the Irish, and

The tricks of the Ministry against it must fail.

3. The remaining plan, conciliation, will succeed if we withdraw the troops from Boston as a first step, for

a. It is the main cause of the fear and the resentment of the Americans, for

(1). While the troops remain, resentment will remain.

b. Even if the Colonies should concede, her concessions would be suspicious and unsecure, for

(1). They would be the dictates of fear and extortions of force.

c. Servitude cannot be imposed upon such men as compose the American Congress at Philadelphia, for

(1). They have shown solidity of reasoning, force of sagacity, and wisdom of conclusion, under such a complication of difficult circumstances.

d. Concession should come from England first, for
(1). Concession from a superior power reconciles the feelings of men and establishes confidence in it.

Conclusion

I. Every motive, therefore, of justice and of policy, of dignity and of prudence, urges the removal of the troops from Boston, the repeal of the acts of Parliament, and a demonstration of amicable dispositions toward the Colonies.
A. Disturbances in America may mean foreign war, for
1. France and Spain are watching for an advantageous chance to interfere.
B. And it also may mean domestic trouble, for
1. The king will alienate the affections of his subjects and will lose his power.
2. The nation will be utterly undone.

CHAPTER III

ARGUMENT

The View-Point.—Argument, it has been said, is a process of resolving differences of opinion by means of assertion and denial, followed by proof and counter-proof or distinctions. In one aspect, this process consists simply in suggesting to another the relations which exist between two or more ideas or judgments so as to enable him to form a correct opinion concerning some particular matter of uncertainty or disagreement.

On the basis of the kind of relations thus employed, arguments may be divided into four classes, as follows:

1. Arguments involving the relation of simple association.

2. Arguments involving the relation of resemblance or contrast.

3. Arguments involving the relation of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, or motive and deed.

4. Arguments involving the relation of particular and general.

Though arguments are thus easily classified into four definite groups, it is not to be supposed that these groups are commonly exclusive. For all arguments, in their final analysis and when carried to completion, will involve an inference from the complex relations of association, resemblance or contrast, particular and general, and cause and effect.

For example, if we should conclude, because of the

issuance of smoke from a chimney, that there was a fire below, we should find on analysis that our reasoning, when fully developed, might easily involve these fourfold relations:

1. Smoke means fire—(association).
2. In other cases where I have found smoke I have found fire—(resemblance).
3. Smoke is an effect produced only by fire—(cause and effect).
4. Where there is smoke there is fire—(particular and general).

The conclusion that there is fire, here drawn from the presence of smoke, involves fundamentally an inference grounded in all four of the relations mentioned. Similarly, an argument based first on the resemblance between two parallel cases may be shown to involve the relation of particular and general, and also of cause and effect. Moreover, all inductive reasoning (that is, from particular to general) involves finally a search for a cause.

While it is ideally true that every argument may involve all these relations, it does not follow that every argument must always set them forth. In practice, arguments may not be developed sufficiently to suggest all the relations involved, for two reasons:

1. Because it is sometimes impossible from a sheer inadequacy of knowledge.

2. Because it is not necessary or desirable for the accomplishment of the object in view.

The reasoner or investigator will sometimes associate things together—the causes of which and the principles underlying which he does not know—and still feel justi-

fied in drawing conclusions from the slight relationship he does recognize. Otherwise he could not go forward, and the problem would be at a standstill. As instinct or feeling precedes positive proof, so a very slight reason may point the way to truth and belief. This is so not merely in ordinary affairs, but even in science, as, for instance, in the following conclusion in the field of zoology:

> The presence of occipital condyles is uniformly associated with the presence of mammal and of warm red blood, and this general fact is treated as a quasi-induction. Hence when the remains of a new animal are discovered, exhibiting such condyles, the zoologist infers, by deduction, that the animal belonged to the class mammalia.

Moreover, it is not usually necessary or desirable to develop an argument any further than is needed to secure its acceptance and belief. To set forth, in every argument employed, the several kinds of relationships involved, would certainly mean an elucidation of the obvious, an attempted proof of much that is admitted, would be a waste of time. A mere suggestion of a relation easily recognized is frequently sufficient, as for instance, that the leaden clouds indicate rain or snow, that the thick ice means cold weather, that the rainbow denotes the end of the storm. Conclusions are constantly accepted without opposition with no development of the reasoning on which they are grounded.

Of course, we reason habitually, in the ordinary affairs of life from premises to conclusions, without any conscious appreciation of the nature of the relation involved. Thus, in shooting at a target in a lake, we might infer that the target was struck because it sank, with-

out troubling ourselves to consider that we were reasoning from an effect to its cause; we might buy a horse without consciously realizing that we were applying our ideas of a good horse, such ideas being derived from past experience; we might attribute a painting to a certain artist almost intuitively without thinking of the painting like it we had seen by the same artist; or startled by a sudden noise we might conclude that a gun had been fired, oblivious of the idea of association in the process employed.

But the debater and student of argument must be able to analyze and test the nature of the relations involved, must become conscious of the processes employed in argument, whether such processes are expressed or implied.

The name ordinarily given to any argument is usually derived from the kind of relation first recognized between the phenomenon, circumstance, or principle first observed and the conclusion drawn. If the relation is that of simple association, it may be called argument from sign; if that of resemblance, argument from example or analogy; if that of particular to general, induction, and if general to particular, deduction; if cause to effect or effect to cause, causal relation.

The effectiveness of any argument will depend upon the recognition and acceptance, by another, of the truth of the relations between the conceptions or judgments presented. On this basis of effectiveness or force, arguments may be further classified as (1) probable or moral, and (2) certain or demonstrative.

Unity of Classification.—Arguments have been classified in rhetoric, as *antecedent probability, sign,* and *example;* and in logic, as *induction* and *deduction.* The

following treatment of the classes of argument removes these distinctions and brings all classes of argument under a single principle of unity.

Classes of Argument

I. Association—Argument from Sign

If the relation from which the conclusion is drawn is regarded as one of simple association, the argument may be called argument from sign.

Reasoning from sign is the simplest and earliest manifestation of mental activity. It appears not only in children, but in the childhood of the race.

Motion signs—nods, becks, gestures—and auditory signs—calls, whistles, etc.—are given a definite meaning almost instinctively, a meaning whose certainty is strengthened by experience. Even animals manifest the ability to act upon sign suggestions or reasoning. Olfactory images acting on the brain of the dog through many generations have developed a remarkable facility in the use of signs conveyed through this sense. An excellent example of animal intelligence is provided in the case of Clever Hans, the trained horse which so long deceived psychologists: This horse had been trained by the owner to "count and calculate so it could retain in mind, and when questioned indicate its own age, the age of its master, and many other numbers. The explanation of the horse's apparent mental feats, which a few years ago created considerable psychologic interest in Berlin, is due to the psychologist Stumpf and his pupil Pfungst. Both these gentlemen showed that Clever Hans, whenever making a calculation, kept close watch on the expressional movements of the interrogator,

especially toward the end. If, for instance, the horse were asked to give the product of five times seven, it scraped a hoof on the ground repeatedly until a slight movement of the head or even a minimal twist of the eye gave the animal the signal to cease pawing. As soon as the horse's eyes were covered with blinders, or it was prevented in some other way from watching the questioner, its remarkable mathematical ability was absent. Moreover, the expressional movements of Von Osten Sacken or of any other examiner were not premeditated or intentional, as tricks designed to deceive the public, but they occurred entirely involuntarily when the animal reached the figure which represented the answer to the question."[1]

All human communication by means of language involves sign reasoning.

Words . . . have no character in themselves. They are merely conventional signs, and consequently they can be good or bad, dignified or vulgar, only in accordance with the ideas they conventionally denote or suggest in the mind of the speaker and his hearers. Yet under this head of suggestions comes in an important consideration, which accounts for a great deal that would otherwise be inexplicable. Most words from their use acquire general connotations or associations, which almost seem to give them a character of their own.

Thus the word fist means simply "the hand with the fingers doubled up against the palm." In the idiomatic comparison "as big as your fist," it is purely descriptive, and has no particular character, good or bad. The use of the fist in fighting, however, has given a peculiar connotation to the term. We may say, "He hit his opponent with his clinched fist," for here again fist is purely descriptive, and occurs in an appropriate environment. Similarly, we may say, "The boy cried dismally, wiping his eyes with his dingy fist," for here there is a certain grotesque-

[1] "Suggestion and Psychotherapy," by George W. Jacoby.

ness in the scene which justifies the use of undignified language. But we can no longer say, as was formerly possible, "The lady held a lily in her delicate fist." In other words, the associations of fist are either pugnacious, vulgar, or jocose.

These suggestive associations are partly general and partly individual. If certain phrases are habitually associated in our minds with low or disagreeable persons or things, they will inevitably be relegated to the category of unseemly terms, and, on the other hand, phrases that are associated with dignified and reputable persons or circumstances, will acquire a kind of respectability independent of the exact meaning which they convey.

The associations in question may be purely personal. Everybody remembers certain words which he dislikes intensely, though they are in common use, convey no bad or disagreeable meaning, and are quite euphonious. We may even remember our reason for such dislikes. Perhaps the word is associated with an unpleasant experience; more likely, however, our antipathy is due to its habitual use by some one we do not fancy. Or we may have been bored by hearing the word overused, so that every new repetition gives us a feeling of satiety.

It is largely these indefinite connotations of words that make it so difficult to speak a foreign tongue. We may be well trained in grammar and command a large vocabulary, and yet use words which, though they express our meaning accurately enough, suggest ridiculous or inopportune associations to a native. "Baboo English" is proverbial. The awkward and equivocal remarks into which one frequently blunders in speaking one's own language, "the things one would rather have left unsaid," depend on a momentary forgetfulness of some more or less obscure connotation which the words that we are using may bear.[1]

Sign Argument Expounded.—Sign argument has been regarded as confined to reasoning "from an effect to a condition" of that effect, as, *e. g.*, ice is a sign of

[1] "Words and Their Ways in English Speech," by James B. Greenough and George Lyman Kittredge.

cold weather. It has also been regarded as having its basis in a partial resemblance; that is, in a resemblance in *one* respect to something in past experience. But since the whole process of thinking is inherently a process of association, the term argument from sign is commonly used to denote reasoning based on any principle of association. It is immaterial whether the process is from fact to principle or from principle to fact; from one case to another case like it; from effect to condition, from effect to cause, from one effect to another effect of the same cause; or even from cause to effect. One thing is connected with another; where one is the other is. Such are arguments from sign. As we analyze and develop them, however, we are apt to call them by the name of the specific relation employed. Thus an argument based on indications that a thing happened or was so elsewhere or in other cases may later be called example, and one based on indications showing why it may be expected to happen or is likely to be true may later be recognized as antecedent probability and so called.

After all, the name is less important than that we should use the processes correctly, and that we should recognize the fact that the full course of the processes of sign will show that a proposition is true because (1) of signs bearing upon it directly; because (2) of signs showing its truth in other cases, and because (3) of signs telling why it is likely to be true.

For example, there are indications that the public ownership and operation of telegraph-lines will result in lower rates. As shown by testimonies in the management of the telegraph system; by testimonies illustrating lower rates in publicly owned lighting plants

as compared with those privately owned; and by statements tending to show that the absence of the need for profit is likely to produce lower rates. Of course, there may be signs in the form of testimonies pointing to the reverse conclusion, testimonies showing, for instance, that the telegraph management is efficient; that in publicly owned railroads the rates have not been lowered; and that the loss of initiative and energy in publicly owned works may explain the reason why lower rates will not follow. There are usually signs on both sides.

The *force* of sign arguments will vary from slight probability to a definiteness amounting to certainty.

Frequently the mere suggestions of an easily recognized association may secure its acceptance and belief, as, *e. g.*, a flag at half-mast means the death of a prominent person; the ringing of the college bell at a certain hour is a call to chapel; geese flying southward in the autumn is an indication of cold weather; and so on. There is a distinct force as an impression in the suggestions of an accumulated number of instances pointing in a certain direction. This is greatest when there is a uniform experience behind it or when the spirit or emotional tone of the argument accords with the feeling of the audience. "Trifles light as air are to the jealous confirmation strong as proofs of Holy Writ."

Carefully stated probable conclusions based on a series of signs are made by scientists and scholars in every field of investigation or research. Internal documentary evidence is usually regarded as supplying inferences from sign. While such inferences do not often clearly establish a cause, the resemblances noted may warrant a conclusion of value. For example, it is only in this way that we can assign probable dates to some

of Shakespeare's plays. After noting, at length, points of resemblance in the Old English story Beowulf and in the Grettis Saga, Stopford A. Brooke states his conclusion as follows:

> The parallel is very close, and three suggestions may be made concerning it. Either the Beowulf Saga was known over Sweden and Norway, and its lays came from Norway or the Western Isles to Iceland with the first settlers; or some of the roving Icelanders had heard of the tale in England, and brought it back to Iceland in a broken fashion; or there was a tale older than Beowulf itself—a combination of a nature-myth and a folk-tale—which was common property of the Northmen, and out of which the Grendel story in Beowulf, and the Glam and Troll story both grew independently of each other.[1]

While it is true that the greater the number of signs noted, the greater the force, complete identity is rarely possible. Indeed few arguments from sign are conclusive, unless they establish a cause—as, *e. g.*, smoke is a sign of fire; where there is a chick, there has been an egg. Junius argues in his first *Letter* that the character of the government is a sign of the deplorable state of the people, because only such depravity and inefficiency could have produced it. Illustrations may be found, in abundance, in the courts in connection with circumstantial evidence; as, *e. g.*, signs showing the motive for an act—as those pointing to revenge, or hatred, in the case of an act of violence charged, or of hunger in a charge of theft.

Theoretically, the force of the argument from sign will increase as the number of resemblances noted tend to establish identity with a known circumstance or fact; tend to establish a principle known or easily

[1] "Hist. of Early Eng. Lit.," p. 92.

recognized as true; and tend to establish a relation which is causal in character.

Observation and Inference.—Reasoning from sign is the basis of solution of the many complex problems set up in the detective story, originated by Edgar Allan Poe. Before facts can be interpreted and combined so as to establish or overthrow an hypothesis, they must of course be observed. In making an analysis of the mental processes employed in playing successfully a game of whist, Poe dwells upon the importance of observation, as follows: [1]

But it is in matters beyond the limits of mere rule that the skill of the analyst is evinced. He makes, in silence, a host of observations and inferences. So, perhaps, do his companions; and the difference in the extent of the information obtained lies, not so much in the validity of the inference, as in the quality of the observation. The necessary knowledge is that of what to observe. Our player confines himself not at all; nor, because the game is the object, does he reject deductions from things external to the game. He examines the countenance of his partner, comparing it carefully with that of each of his opponents. He considers the mode of assorting the cards in each hand; often counting trump by trump, and honor by honor, through the glances bestowed by their holders upon each. He notes every variation of face as the play progresses, gathering a fund of thought from the differences in the expression of certainty, of surprise, of triumph, or chagrin. From the manner of gathering up a trick he judges whether the person taking it can make another in the suit. He recognizes what is played through feint, by the air with which it is thrown upon the table. A casual or inadvertent word; the accidental dropping or turning of a card, with the accompanying anxiety or carelessness in regard to its concealment; the counting of the tricks, with the order of their arrangement; embarrassment, hesitation, eagerness, or trepidation—all afford, to his apparently intuitive

[1] "The Murders in the Rue Morgue," E. A. Poe.

perception, indications of the true state of affairs. The first two or three rounds having been played, he is in full possession of the contents of each hand, and thenceforward puts down his cards with as absolute a precision of purpose as if the rest of the party had turned outward the faces of their own.

Common *Sources of Error* in inferences from sign are the ignoring of contrary signs, misinterpreting facts, combining them improperly, and overdrawing the conclusion, that is, stating it without sufficient qualification. Especially, a slight indication must not be used as a sufficient cause. It is true, *e. g.*, that clouds are a sign of rain, but we are hardly warranted in asserting that it will rain to-day merely because the sky is overcast.

II. Argument from Example

If the relation from which the conclusion is drawn is regarded as one of resemblance, or its opposite contrast, the argument may be called argument from example.

A. RESEMBLANCE

There are two classes of resemblance: (1) By generalization and (2) by analogy.

1. **Example by Generalization.**—Any of the facts of observation and experience may be used as examples. There are examples of war and peace, of heroism and cowardice, of the blessings and sorrows of preparedness as well as of pacificism. From the success or failure of woman suffrage in Colorado we may argue to the wisdom or folly of adopting it in New Jersey; from a government ownership and operation of the mails, we

may argue to a government ownership and operation of the telephone, or municipal ownership and operation of car-lines; from the budget system of Parliament to the budget system of Congress or the State Legislatures. Its field is practically unlimited. "I have but one lamp," says Patrick Henry, "by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience." Again, "History," says Dionysius, "is philosophy teaching by example."

It is essentially, however, an argument from resemblance. It proceeds from case to case, from likeness to likeness. What is true in one place under one set of circumstances and conditions is equally true in another place under similar circumstances and conditions; things happening in a certain way at one time under one set of circumstances and conditions will happen again in a similar way at another time under parallel circumstances and conditions; whatever is alike in essential parts is alike in whole. It cannot be confused with sign, which is an argument of unanalyzed or unspecified association; or with antecedent probability or causal argument which tells *why* a thing is or must be so. Example proves that it *is* so, or did happen.

The fact is so, and these people of the Southern Colonies are much more strongly attached to liberty than those to the Northward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths; such were our fathers—ancestors; such in our days were the Poles; and such will be all masters of slaves who are not slaves themselves. —*Burke*, "Conciliation."

Burke reinforces this argument from example, by an argument from causal relation, when he adds: "In such a people the haughtiness of domination com-

bines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible——"

> Cavour whose monument is united Italy; Bismarck who has raised the German Empire from a name to a fact; Gladstone today the incarnate heart and conscience of England—they are the perpetual refutation of the sneer that high education weakens men for practical affairs.—*Curtis,* "The Public Duty of Educated Men."

The argument from example always involves a principle, stated or implied, a principle of classification or of causation, a principle supported by authority or regarded as true. In the preceding illustration, Cavour in Italy, Bismarck in Germany, Gladstone in England—all come within the class of educated men who are practical and unvisionary. In the quotation from Burke, a causal principle was stated at the end. In neither, however, was there authoritative support of the principle involved.

In law, it is often argued that the case at bar is sufficiently like a case previously decided to bring it under some well-established principle. In the famous Dartmouth College Case, Justice Story endeavored to show that a charter is like a grant, through the definition of a contract. The Federal Constitution denies to the States the right to pass any law impairing the obligations of contract. Moreover, in Fletcher *vs.* Peck, it was decided that a grant of land, from the State of Georgia to a citizen, was a contract between two parties. In order then to decide the question—is this charter a contract?—it becomes important to prove that the charter was like the grant of land in respect to those essential things which made it a contract.

Many questions naturally arise in such a comparison, some important and some unimportant. For instance, both are sealed instruments; the charter was from the State to a corporation, while the grant was from a State to a citizen; both involved mutual promises, and so on. The resemblances, however, outweighed the differences in all essential points affecting a contract, and the court decreed that the Dartmouth College charter, being essentially like a land grant, was therefore a contract, and so could not be impaired by the State. The general principles so applied in the arguments of a case at law are derived from the Federal Constitution, statutes, decisions of courts, legal text-books, etc.

Thus the process of example may be little more than a matter of establishing the correctness or relevancy of a definition. The lawyer, for instance, seeks first to *find* a principle covering the case under investigation; then to *interpret* it according to the previous decisions of a court; and finally to *apply* the definition so determined to the case at bar. Another notable instance of an argument of this sort is that made by Lord Erskine in defense of Lord George Gordon when he was tried for high treason; a speech worthy of analysis and careful study for logical method, use of authority, and presentation.

"What is law?" asks the student. "It is a rule of action," says Blackstone. Practically, however, it is an interminable definition.

The authority of precedents is perhaps more emphasized in law then elsewhere, for it must be remembered that precedents must sometimes be followed by a court when its own view is to the contrary. And yet the antecedent idea that the end of a State is jus-

tice, is always more or less involved in the interpretation and application of our laws, and sometimes a view is even taken of the probable consequences of a particular interpretation or application. It happens frequently that, where two opposed arguments are structurally correct and equally supported by authorities, one will prevail over the other because it is supported by a sound public policy.

In the debates in Parliament on the taxation of America, there was much citation of examples affecting the question of representation — Lord Camden, Lord Chatham, and Burke believed in a real representation (such as is at present in vogue in the United States), while Lord Mansfield held to the theory of a virtual representation. We will see more in the latter view if we recall that to-day parliamentary representatives often do not reside in the district which elects them. They represent the nation.

Lord Camden, speaking in the House of Lords in 1766, said: "My lords, I challenge any one to point out the time when any tax was laid upon any person by Parliament, that person being unrepresented in Parliament." He considered the cases of Chester, the clergy, Wales, and Ireland; and averred that "from the whole of our history from the earliest period, you will find that taxation and representation were united." The principle underlying his contention he derives from John Locke, "The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent," and B II, pp. 136–139, particularly 140, drawn from the heart of our constitution, which he thoroughly understood, and will last as long as that shall last—*Parliamentary Debates and Proceedings*, vol. IV, p. 366.

Lord Mansfield answered "the noble Lord (Cam-

den), particularly upon the cases he has quoted." With respect to the marches of Wales, he admits that they enjoyed the privilege of taxing themselves for a brief time, "during the life of Edward I till the Prince of Wales became King," but says that they were then annexed to the crown and became subject to taxes, like the rest of the dominions, until Henry VIII. The latter issued writs for it to return two members of Parliament, and issued a writ also to Calais to send one Burgess. Besides, one of the counties palatine (Durham) was taxed fifty years before he sent members to Parliament, while the clergy were, at no time, unrepresented in Parliament.

All parallels drawn from the colonies of antiquity to the present case are then excluded as irrelevant and immaterial. The Tyrians in Africa and the Greeks in Asia, for instance, were totally different from ours. No nation before ourselves had any regular system of colonization except the Romans, whose system was a military one. Expounding next the theory and history of the British colonial system, he argues that if there was no express law, usage alone would be sufficient, and concluded by drawing the distinction between virtual and real representation—the true source of difference—asserting that the colonies are as much represented in Parliament as are the greatest part of the people of England.

Burke, speaking in 1774, argued from example to show that "rebellion and loss to yourselves" would surely follow the narrow policy of the crown, as they had done in the case of Wales and of Lancaster.

> You tried in Wales to raise a revenue which the people thought excessive and unjust: the attempt ended in oppression, resistance, rebellion, and loss to yourselves. You tried in the duchy of Lancaster to raise a revenue which the people believed un-

just: this effort ended in oppression, rebellion, vexation, and loss to yourselves. You are now trying to raise in America, a revenue which the colonists disapprove. What must be the result?—*American Taxation.*

Thus, Lord Camden argued from the principle that taxation and representation had always been united, and quoted from John Locke to prove that a person could not be deprived of his property without his consent. The argument in the Dartmouth College case rested on the principle that no State had the right to deny or impair the obligation of a contract, as affirmed in the Federal Constitution. Here cases were examined for the purpose of establishing sufficient resemblances to the case in question to bring the latter under a principle established by authority.

Lord Mansfield based his argument on the principle of virtual rather than real representation as the historic British policy—a principle grounded in tradition and reason. Burke, in the last quoted passage on the British attitude toward America, reasoned (as he did later in his speech on conciliation) from the idea that any colonial policy will fail which the people believe to be unjust; or, in other words, that the feeling of injustice or oppression resulting from a policy will tend to produce its failure. The process here too is one of classification (for he brings America into the category of colonies which have suffered through British policy); but it is more. The resemblances are of things viewed as results; results imply causes or antecedents; and the antecedent here is British colonial policy acting as an agency or law sufficient to produce the phenomenon of rebellion, a principle of causation.

Unless the principle is easily accepted behind the argu-

ment from example, there must be some warranting process such as an authority or a cause. If, however, an issue should arise as to the validity of any particular causal principle asserted, so that we are obliged to consider causal relationships instead of resemblances in results, the argument becomes causal relation. But even the use of authority, it should be remembered, involves the idea that like follows like, like causes must produce like results.

Further Analysis of the Process.—Any argument from example will be valid, if the resemblances between the case or cases cited and the case in question are sufficient to bring them, in essential particulars, within the scope of a recognized principle or law. This presupposes, however, that the facts and circumstances relating to the cases are truly and fully stated, and that other things have not been overlooked. It will be clearly invalid, for instance, if other cases are found which establish another principle stronger and equally well recognized.

The following table or rules will show the process as a whole, including its more important steps:

1. Find the principle covering the cases cited and the case in question.

2. Are the facts and circumstances concerning these cases fully stated, and true as alleged?

3. Are they relevant and material to the principle under which they are now included?

a. What of the number and points of resemblance?

b. What of the number and points of difference?

4. Are there contrary cases which weaken or invalidate the conclusion?

5. If the contrary cases tend to establish a new and different principle, what is the value, comparatively,

of these two principles with respect to such things as authoritative support, general acceptance, causal relation, or sound public policy?

A complete analysis of the process of example as an argument may involve, therefore, the consideration of such things as a general principle, truth and completeness of circumstantial details, relevancy, and materiality of cases cited both as to the case in question and to a principle affirmed, contrary cases with their circumstantial detail, and finally the comparative value of opposed principles.

Next in importance to establishing the principle or ground of reasoning is the rule of relevancy.

Definition of Relevancy and Rules.—Any case may be said to be relevant to a case under inquiry if it resembles the latter in such a way as to permit its use as a premise in drawing a conclusion about a doubtful or unknown X.

The logical form of the process of reasoning from example may be stated thus:

Whatever is like B with respect to M is like it with respect to X; A is like B with respect to M; therefore A is like B with respect to X. Here A represents a cited case, B a case in question, and M is a known characteristic of both A and B; while X is the uncertain or disputed point about A. Concretely, this may be expressed as follows: Whatever British policy is like the policy toward Wales in that it is felt to be unjust is like it in being followed by rebellion and loss. The British policy toward America is like that toward Wales in that it is felt to be unjust. Therefore, the British policy toward America will be like it in bringing rebellion and loss.

The major premise of this syllogism—"Whatever is like *B* with respect to *M* (or *M*, *N*, etc.) is like it with respect to *X*"—is sometimes called the basis of comparison.

The process in arguing thus from example may be regarded as jointly inductive and deductive: in the sense that we first find cases covering the case under inquiry, including of course the doubtful point *X*, in order to establish a general principle; and that we then apply this general principle to the present case, and conclude that *X* should be accordingly.

Where conditions are undeniably similar, and the point to be proved is carefully stated so that the parallelism cannot be pushed too far, a single example may sometimes be convincing. Thus President Hibben —when arguing that the United States Government should prepare against war rather than for war, and could do so without becoming militaristic—cited the example of the invisible army of Switzerland:

> This is not an impracticable theory, incapable of being realized in the actual experience of a nation. Switzerland proves the possibility of a nation in arms challenging the world as the defenders of peace.
>
> It happened that I crossed the western frontier of Switzerland on the first day of August, 1914, and was compelled to travel toward the eastern frontier in the Engadine Valley during the time of mobilization of the troops. The invisible army of Switzerland came into being within forty-eight hours. On the first day of August there was no evidence of any military organization in the country; then within four days, between 400,000 and 500,000 troops were on the borders; guides from the mountains, men from the shops and stores and fields, from all the industrial pursuits of the country, and they remain there to this day, defending their land from the incursions of any foreign foe. There is no country in Europe that gives as little

impression of military display as Switzerland, and no country better prepared to defend its borders against the devastation and disaster of war.

For our own country it is possible for us to follow a similar policy. We too can have within our midst if we choose an invisible army, men having some training in military affairs and yet not withdrawn from their daily activities and pursuits. In this way our military strength may be conserved at a minimum expense and minimum industrial disturbance. If we are confident, and I think justly so, that in the event of war the young men of our country would be ready and eager to volunteer their services, why should we not issue a call to volunteer for the military training-camps which the government has already instituted with such marked success? Every thoughtful person is naturally opposed to military ostentation and display and the whole spirit of insolent militarism. That which is essentially the American way of doing things is to have our military strength in potential form rather than actually existent in a large standing army.

The important *rules of relevancy* when using the argument from example may now be summed up thus:

1. Find the doubtful *X* in the present case or situation. In the preceding illustration the doubtful *X* was the possibility of a nation being prepared against war without militarism.
2. Find a case essentially similar (which contains the doubtful *X*) after comparing resemblances and differences with all attendant conditions. Such was the selection of the example of Switzerland.
3. Make its relevancy apparent. On the first day of August there was no evidence of a military organization in Switzerland; but within four days about four hundred thousand troops were on the borders, assembled from the activities of peace, to defend their lands. No country in Europe makes so little display as Switzerland, none is better prepared for defense. Then follows the

comparison. We too can have an invisible army. Our young men are eager to volunteer for military training-camps; it is essentially the American way, and so on.

Indeed, the perpetual and insistent problem of all argument is what is to be proved—what proves it—and how to make the proof manifest.

4. Establish the fundamental basis of the argument either by reason or by authority. The training-camps already existing in the United States, for instance, make possible, through natural growth, the development of an invisible army.

If illustration of authoritative support be needed further, let us take it from Lord Erskine. He is defining the law of treason as it applies to the circumstances of the Gordon case, and has just examined the case of Demaree for essential resemblances to the case at bar. He remarks that all men "agree that it is the *intention* of assembling" the mob which forms the guilt of treason, and adds, "I will give you the words of high authority, the learned Foster" . . . who says, in a similar case: "The true criterion seems to be *quo animo* did the parties assemble? With what intention did they meet?"

Arguments from example often need thus to be supported by further arguments. We may accumulate resemblances, select the most striking, or summon our greatest rhetorical skill; and yet not escape the inevitable why or suppress the feeling that authoritative support should have been given. Even when this is done, and when the resemblances are great in number and striking, it should always be remembered that the argument from example can never reach absolute certainty. Practically no two things are exactly alike, and the conditions under which they exist or operate

are never exactly the same. It can, at best, only establish a very high degree of probability.

The Fallacy, Begging the Question.—A cited case will not be relevant to a case under inquiry, unless it contains the doubtful *X*. It will not be relevant unless the resemblances noted are in essential, rather than accidental or superficial, respects. We cannot know that the resemblances are essential unless we compare the cases not only theoretically, but in the full and exact setting in which they actually existed, or with all the attendant circumstances or conditions under which they actually took place. It will be plainly irrelevant, if the differences are found to be sufficient to overcome the resemblances.

If in an argument we assume resemblances or ignore differences, we assume the very basis of comparison, the very premise needed to be proved, and so beg the question. Indeed, arguments from example are commonly ineffective and regarded as irrelevant, simply because the basis of comparison is not indicated by pointing out and making clear the exact points or resemblance. Observe how carefully Shylock, when attempting to show that he was entitled to human treatment, indicated in detail his resemblance to a human being and a Christian:

> Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we are like in the rest, we will resemble you in that.

You are doubtless familiar with the ancient fable relating to the donkeys. One donkey, carrying on its back a bag of salt, plunged into a stream, with the result that the salt melted, and he disported himself with glee on the opposite meadow. The other donkey which was laden with sponges instantly followed the example of the salt-burdened leader, and, leaping into the stream, almost came to grief.[1]

Indeed, the most common form of fallacy in arguing from example arises from assuming a resemblance between cases and ignoring the differences in attendant circumstances and conditions. Let us examine an illustration or two of a causal example, involving the prediction that what happened from a certain cause in another place will inevitably happen in the same way from the same cause here.

Ringwalt in "Briefs on Public Questions" frequently uses the argument from example as one of the main divisions of a brief. These briefs, it should be said, are meant to be suggestive; and a good deal is purposely omitted for the student to supply. In one of them the doubtful *X* is the question whether or not ownership of the railways by the United States Government should be adopted, and the example of other nations is made the closing argument, thus:

V. The experience of foreign nations is favorable to government ownership and operation. *A*. The experience of Prussia is favorable. 1. In Prussia a large annual surplus has been earned. 2. Uniform, stable, and lower rates have been secured. 3. Facilities and accommodations have been improved. 4. Natural resources have been developed and the commercial

[1] "The Fables of La Fontaine." Trans. by Robt. Thomson, bk. II, Fable 10.

prosperity of the nation enhanced. *B.* The experience of Belgium is favorable. 1. A profit has been earned. 2. The total of ton mileage has increased. 3. Improvements have been introduced. 4. Rates have been lowered. 5. Accidents are fewer. *C.* The experience of Australia and New Zealand is favorable. 1. Great social advantages have been secured. *x.* The better distribution of labor. *y.* An increase in suburban dwelling. *z.* Increased educational advantages. 2. Agricultural interests have been fostered. *D.* The experience of other nations is favorable. 1. That of Austria-Hungary. 2. Of Switzerland. 3. Of France.

This argument is not shown to be relevant to *X*; but to government ownership in general. If it is meant to imply that, because government ownership has been successful in certain respects in other countries, it will be so in these same respects in this country, the conclusion does not follow. By ignoring the conditions under which the railroads are owned in the countries mentioned, as well as conditions in the United States, the argument assumes so much that there is no valid basis of comparison. In fine, the conclusion is too broad and the premises are not proved.

We have seen that a case cited should have not only a bearing on the general subject, but a relevancy to the doubtful *X* in the case in controversy. Very rarely do the many cases thought to be pertinent to a subject turn out on examination to resemble one another completely. Indeed, so frequently and in so many ways do differences appear, that the successful use of example as an argument requires exhaustive study: involving the exercise of memory to carry in mind all the circumstantial details; a power of discrimination and analysis to discard the irrelevant, seize upon the vital points, and determine the relationships of the cases to one an-

other and to the various principles, as well as the ability to grasp firmly the soundest principle involved and hold it distinct, so that in the most intricate circumstances its relation to the doubtful *X* will be clear and luminous.

Answering a Causal Example by Alleging a Different Cause.—An argument from example may be refuted (1) by proving that the facts are not true as alleged, or (2) by admitting or assuming the alleged facts to be true and then proving that conditions are not parallel, and that hence there is no valid basis of comparison. The latter refutation will be even stronger if the alleged results can be ascribed to another and different cause. Thus, General Hugh L. Scott refutes the argument that the cost of the United States army is too high as compared with the cost of the German army. He shows that there is no valid basis of comparison, and then attributes the relatively higher cost of our military establishment to the voluntary as opposed to the compulsory principle:

From time to time statements have appeared in current publications showing the large appropriation necessary for the support of the military establishment of the United States and the relatively small cost of the German army. By dividing each of these amounts by the total strength of each military establishment an effort is made to compare the high cost of one of our soldiers with the cost of a German soldier, which is very much lower than ours. No intelligent comparison can be made between the cost of the German and American military establishments without having first a clear understanding of the differences in the military system of these two countries.

The German pays his military obligations to the state in personal service, while we go into the labor markets, where we are forced to compete with other employers of labor in order to secure our soldiers. In addition, there is a small class of volunteers in the German army who, in exchange for certain privileges

as to service, maintain themselves and supply their own uniforms and equipment. Again, the normal wages of our labor markets, where we obtain our recruits, are much higher than in Germany. The comparative cost of these two soldiers in dollars and cents, therefore, means little except to emphasize the cost of maintaining a military establishment on the voluntary principle. If we wish, then, to compare the cost of our army with the cost of those of other nations, we must limit our comparison to those nations which employ the same general system as ourselves. We will find that only one other nation in the world does so—Great Britain.

2. **Example by Analogy.**—*Analogy* is another term used to describe arguments from resemblance. Here the objects compared are regarded as widely different and lying in totally different fields; and though the implication of a common cause is present, the specific cause is more remote and vague; so that the probability established is regarded as less strong than if the cases compared were known to be in the same class. Hence, analogy has sometimes been defined as "a resemblance of ratios" or a "resemblance of relations rather than of objects" or a "parity of reasoning." It is of much value to the scientist in offering hints or ideas for experiment and investigation. There is, for instance, a relation between the falling of an apple to the ground and the motion of the heavenly bodies; the lifting of the lid of a teakettle, through the idea of the expansion of steam, and the piston in a locomotive; the structure of the human ear and the receiver of a telephone.

Analogy is also used by the great orators, and often with telling effect. When so used as an argument the resemblances should be essentially alike in all particulars which affect the proposition and they should be true as stated. Besides, the proposition should, if im-

portant enough, be supported by further evidence. Analogy offers only parallel or collateral evidence. It has place also in the clarifying processes of exposition; is the essence of much of the description and narration used as argumentative adjuncts, and is of great value wherever the purpose is to engage attention, enlist interest, appeal to desire, or to "suggest" to the imagination, as well as to prove. Lincoln's analogies are widely known:

Gentlemen, I want you to suppose a case for a moment. Suppose that all the property you were worth was in gold, and you had put it in the hands of Blondin, the famous rope-walker, to carry across the Niagara Falls on a tight rope. Would you shake the rope while he was passing over it, or keep shouting to him: "Blondin, stoop a little more! Go a little faster"? No, I am sure you would not. You would hold your breath as well as your tongue, and keep your hands off until he was safely over. Now the government is in the same situation. It is carrying an immense weight across a stormy ocean. Untold treasures are in its hands. It is doing the best it can. Don't badger it! Just keep still and it will get you safely over.

The use of the several arguments previously mentioned as well as a clear mode of procedure may be illustrated from the following quotation from Whately on indirect description. He begins by telling what his thesis is *like*, and then *states* it; after which he tells *why* a description using carefully selected details will produce a more striking impression than one based on a catalogue method, and then cites two examples to prove that this is so:

It is observed by opticians and astronomers that a side view of a faint star, or, especially, of a comet, presents it in much greater brilliancy than a direct view. To see a comet in its full

splendor, you should look not straight at it, but at some star a little beside it. Something analogous to this often takes place in mental perceptions. It will often, therefore, have a better effect to describe obliquely, if I may so speak, by introducing circumstances connected with the main object or event, and affected by it, but not absolutely forming a part of it. And circumstances of this kind may not infrequently be so selected as to produce a more striking impression of anything that is in itself great and remarkable than could be produced by a minute and direct description, because in this way the general and collective result of a whole, and the effects produced by it on other objects, may be vividly impressed on the hearer's mind, the circumstantial detail of collateral matters not drawing off the mind from the contemplation of the principle matter as one and complete. Thus, the woman's application to the King of Samaria, to compel her neighbor to fulfil the agreement of sharing with her the infant's flesh, gives a more frightful impression of the horrors of the famine than any more direct description could have done, since it presents to us the picture of that hardening of the heart to every kind of horror, and that destruction of the ordinary state of human sentiment which is the result of long-continued and extreme misery. Nor could any detail of the particular vexations to be suffered by the exiled Jews for their disobedience convey so lively an idea of them as that description of their result contained in the denunciation of Moses: "In the evening thou shalt say, Would God it were morning! and in the morning thou shalt say, Would God it were evening!"—*Whately*, "Elements of Rhetoric," p. 125.

Knowledge grows slowly by ever-widening generalizations. What in one age may seem to be a weak analogy may later become an example of a truth. All men may reason to-day, for instance, from the analogy of biological growth in certain particulars in all living things and their products, but once we find warrant for a belief in some such generalization as that asserted by Herbert Spencer as law, we would not hesitate to cite as examples what hitherto we had regarded as analogies.

Whoever, indeed, could accept the following should find small difficulty in so doing:

> Now, we propose in the first place to show that this law of organic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in the development of the earth, in the development of life upon its surface, in the development of society, of government, of manufactures, of commerce, of language, literature, science, art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex, through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is that in which progress essentially consists.

B. CONTRAST

A Principle of Association.—Conventional treatises on argumentation make insufficient mention of the argument from contrast. Aristotle included contrast as well as resemblance among the fundamental categories of association. Moreover, simple association-tests show that there are certain types of words which suggest their opposites, as, *e. g.*, head—foot; right—left or wrong, etc. While there is a tendency among modern psychologists to regard contrast as a secondary principle rather than a primary, they are continually recognizing a variation of method among individuals and a characteristic individual method of reasoning. Indeed, just as there are types of orators and debaters whose method seems to be governed largely by the principles of resemblance, as, for instance, Burke, so there are others equally eminent—notably Lincoln—in whom the principle of contrast seems also to be particularly strong.

Uses in Debating.—The method of contrast is perhaps more essential in debating than in any other form

of speech, for the debater must continually keep his case before an audience in opposition to that of his opponent. He does this in his definition of the main issues, in the development of his argument, and in his recapitulation. Refutation, too, may be not only a matter of drawing distinctions in a counter-proof but of contrasting premise with premise, proof with proof, conclusion with conclusion; and so, in ordering his materials, when the debater wishes to grapple with his opponent closely and impress his audience strongly, he brings strength into sharp contrast with weakness, or assumption and assertion into bold opposition to his own evidence, with their inevitable conclusions to his own advantage.

In the remarks of Lincoln on the Dred Scott Decision[1] delivered June 26, 1857, observe how naturally and effectively Lincoln contrasted (1) the dissenting opinions of Judge Curtis with the opinions of Justice Taney, (2) the public estimate of the black men in the days of the Revolution with that at the present time, and (3) Judge Douglas's action "three and a half years ago" in forcing the Nebraska bill upon the country with its consequences "now." We have here a contrast in authoritative opinion, a contrast in time, and a contrast involving the additional relation of antecedent to consequent.

Uses in Refutation: Types of Argument by Contrast.—There are three special types of the argument by contrast in which Lincoln, the great American debater, was especially proficient, *i. e.*, *reductio ad absurdum*, the dilemma, and the method of the residue. They are so effective in debating and so common in practice

[1] "Little Masterpieces," "Lincoln," by Bliss Perry, p. 13.

that we will consider them with some detail and with a variety of illustration.

1. **Reductio ad Absurdum.**—In *reductio ad absurdum*, the debater contrasts the conclusion reached by his opponent with an utterly ridiculous conclusion derived from the citation of other cases involving the same process of reasoning.

Any argument that can be reduced to an absurdity is said to "prove too much"; for instance, the argument that "the liquor traffic is liable to abuse and therefore should be abolished" proves too much. Its absurdity will appear if one should answer: "Religion and learning also are liable to abuse; therefore, they should be abolished." The implied premise in the argument is "whatever is liable to abuse should be abolished." The *reductio ad absurdum* connects this implied premise not only with the expressed premise "the liquor traffic is liable to abuse," thereby showing that the argument leads correctly to the conclusion drawn, but also contrasts it with another premise, namely, "Religion and learning are liable to abuse," showing that the argument here leads to the absurd conclusion, "Religion and learning should be abolished."

Every argument which proves too much does not require a *reductio ad absurdum* to overthrow it. Webster meets the objection that bank credit may be abused, thus:

> I am well aware that bank credit may be abused. I know that bank paper may become excessive; that depreciation will then follow; and that the evils, the losses, and the frauds consequent on a disordered currency fall on the rich and the poor together, but with especial weight of ruin on the poor. I know that the system of bank credit must always rest on a specie basis, and that it constantly needs to be strictly guarded and

properly restrained; and it may be so guarded and restrained. We need not give up the good which belongs to it through fear of the evil which may follow from its abuse. We have a power to take security against these evils. It is our business as statesmen to adopt that security; it is our business not to prostrate or attempt to prostrate the system, but to use those means of precaution, restraint, and correction which experience has sanctioned, and which are ready at our hands.

Macaulay detects in an argument of Mr. Gladstone an instance of proving too much and exposes its premises, indicating at the same time the unscientific mode of deriving them:

He (Mr. Gladstone) lays down broad general doctrines about power, when the only power of which he is thinking is the power of governments—about conjoint action, when the only conjoint action of which he is thinking is the conjoint action of citizens in a state. He first resolves on his conclusion. He then makes a major of most comprehensive dimensions; and having satisfied himself that it contains his conclusion, never troubles himself about what else it may contain. And as soon as we examine it, we find that it contains an infinite number of conclusions, every one of which is a monstrous absurdity.[1]

In *reductio ad absurdum*, speaking exactly, the incorrect premises and conclusion are not pointed out; but the argument is assumed to be sound and contrasted with other cases which prove it unsound.

The debater must not expect always to find actually expressed the argument proving too much; it is frequently derived by implication either from an opponent's argumentation or from the usual or possible logic of his side. In any event he seeks to fasten upon his opponent a belief in its soundness.

In his Liverpool address Beecher charged upon a

[1] Macaulay's Essay on "Gladstone on Church and State."

hostile audience a belief in an argument which proved too much and revealed its absurdity. He had just been interrupted and considerable tact was required in resuming. He caught the ear of the audience at once, however, by attributing to them a very natural sympathy for "the weaker party," and then altering his position slightly and without stating the proposition he intended to discuss, he applied the *reductio ad absurdum* to the proposition that "the minority is always right."

But I know that you say you cannot help sympathizing with a gallant people. ("Hear, hear!") They are the weaker people, the minority; and you cannot help going with the minority who are struggling for their rights against the majority. Nothing could be more generous, when a weak party stands for its own legitimate rights against imperious pride and power than to sympathize with the weak. But whoever sympathized with a weak thief because three constables had got hold of him? ("Hear, hear!") And yet the one thief in the policemen's hands is the weaker party. I suppose you would sympathize with him. ("Hear, hear!" Laughter and applause.) Why, when that infamous King of Naples—Bomba—was driven into Gaeta by Garibaldi with his immortal band of patriots, and Cavour sent against him the army of northern Italy, who was the weaker party then? The tyrant and his minions; and the majority was the noble Italian patriots struggling for liberty. I never heard that Old England sent deputations to King Bomba, and yet his troops resisted bravely there. (Laughter and interruption.) Today the majority of the people of Rome is with Italy. Nothing but French bayonets keeps her from going back to the kingdom of Italy, to which she belongs. Do you sympathize with the minority in Rome or the majority in Italy? (A voice: "With Italy.")

The manner of treatment may be either direct or indirect. The debater, that is, may proceed frankly,

seriously, to show by a wider application that the argument is unsound; or he may pretend to agree with his opponent, admit the soundness of his argument and defend the truth of its absurdest conclusions—the opposite of what he really believes. Whately in "Historic Doubts" employs, in an ironical manner, Hume's arguments against Christianity to prove the non-existence of Napoleon. Burke in "Vindication of Natural Society" applies ironically Bolingbroke's arguments against religious institutions to civil society. Swift's "Modest Proposal" defends the cooking and eating of the children as the proper mode of relief from famine in Ireland.

A good instance of the direct way of treatment occurs in a letter written to Junius by Sir William Draper. Now, Junius had not only ridiculed the King in his first letter to the printer of the *Public Advertiser* but had handled unsparingly the Ministry. Sir William then came forward over his own signature to remove the suspicions cast upon his friend the Marquis of Granby as commander of the army. Draper was a man of scholarly attainments, but alas! he was open-hearted and highly sensitive to ironical criticism, the chief weapon of his powerful antagonist. Junius accepted the challenge and instantly put the indiscreet Draper upon the defensive. The latter managed to clear himself from the charges affecting his personal honesty and withdrew from the unequal contest. In the quotation given below, referring to the Manila ransom, Draper showed that if silence meant guilt, then Junius had convicted himself of several charges.

Spain having taken sides with France during the French and Indian War, an English expedition appeared

(September 25, 1752) off Manila, capital of Luzon, an island of the Philippine group, and at length carried the place by assault (October 6). The victors accepted "bills on Madrid for a million sterling in lieu of pillage," and departed; but Madrid repudiated the treaty. Colonel Draper, who with Admiral Cornish commanded the expedition, urged the government to insist upon payment of the ransom, but dropped the matter, as he tells us, on grounds of "national convenience." Junius insinuated that Draper's silence had been bought by subsequent military honors from the English Government, and that he had sold out his companions who would have shared in the prize. The charge must have appealed to a very strong popular sentiment, for, as Lecky says, "the tame acquiescence of the government in the Spanish refusal bitterly offended the national pride."

To support your story you have recourse to the following irresistible argument: "You sold the companions of your victory, because when the 16th Regiment was given to you, you were silent. The conclusion is inevitable." I believe that such deep and acute reasoning could only come from such an extraordinary writer as Junius. But, unfortunately for you, the premises as well as the conclusion are absolutely false. If your puerile and tinsel logic could carry the least weight or conviction with it, how must you stand affected by the inevitable conclusion, as you are pleased to term it? According to Junius, silence is guilt. In many of the public papers you have been called, in the most direct and offensive terms, a liar and a coward. When did you reply to these foul accusations? You have been quite silent, quite chop-fallen; therefore, because you were silent, the nation has a right to pronounce you to be both a liar and a coward, from your own argument.

In his reply to Draper's argument, Junius neither mentioned nor supported the general proposition that

silence was guilt. He did not, however, refuse all contest; but, noticing the new and personal application, was at great pains to explain why his name must be withheld. It can pass unobserved largely from his use of interrogatories and insinuations that in modifying he has denied his original and sweeping contention. His answer was as follows:

> Your remarks upon a signature adopted merely for distinction are unworthy of notice; but when you tell me I have submitted to be called a liar and a coward, I must ask you, in my turn, whether you seriously think it any way incumbent on me to take notice of the silly invectives of every simpleton who writes in a newspaper; and what opinion you would have conceived of my discretion if I had suffered myself to be the dupe of so shallow an artifice? As to me it is by no means necessary that I should be exposed to the resentment of the worst and most powerful men in this country, though I may be indifferent about yours. You assure me that my logic is puerile and tinsel; that it carries not the least weight or conviction; that my premises are false and my conclusions absurd. If this be a just description of me, how is it possible for such a writer to disturb your peace of mind or to injure a character so well established as yours? Take care, Sir William, how you indulge this unruly temper, lest the world should suspect that conscience has some show in your resentments. You have more to fear from the treachery of your own passions than from my malevolence.

How Answered.—Reductio ad absurdum is effective not only because it leaves an opponent's proposition unproved, but because it reveals his unsound logic and shakes confidence in his reliability as a debater. In answering, the chief aim of a debater may be to show that he has not proved too much, that his position is within reason. If he has been misrepresented, an emphatic denial that he believes the discredited ideas,

accompanied by a statement of his true position, may be all that is necessary. But generally it is well to show something more than the reasonableness of your position. Possibly his argument was not germane to the point at issue. An answer somewhat more effective is the *tu quoque* or countercharge. For instance, if, upon a question involving an amendment to an existing law, it is held upon one side that the objections consider only the abuses under the law, it can be held upon the other that the enemies of amendment are merely opposing innovation. Circumstances may make it possible to answer *reductio ad absurdum* by any of the chief modes of attack suggested. Examine, in illustration, the following inquiries of Beecher's argument from the point of view of his audience:

Suppose that a listener in the audience refused to believe that the "Minority is not always right." In answering would it be effective to attempt to prove the contradictory? In this case, the reasoner would seek to establish a proposition whose falsity seems obvious.

Refusing thus to believe that "the minority is not always right," could the objector employ in his discussion the method of the residue? Beecher's well-chosen examples were most probably admitted and, therefore, could not be eliminated.

Would it be effective to answer: "I grant your premises and conclusion but remark in your reasoning the fallacy *ignoratio elenchi*. I grant that the majority is sometimes right and is sometimes wrong; that the minority when right should receive support not because it is the weaker party but because it is right, and believe that sympathy may go where it likes—usually to the weaker party; still I find your argument irrelevant,

for it ignores what, in my mind, is the real issue, namely—Is the South in the right or in the wrong?" Again, would it be effective to return upon Beecher's general position, charging him with an equally false assumption in the implied belief that "the majority is always right"? In the event of a riot in a lunatic asylum, for instance, would he always sympathize with the inmates or the superintendent? The inmates, it will be noticed, are in the majority.

From its general nature, it is clear that *reductio ad absurdum* is of *special value* in opening an attack. It is used to introduce in a general way an answer to a particular issue. In debate, therefore, it has proper place in the first part of the first speeches in rebuttal. When here employed it can overthrow an opponent's entire case; more probably, however, it will remove prejudice, enlist attention, and put an opponent upon the defensive at the outset. If a speaker has reason to believe that prejudice exists against his side, he may employ the method in his first speech. An affirmative speaker, advocating a reform or amendment, sometimes will begin by applying the argument to the conservative temper; or recommending to a body of patriotic Americans the adoption of a European scheme of government, before attempting proof, will reduce to an absurdity the assumption that "whatever is American is right." A debater objecting to a proposition on the ground that it is an "innovation" employs a "question-begging term" which can be effectively exposed by this method. Henry Grattan, speaking upon the "Tithes," answers this objection as follows:

> Yes; but will you innovate? Admit this argument and we sit here to consecrate abuses. The statutes of mortmain were

innovations; for what is the Protestant religion but the interposition of Parliament, rescuing Christianity from abuses introduced by its own priesthood?

Institutions, divine or human, corrupt by their nature or by ours; the best human institution—the British Constitution—did so corrupt, that at different periods it was anarchy, oligarchy, despotism, and was restored by Parliament.

The only divine institution we know of—the Christian religion—did so corrupt as to have become an abomination, and was rescued by act of Parliament.

Life, like establishments, declines; disease is the lot of nature; we oppose its progress by strong remedies; we drink a fresh life at some medical fountain, or we find a specific in some salubrious herb; will you call these restorations innovation on the physical economy? Why, then, in the political economy, those statutes which purge the public weal and from time to time guard the infirm animal, man, against the evils to which civil society is exposed—the encroachment of the priest and the politician?

It is then on a false surmise of our nature, this objection; we live by a succession of amendments; such is the history of man; such, above all, is the history of religion, where amendment was even opposed; and those cant expressions, the supporting church and state, were ever advanced to continue the abuse of both.

2. **The Dilemma.**—We may also contrast two ideas in the form of a dilemma, so as to put an opponent at a disadvantage or render his position, or case, untenable. Here the contrasted idea must be contradictory, and each side of the contradiction—or, as we frequently say, each "horn of the dilemma"—must have the power to "gore" or injure. In his Cooper Institute Address, Lincoln said:

You charge that we stir up insurrections among your slaves. We deny it, and what is your proof? Harpers Ferry! John Brown! John Brown was no Republican; and you have failed to implicate a single Republican in his Harpers Ferry enterprise.

If any member of our party is guilty in that matter, you know it, or you do not know it. If you do know it, you are inexcusable for not designating the man and proving the fact. If you do not know it, you are inexcusable for asserting it, and especially for persisting in the assertion after you have tried and failed to make the proof. You need not be told that persisting in a charge which one does not know to be true is simply malicious slander.

Two Kinds.—More closely, the dilemma is (1) simple or (2) complex according as there are one or two suppositions. If it should be asserted that the United States should declare war, a person, believing in the inadequacy of the present navy, might answer: "If we declare war, we must be able to defend our coasts and to attack the enemy; either we cannot defend our coasts or we cannot attack the enemy; therefore, we must not declare war." The simple dilemma may be formally expressed as follows: If *A* is *B*, *C* is *D*, and *E* is *F;* either *C* is not *D* or *E* is not *F;* therefore, *A* is not *B*. Imagine a character, declared by his eulogist to be wise and then good; imagine also that he is believed by a critic to be an irreverent person. The critic may resolve the argument into a contradiction, showing that he cannot be both wise and good, *e. g.*, "If he were wise, he would not be irreverent in jest, and if he were good, he would not be irreverent in earnest; but either he is irreverent in jest or in earnest; therefore, either he is not wise or not good." Again, Calhoun argued that the doctrine of Nullification was a constitutional right, that it was possible for a State to live within the Union and without it at one and the same time; Webster, however, claimed that the doctrine was rebellious. The doctrine may be assailed thus: "If a State is without the Union, Nullification is impossible, and if within, it is rebellious;

but either a State is without the Union or within it; therefore, either Nullification is impossible or rebellious." The complex dilemma may be formally expressed as follows: If *A* is *B*, *C* is *D;* and if *X* is *Y*, *E* is *F;* but either *C* is not *D* or *E* is not *F;* therefore, either *A* is not *B* or *X* is not *Y*.

The simple dilemma has merely shown that an opponent's assertion is false. The assertion being proved false, it will follow that the argument of which it is a premise must fall. The complex dilemma ended with stating that either of two assertions is false; that the argument fails will follow from the fact that both assertions are needed as premises to support it.

Its Use.—It is clear from its twofold division that a dilemma can attack either one or two assertions in an argumentation. In case two assertions are attacked, they may be found either in a single argument or in two distinct arguments. The critic will sometimes discover a contradiction in an opponent's proof of a single main proposition and expose it by a complex dilemma; or examining and criticising the proof of one main proposition and then of another, he will note some point of contradiction contained in the proof of the two propositions and state it in dilemmatic form. But whether the dilemma be simple or complex, or whether it be derived from one or from two arguments, it should always be remembered that unless the critic has grasped his opponent's argumentation as a whole, has found his fundamental premises, his attack can hardly be fundamental or essential.

How Answered.—In answering a dilemma you may show that the contradiction is more apparent than real —that there is a middle ground; or that one side is not

sound; or admitting that the dilemma will hold true, that it is irrelevant to the main argument. In any event, your object is to show that your argument is not "in dilemma." What I have said here of the destructive dilemma applies, equally, to a constructive dilemma. That is, for instance, if your opponent gives you a choice between two alleged contradictions for the purpose of eliminating one of your arguments (after which he intends to disprove the remaining one), you may in answering, treat it likewise, by any of the ways mentioned.

Lincoln was particularly clever in charging his opponent with putting him in a false dilemma and then of showing that there was a middle ground. This is what he did in the following:

> He finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of Independence includes *all* men, black as well as white, and forthwith he boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to argue gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because they want to vote, and eat, and sleep, and marry with negroes. He will have it that they cannot be consistent else. Now I protest against the counterfeit logic which concludes that, because I do not want a black woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either. I can just leave her alone.

3. The Method of the Residue.—The method of the residue may be regarded as a method of contrast, for it is essentially a process of exclusion. Specifically, the reasoner states a number of cases; then eliminates all the cases but one; and concludes, therefore, that the residuary case is presumably true—*e. g.*, it is not this, it is not that, therefore it must be the other. If a murder has been assigned to deliberate purpose, passion, or insanity, and the theories of passion and of de-

liberate purpose have been respectively exploded, the theory of insanity may be presumed to be true. Several hypotheses are set up to account for a thing. Usually, the affirmative will advance one hypothesis; the negative another or others. The affirmative then will endeavor to support his hypothesis against its rivals. He must overthrow them. Enumerating all the hypotheses advanced, excluding the opposing ones on specified grounds, he infers that the remaining hypothesis, which is, of course, his own, is presumably the true one.

It should be noted that only in case all possible hypotheses have been considered and the grounds of elimination have been sufficient can the speaker go further and conclude that his hypothesis is undeniably true; but these suppositions do not often exist in fact. The force of the method is destructive, but, as such, it is simple and convincing. The debater will therefore generally follow up his advantage by supporting his theory by other and more positive proof.

The Hon. Member for Taunton insisted that there ought to be "some understanding." Now, it was a mighty easy thing to assert that there ought to be some understanding; but gentlemen, however decided in their opinion, ought to come forward and say what that understanding ought to be. There were only three courses which the government of this country had to pursue. It might decline all interference in the matter and leave the planters, the negroes, and the Anti-Slavery Society to fight the battle out amongst themselves. Would a resolution like that be acceptable to the Hon. Member for Taunton? Was the government not only to decline all interference, but to set their faces, in toto, against alteration and improvement and to abstain from proposing or recommending anything? Would the Hon. gentleman approve of such a course? Why, probably not; because the Hon. gentleman admitted that much alteration and much gradual improvement of the condition of the

slaves were desirable. The only question then was, how could that amelioration be effected? But there was a third course which the government might pursue upon the present question. It might resolve to legislate altogether for the colonies—to take the measures necessarily into their own hands; making no distinction between these colonies which had legislatures of their own and those which were immediately under the control of this country. Would that course be acceptable to the Hon. Member for Taunton? Why, again, probably not; for a portion of his speech had been occupied in showing the folly of such a line of conduct.

The only remaining course, then, was that precise course which government had pursued, and which the Hon. Member for Taunton had taken much pains and time to show was the very wisest that could possibly have been pursued. In those colonies as to which the crown had a distinct right of legislation, government had resolved to commence an example, which it was hoped would soon be followed by those who had a right to legislate for themselves.—(*Peel, Sir Robert.*)

Or look at it as a class question. What is it that is interested in the maintenance of these laws? It cannot be the farmer, because the rent screw is turned upon him for every extra shilling a quarter he makes on his corn. It cannot be the laboring classes, for look at the wages of eight a week for a family of seven or eight persons. It cannot be the commercial class, for the present system keeps them out of a foreign as well as a home market. It cannot be the literary class, for who would care to provide food for the mind when the food for the body is so heavily taxed? Then in fact it cannot be any class but that very small one composed of some 10,000 or 20,000 (not more) of nominal owners of the soil.—(*Fox, W. J.*)

In Plato's Republic, Socrates answered the erroneous definitions which were held of justice, and suggested that justice would best be seen in a perfect state. He therefore traced the rise of a state; after which he ascribed the four virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, to a state that is perfectly good. The first

three ascertained the nature of the fourth, or justice will be known by the method of residues, "for it is plain that it could only be the remainder," and when justice is discovered in a perfect state, it may be recognized, by analogy, in the individual man. Accordingly, the ideal state is constructed. The following, from an analysis[1] of the Republic, will illustrate his employment of the method of residues:

And now having traced the rise of a state from first to last, Socrates returns to the question: What is justice? And in what part of the state are we to look for it?

The state, if it has been rightly organized, must be perfectly good, it must be wise, brave, temperate, and just. Hence, regarding the virtue of the state as a given quantity, made up of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, if we can find three of these, we shall by that very process have discovered the nature of the fourth.

The wisdom of the state obviously resides in the small class of guardians or magistrates. The courage of the state, as obviously, resides in the auxiliaries, and consists essentially in ever maintaining a right estimate of what is, or is not, really formidable.

The essence of temperance is restraint. The essence of political temperance lies in recognizing the right of the governing body to the allegiance and obedience of the governed. It does not reside in one particular class, like wisdom and courage, but is diffused throughout the entire state in the form of a common consent, or harmony, upon this subject. Thus we have found the three: where, then, is the fourth?

After eliminating wisdom, courage, and temperance, there still remains a something which enables the other three to take root in the state, and preserves them intact therein. This something must, therefore, be justice. It may be defined as that which teaches everybody to attend to his own business without meddling in that of other people—which fuses together the three

[1] "The Republic of Plato." Davies and Vaughan.

classes in the state and keeps each in its proper place. Conversely, the essence of political injustice lies in a meddling, restless spirit pervading the three classes, and leading each to meddle with the offices, tools, and duties of the other two.

CHAPTER IV

ARGUMENT

(CONTINUED)

III. Argument from Causal Relation

If the source from which the conclusion is drawn is regarded as having its basis in the relation which cause bears to effect, antecedent to consequent or motive to deed, the argument may be called argument from causal relation.

We have learned from experience that "nothing happens," but that all that exists is really the result of some great antecedent principle or causal law. So, in the field of science, we are constantly seeking to interpret physical or biological phenomena through the discovery of some general principle or law governing the universe which we may apply in argument as a causal reason or explanation of a particular phenomenon or fact. Likewise, in the field of human conduct generally, we are prone to regard men as responsible agents whose actions are guided by will, motive, desire, intention, modified of course by such attending circumstances as heredity and environment.

Fundamentally, all reasoning assumes as its basis the law of causation which affirms that every cause is invariably followed by an effect and every effect is invariably preceded by a cause. The belief in this law is too generally recognized to need elaboration here,

but the practical difficulties of applying it to a concrete case are so great as to be worthy of specific mention. Obviously, causal reasoning may proceed from effect to cause, from cause to effect, or from effect to effect.

The Rule of Adequacy.—The cause assigned must be adequate to produce the known effect.

In discussing public questions as in government, politics, economics, etc., when we assign a cause for a known effect, we must take into account:

1. The parallelism or difference in conditions in past experience under which the assigned cause is said to operate. It is here that reasoning from resemblance and difference or contrast performs its essential function in causal reasoning.
2. The possibility of the existence of other causes operating in conjunction with or in opposition to the assigned cause in a cited case or in general, and also in the case in question. Hunger, for instance, may in certain circumstances prompt to theft; but fear of detection may prevent the act.
3. We must always allow for the evolution, change, and growth of society as tending to modify, by progressive experiences, the safe generalizations, abstractions, or opinions of a former time.

   That is to say, the adequacy of any cause assigned for a known effect may depend on whether or not the conditions we have in mind are really parallel, on the absence of other co-operating or competing causes, and on the law of progress. This same rule of adequacy is equally true in using the reverse process, namely, that of predicting the effects which will probably follow from a known fact or principle asserted as a cause.

When we state some principle or fact and argue as to the consequence or results which are likely to flow from it, in general or in a particular case, we are arguing

from cause to effect. In debating, the advantages of adopting or rejecting a proposed plan, with its complex of benefits and evils, is a causal process of this kind. So Washington argued against foreign alliances because they would lead to international conflict, and Webster opposed the South Carolina Doctrine because it would result in Civil War. As a rule, we first either affirm or seek to establish some principle to guide our judgment in the case in question, and then show also the consequences which will result from its acceptance in the present matter. The perorations of oratory are replete with prophecies setting forth the effects resulting from the adoption of policies or courses of action, with the added devices of imagery, important in emphasis and persuasion.

Further, we may argue directly from effect to effect. If, for example, the process is from one effect to another effect of the same probable cause, the argument may be regarded simply as another name for argument from sign. In the illustration, "the clouds indicate rain," it is hardly reasonable to regard the clouds as a cause of rain, but rather to think of both clouds and rain as effects of some such cause—as the weather bureau might say—as "changes in the barometric pressure." If, however, the process is from one effect to an allied effect of a parallel cause, the argument may be simply regarded as argument from analogy.

Illustration of Causal Reasoning.—In seeking an answer to the question "what is a nationality?" Theodore Ruyssen,[1] after examining six possible causes of nationality, namely, the country, common interests, race, language, religion, and spiritual unity, reaches the con-

[1] American Association for International Conciliation, No. 112.

clusion that "the ideal nation appears to us as the close synthesis of the social soul or collective will, with a system of political institutions." To make clear further the minute care needed in assigning causes for complex facts or circumstances in human affairs, and also to point out the difficulties of causal arguments, the following points in Ruyssen's analysis should be of interest:

1. The interaction of cause and effect.

Does it not seem, after all, that the "natural boundary" theorists by an unconscious sophism mistake for a cause what is but an effect? In interpreting experience we naturally tend to explain what is changeable by what is immutable, what is variable by essential and permanent characteristics. Nothing is more misleading than to account for the life of a people by the form of their country in our atlases of historical geography. The natural features of the great historic countries, Spain, Great Britain, France, are so familiar to us, they have so completely become for us the image of these nations, that there would seem to be a necessary connection between their topography and their history; and surely no one would deny that there is much truth in this view. But it should be remembered that the geography of a nation is itself the product of its history; we need only look at an historical atlas to be assured of this. France has not always reached to the Alps and the Pyrenees, and her northeastern frontier has been subject to constant alteration. Of what existing boundary may we say that it is fixed by the nature of things? If any country might be thought predestined "by nature" to attain national unity, it is certainly Italy, isolated from other nations by the sea and by the highest mountains in Europe. Nevertheless, she remained for centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire but a "geographical expression," and even to-day she must fight hard to conquer the frontiers which nature seemed to have assigned to her. Doubtless, it is true enough that in one sense the country makes the people, modifies their character and imposes on them certain habits; but, on the other hand, we may also say that the people fashion their country by their dreams and aspirations.

2. Partial and temporary causes.

How explain by motives of self-interest the Polish insurrection of 1863, a movement of chivalrous folly condemned from the outset to a cruel defeat? In short, common interests may unite *for a time* even hostile forces, just as they may bring into opposition persons or groups otherwise sympathetic. But the national bond is of a different sort than a convenient compromise; a nation is not a syndicate of desires.

3. Multiplicity of causes.

The most important part of Renan's analysis, in my opinion, is his masterly criticism of the theories which would determine nationality by race. The progress of ethnography and of anthropology in the last thirty years has not in the least weakened Renan's position. Can any one use the term race in its strictest sense as implying a number of individuals of the same species linked together by a common ancestry? It is obvious that to do so we should have to seek out the very origins of the human race which are lost in the uncertain distances of prehistoric times; rather a question of metaphysics than of physiology or of human geography. We believe no longer in the mythical division of the human family among the sons of Noah, and yet we do not know whether the forest of humanity has sprung from a single root or from a number of diverse stocks. Anthropology knows no instance of a pure race, nor a single example of any race unable to blend itself with another. We may, it is true, by comparing certain outstanding human characteristics, such as stature, facial angle, cephalic index, and so forth, determine the predominance of certain types in a given region and explain the variations from this by migrations or by the resurgence of very ancient homogeneous races; but, apart from the fact that no one knows whether these races are themselves pure or composite, the indications of anthropology are confirmed neither by linguistics nor history. Nowhere can the geographical distribution of languages be traced back to the division of populations into tall, blond dolichocephalic and dark, short brachycephalic types.

4. Relative value of causes.

But we readily perceive that in a race so considered, the factor which is considered of first importance, physiological inheritance, plays an uncertain but always secondary part, and that the truly determining factors are climate, costume, or habits of life. It will be found, for example, that peoples undoubtedly akin may become decidedly different from each other—as with the Alsatians and the Badenese—whereas populations that grow by immigration soon impose upon the newcomers a new type; for instance, the Yankee type which asserts itself in so curious a fashion after two or three generations among immigrants of every descent who have come to the United States, Anglo-Saxons, Germans, Jews, Italians, and all others. From this it follows that race, wherever it constitutes an effective social reality, is fully as much a *product of* as a *factor in* the national life. A nation is not determined by its heredity; it is a living organism which is both adapted to its environment and adapts that to itself. Or better said—for this mutual adaptation might be a wholly material process—a nation bears the imprint of its spiritual vitality on its brow and in its sinews. It may degenerate from alcohol, debauchery, overstrain, or deliberate surrender; or it may enhance, rebuild, and beautify its life by good hygiene, athletics, schooling, military training, games, the arts, and the intensive development of spiritual life.

In a word, nationalities are populations that aspire to become nations. Like nations they are complex collectivities, drawing their sentiment of unity from a great number of sources, among which the moral factors, traditions, religion, and a common speech are the most essential. But in order to become nations in the full sense of the term they must gain that political independence through which means alone a complete social life can manifest itself.

Causal Argument, and the Other Sources of Reasoning.—Moreover, the reader will notice in these quotations that, while the inquiry is obviously the solution of a causal problem, there is used much concrete material, involving the principle of resemblance and dif-

ference as well as much generalization in order to make the argument clear and intelligible.

It has been said that all arguments in their final analysis, and when carried to completion, may be shown to involve an inference from a complex of four relations. The illustration previously used may be stated for causal argument thus: This smoke is the result of fire, for smoke usually means fire. In other cases when I have seen smoke I have found fire, or where there is smoke there is (or has been) fire.

Differences of View-Point.—The points of view of men differ so widely, as, for instance, between scientist and business man, lawyer and doctor, professor and student, that we often despair of agreeing with others on a single cause for a known effect. On this account, no doubt, we sometimes use exposition to show how a proposed plan will work, and also persuasion to create a wish or desire for its adoption. An attractive *how* is more effective than a disputed *why*.

Much of our causal reasoning, indeed, is merely explanatory and not fundamental, which suggests the uncertainty of all human reasoning about nature, life, and conduct.

IV. Inductive and Deductive Arguments

If the source from which the conclusion is drawn is regarded as having its basis in the relation which a particular bears to a general or a general to a particular, the argument may be called inductive or deductive.

If the reasoning moves from a general to a particular, from a more to a less general, the process is deductive. Hence, when we say all sailors are swimmers—Jones is a sailor; therefore, Jones is a swimmer—we reason

deductively. If, on the other hand, the reasoning moves from a particular to a general, from a less to a more general, the process is inductive. Hence, when we say that because John who is a sailor is a swimmer, and because William who is a sailor is a swimmer, etc.—therefore, all sailors are swimmers—we reason inductively. This classification, of course, is quite independent of the source of the reasoning employed as involving the principle of simple association, of resemblance, or of cause to effect. Any such relations may exist either in deduction or in induction.

Whatever may be the sources of our particulars, facts, or instances, whether they come from our own experience and observation, or are made known to us by reading, or by the testimony of witnesses given in person; we may draw inferences from them, as to facts not yet known or as to general truths to which the particulars are related. If, when travelling through the West, we should happen to observe that the faces of all the Indians we have seen were invariably of a reddish color, we should perhaps feel justified in concluding, therefore, that the faces of all Indians are invariably of this color. The reasoning is inductive, for it proceeds obviously from the hue of a number of Indians separately observed to a general conclusion about all Indians. Or, if upon reading the lives of several Presidents of the United States, for instance, of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, we should be impressed by their ability and character, and should conclude consequently that "all Presidents of the United States are men of ability and character," the reasoning would be inductive. We should draw a general conclusion about all Presidents from what we had read about several.

The Inevitable Assumption.—The great value of inductive reasoning appears to be in those cases where it is impossible to examine all the particulars or facts. It is reasoning from the known to the unknown. Because the Indians whom we have observed are red, we infer that all persons called Indians possess a like appearance; because several Presidents whose lives we have read appear to us as men of ability and character, we infer that all men belonging to the class, Presidents, possess similar characteristics. But the question arises, How can we say anything accurately about "all Indians" or "all Presidents," since we have only seen a few Indians and have read the lives of but three Presidents? The answer is that the argument from induction is based upon the law of uniformity. In other words, there lies at the bottom of all inductive reasoning this unexpressed assumption: that what is true of several particulars making up a general is true of the general, "what is true of several members of a class is true of the class as a whole."

The Inductive Formula.—If we attempt to put inductive reasoning into a formula, it is clear that what has been called the law of uniformity must appear as a premise, for it has been shown to be necessary to the inductive conclusion. The formula may be stated thus:

I. Assumption. What is true of several members of a class is true of the class as a whole.

II. Facts.
   a. President Washington was a man of character and ability.
   b. President Jefferson was ditto.
   c. President Lincoln was ditto.

III. Therefore, all Presidents of the United States have been men of character and ability.

The previous illustrations are simple illustrations of the loose inductions which we ordinarily make in daily affairs.

Induction, the Scientific Method of Investigation.—Induction should proceed by hypothesis and verification. The scientist who reasons pre-eminently by induction is patient in his investigations and cautious in drawing his conclusions. Starting with a few facts, he will make some inference provisionally and assert it as an hypothesis. This is hardly more than a conjecture made for the purposes of the investigation, and to be modified or even abandoned as the subsequent discovery of facts may seem to require. That hypothesis which will explain all the facts in the best possible way is the one finally to be accepted and affirmed as true.

Kinds of Induction.—Induction is of two kinds, imperfect or perfect. *Imperfect induction* is induction based on the above assumption. It is of three kinds according as it is regarded as involving the other sources or bases of reasoning, *e. g.*, in the first place there is the causal or scientific method, in which the generalization resulting is a cause—*e. g.*, the law of gravitation. *Second*, there is the method of resemblance, in which the generalization is a conclusion drawn from other cases similar in character; *e. g.*, arsenic will prove fatal because of cited cases in which death resulted. *Third*, the method of association in which the generalization is the result of previous associations in experience, *e. g.*, clouds are a sign of rain. Here again we may see how the name we affix to any argument will depend on the point of view. *Perfect induction* does not involve an assumption. It is simply a method of enumeration, *e. g.*, there are fifteen persons in this room.

Deduction, a Ready Mode of Reasoning.—Deduction is a thoroughly simple, natural process. In ordinary affairs we constantly employ general ideas to aid us in reaching a conclusion concerning a particular instance. On seeing clouds I infer that it is likely to rain to-morrow, because clouds are usually followed by rain. Having to reach a railroad-station a mile off, I allow myself fifteen minutes, because I have found out from experience that I can walk a mile comfortably in that time. I attend the Princeton-Yale football game, feeling sure that it will be worth seeing, because all these contests in the past have been worth seeing, and so on. The process is, in each of these illustrations, deductive—from the general to the particular. I have merely applied what I already know from past general experience to aid me in drawing conclusions in the several special instances. I have done this, too, without specially investigating the truth of the general ideas employed. Hence, it may appear that deduction is a ready method of reasoning and proof involving the use of generalizations already known or ascertained.

Deduction, Supplemented by Induction.—The generalizations employed by deduction usually have their source in past experience. If we examine the general propositions used in the preceding illustrations, we find that they rest upon previous inductions. It is from the observation of a number of separate instances that I have been able to say that clouds usually mean rain; it is from the recollection of the several Princeton-Yale games that I have witnessed that I have confidently asserted that all Princeton-Yale games are worth seeing; and it is because I have walked a mile comfortably in fifteen minutes on this and that occasion that I feel justified

in assuming in general that I can walk that distance comfortably in that time. "Deduction," says President Hibben, "that reaches other than purely abstract and formal conclusions must rest upon induction for the material to form its premises." Thus, while deduction is a ready mode of reasoning, and may be sufficient for one's purposes, we may have need to use induction in order to make the conclusion more certain by establishing the generalization on which the deduction is based.

The student should beware of the use of hastily assumed generalizations in reasoning. "The boasted Athenians," said Doctor Johnson, "were barbarians. The mass of every people must be barbarous, where there is no printing." Macaulay shows that this reasoning was based on a generalization which was both incorrectly derived and false.

Deduction, a Method of Criticism.—We have been thinking of deduction constructively, as a mode of reasoning or proof; but it may be equally important for us to be able to criticise scientifically the accuracy of a reasoning process. We are sometimes less concerned about the truth of the propositions used in reasoning than about the consistency of the reasoning itself. In such cases, we can test the process in question by throwing it into the form of a syllogism.

The syllogism is a group of three propositions; namely, the conclusion or proposition to be proved and two other propositions from which the conclusion is drawn. If now we say "the man is intelligent," "an intelligent person is rare," we can conclude therefore that "the man is a rare person." The reasoning is in accord with the known principle that things which are equal to the same things are equal to each other. This group is called a syllogism. But we cannot draw a conclusion from

any two propositions; they must have one term in common, as, for instance, "intelligent." There are three terms in a syllogism, the first and second propositions having one term alike and each a particular term, which reappear in the conclusion. Not only must there be a common term in the first two propositions but in one of them this term must be, as it is called, distributed. A universal proposition distributes its subject, that is, makes it include all members of its class taken separately, while a particular proposition does not. If we say "John is intelligent," "William is intelligent," we have a common term, but since it is not distributed we cannot draw a new conclusion. In the correct syllogism, however, the common or middle term, as it is usually called, was distributed in the proposition "an intelligent person is rare," for an assertion was made of all intelligent persons. The first two propositions in a syllogism are called premises; the premise which contains the middle term and the predicate of the conclusion is called the major premise, that which contains the middle term and the subject of the conclusion is called the minor premise.

This is but one form of syllogism into which our reasoning can be thrown. Altogether there are twenty-four varieties of valid syllogisms, the variations depending on the position of the middle term and on the quantity and quality of the first two propositions. The quantity of a proposition refers to its universal or particular character, the quality to its affirmative or negative.

The Enthymeme.—In debating, the syllogism does not appear in its complete form but with one of its premises suppressed. Such instances of the incomplete formula are known as enthymemes. The syllogism just

mentioned may be stated as an enthymeme thus: the man is a rare person because he is intelligent. Or discarding the major premise we may say: the man is a rare person because an intelligent person is rare. If we argue in the former way we assume, as admitted, that "an intelligent person is rare"; if in the latter, that "he is intelligent." We may see again the need of three propositions in any reasoning that is logically complete. We may also see that, for ordinary purposes, the use of two propositions may be sufficient. An enthymeme, however, can be tested by referring it to a syllogism.

The Chain of Reasoning.—When we reason so that the conclusion of one argument is made the premise of the second argument and so on to a final conclusion, we employ a chain of reasoning. A single argument may indeed be sufficient to establish the conclusion desired, but in case a premise of the argument employed is questioned it may be necessary to formulate another argument in which the disputed premise is made the conclusion. Epictetus remarked that when "death may appear to be an evil, have ready the thought that it is right to avoid evils and that death is unavoidable." What he said was in effect this: (1) Nothing that it is right to avoid is unavoidable; it is right to avoid all evils; therefore, no evils are unavoidable. (2) No evils are unavoidable; death is unavoidable; therefore, death is no evil. The reasoning is here thrown into two syllogisms, the major premise of the first being supplied. We may put this chain of reasoning into a series of enthymemes as follows:

Death is not an evil, because

A. All evils are avoidable, for

1. All that it is right to avoid is avoidable.

The reasoning here is perfectly clear, both the suppressed minor premise of *A*, that "death is unavoidable," and the suppressed minor premise of *A* 1, that "it is right to avoid all evils," being taken for granted.

Two Classes of Fallacies.—Fallacies, or errors in reasoning, have been divided into two classes, formal and material, according as they occur in the form of the reasoning or in the subject-matter. We may mention several cases of formal fallacies: (1) Equivocation, or the use of a word in more than one sense, *e. g.*, England has a responsible cabinet system. Her ministers are responsible, trustworthy men. (2) Amphibology, or ambiguous grammatical structure. This fallacy frequently arises from undue ellipsis or from an improper arrangement in a sentence—*e. g.*, "the duke yet lives that Henry shall depose," "and all the air a solemn stillness holds," Daudet is nearer Trollope than Dickens. (3) Composition, which affirms something of a class separately in the major premise and collectively in the minor, *e. g.*, three and two are two numbers; five is two and three; therefore, five is two numbers. (4) Division, which affirms something of a class collectively in the major premise and separately in the minor, *e. g.*, all the angles of a triangle (taken together) are equal to two right angles; these are angles of a triangle (separately); therefore, these angles are equal to two right angles. (5) Accent, or a grammatical structure in which the ambiguity arises from a misplaced accent, *e. g.*, "thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor," as signifying that we can bear false witness against others.

Several cases of material fallacies may be mentioned. (1) *Petitii Principii*, begging the question, which con-

sists in its simplest form of attempting to prove a proposition by itself, *e. g.*, opium produces sleep, because it is soporific. Broadly, it is the fallacy of assuming without proof. (2) *Ignoratio Elenchi*, irrelevant conclusion, *e. g.*, arguing that the sexes are mentally equal while pretending to argue that the suffrage should be given to women. (3) *Non Sequitur*, or false consequent, *e. g.*, the ground is wet; therefore, it has rained. (4) *Non causa pro causa*, or the false cause, *e. g.*, one of a party of thirteen who sat at a table died within a year; therefore, the unlucky number at the table was the cause of his death. (5) *Plurium Interrogationum*, or many questions. "Have you left off your bad habits?" This question cannot be answered categorically without an injurious admission. The remedy is to separate it thus: Have you bad habits? If so, have you left them off?

A Common Ground in Argument.—Valuable as is the preceding classification of arguments for an understanding of the nature and scope of the argumentative processes, it should always be remembered that the end of argument is agreement. Logically, unless there is agreement in the premises, there can be no agreement in the conclusion. There must be some common ground, some basis of agreement in the premises and reasoning.

The practical debater simply applies portions of his own experiences, with insight and tact, to the needs of a particular situation. But the getting of another to recognize one's point of view sufficiently to make him change his mind is a very difficult matter. It will usually demand the ability "to see others as they see themselves," and will require considerable insight, a process of interpretation which is both perceptual and associative in character.

In general, an effective argument is an argument well imaged; as, for example, one whose major premise, minor premise, and conclusion are so vividly presented that the conclusion is instinctively visualized as a reality by the mind to which it is addressed. But in imaging ideas, we shall have need to consider not only our own views but to find the ideas and beliefs in the mind and experience of our hearers with which we may connect the views urged by us. We can take care, for instance, that the opinion or action urged is in accord with some *class* conception or "principle of action which is a *fixed* and *stable* part" of the ego of the persons we seek to convince.

"It may be said in general," says James, "that a great part of every deliberation consists in the turning over of all the possible modes of conceiving of the doing or not doing of the act in point. The moment we hit upon a conception which lets us apply some principle of action which is a fixed and stable part of our ego, our state of doubt is at an end. Persons of authority, who have to make many decisions in a day, carry with them a set of heads of classification, each bearing its volitional consequence, and under these they seek as far as possible to arrange each new emergency as it occurs. It is where the species is without precedent, to which consequently no cut-and-dried maxim will apply, that we feel at a loss, and are distressed at the indeterminateness of our task. As soon, however, as we see our way to a familiar classification, we are at ease again. In action as in reasoning, then, the great thing is the quest of the right conception." [1]

There may also be a *common ground of feeling* as well

[1] "Briefer Course," 430.

as of reasoning. But even when it is necessary to arouse attention and interest in order to overcome prejudice or belief, to enlist sympathy, or to stiffen the will before we can get our views accepted by another, the image-making process may be said to be the handmaiden of that type of the associative process which we called the logical. We shall see this more fully later on.

V. The Refutation

It is not to be supposed that the rebuttal is very different in character from the first speech. In the opening address, for example, a debater will avoid fallacy and assertion, things which he may hope to detect in the argument of his opponent. There is no class of arguments peculiar to refutation which may not be employed directly. The same power of analysis, knowledge of evidence, skill in the construction of a logical framework, tact in persuasion are to be employed in both speeches. It is to be remembered, too, that the general aim of debate is to compel assent or to induce action.

As distinguished from the first speech, the rebuttal deals with objections. Its specific aim, therefore, is to answer objections advanced in opposition, and to offer objections to opposed arguments. Arguments which are in form constructive belong to the first speech; those in form destructive to the rebuttal. But this rule is not invariable, for it is frequently wise to anticipate objections, and answer them in the first speech. This is done upon two grounds: either to remove prejudice or to weaken the force of the objections. Even in rebuttal if an opponent's objections are weak, very little time should be consumed in answering them. They may, indeed, be ignored; in which case the debater will

employ his time in presenting new arguments, in enforcing an argument already advanced, in recapitulation, or in an appeal to the audience. It is important to note that a great amount of attention devoted to objections will give the impression of a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker in his own constructive arguments.

Preparation for the rebuttal must include a thorough and minute study of the opposite side. Several suggestions may be made. In the first place, the debater should be so thoroughly acquainted with the arguments usually employed in support of the opposite side and the usual form of stating them, that he cannot be taken by surprise. Again, he should be equally well acquainted with the arguments usually advanced to refute the opposite arguments, including their usual form of statement, so that he will know exactly with the least hesitation how each argument may be answered. But a study of only the usual arguments will be inadequate if an opponent is specially skilled, and impossible if the question is under discussion for the first time. At all events, the successful debater will hardly be content to quit work when he has guarded his defenses and directed his attacks in only the conventional ways; to many a man real work is just begun. He will institute new inquiries, make new researches, glean new facts from distant quarters, give old ones new applications, find new theories, unexpected devices; in a word, he will seek to discover by painstaking effort the strongest possible objections and the strongest possible ways of overturning them.

An important limitation is imposed upon the discussion by the presentation of the arguments upon the op-

posite side. The affirmative's rebuttal is conditioned by the negative's answer or opening speech, the negative's rebuttal by the affirmative's opening speech. The practical rule is this: limit discussion to arguments actually presented by your opponent. Your opposition is no longer general and undefined, it is not now merely supposed or anticipated, but specific, real, and present. Do not, for example, state that "my opponent will say such and such a thing," but answer arguments actually made. Do not set things up for the sake of destroying them, fight windmills, or deal with possible arguments not actually employed. Your attack should be directed against your opponent's case as made up by him and with the evidence which he adduced to support it.

Selection.—It is sometimes difficult to consent to throw away unnecessary ideas. But, unfortunately, the things which come into the mind on first hearing an argument are not always the most important. Your objection being a weak one, it might be omitted altogether, and a little coolness and deliberation might cause you to canvass the subject more thoroughly and reveal to you a stronger answer. Or perhaps the argument should be ignored. Equally important with a knowledge of the way each argument should be answered is the exercise of judgment and tact in the selection of the argument to be attacked. Not every main argument of your opponent is to be answered, for there are usually strong arguments upon both sides. "There are objections," says Doctor Johnson, "against a plenum and objections against a vacuum; but one of them must be true." To attempt, however, to answer an argument most probably true, will not only fail, but, in ad-

dition, serve to emphasize the weakness of your own argument. If, therefore, you believe an argument to be valid, do not attempt to refute it. If it should seem necessary to notice it, you can employ what may be called a method of depreciatory contrast. You can do this, for instance, by saying: "Even supposing such or such a proposition of my opponent to be true, it is of much less significance, of much inferior moment, than such or such a proposition of my own." Or, again, without denying the proposition, perhaps you can attack its proof. In doing this, you will keep clearly in view the distinction that the question is not whether the hearers believe the proposition true, but whether its truth is conclusively proved.

A debater can attack all the main propositions set up by his opponent; he can attack only one main proposition, admitting or ignoring the others; or he can admit or ignore them all, attacking only the general conclusion. It is here to be said that the arguments employed most frequently in debate are not demonstrative but only probable in their force; and, consequently, that the debater's aim is to show that the preponderance of probability rests upon his side. If, then, this preponderance can be shown as to the general conclusion, it is not material that some objections are passed by.

What objections are to be selected for attack? What ignored? What admitted? These questions, in practice, are not easy of solution. The decisions should be made with deliberation after accurately weighing in balance each argument against its corresponding objection. The strongest arguments which can be most successfully rebutted should be made in every case in the contest the objects of attack.

Fundamental Criticism.—Where shall the argument be attacked? Manifestly, at essential or fundamental points. But these points should be vital. A spear thrust through the cuirass or gorget is more formidable than one through the joints of the greaves. Find the vital, vulnerable points in your opponent's main argument. Deal with the argumentation as a whole, and not only in its minor divisions. Construct for yourself, if possible, the main syllogism of your opponent's argumentation and notice minor syllogisms only when your criticism of them can be shown to affect the main syllogism. Now, the syllogism of an argument ought to be such that its premises can either be granted or proved to be true; and its reasoning ought to be conclusive. If, however, the reasoning is inconclusive or either premise is false absolutely or most probably, the fact should be made evident.

Burke's argument that "taxation without representation is unjust" can be reduced to the following syllogism: taxation without an equivalent is unjust; the taxation of the American colonies is without an equivalent; therefore, the taxation of the American colonies is unjust. In examining this syllogism two things will appear: *First*, that the reasoning is conclusive; *second*, that the major premise can perhaps be admitted to be true, because taxation is of the nature of a contract. It will be discerned, however, that the minor premise demands proof, which, indeed, Burke did not ignore. But if it should be expedient to attack this argument, the issue would be raised upon the truth of the minor premise. Such criticism would be relevant and fundamental, its success or effectiveness depending, of course, upon the relative force of the arguments pro

and con. A fundamental criticism directed against slight misstatements, discrepancies, or minor and isolated points will be, of necessity, weak and superficial.

Two General Methods of Refutation.—The susceptibility of any proposition to attack is due either to the existence of an error in the argument or to the existence of other facts not taken into consideration. Sometimes a part of the facts is suppressed. This is what happened in the memorable trial of Bardell against Pickwick. In our amusement here at the incident of the finding of Mrs. Bardell in the arms of the defendant, who was soothing and caressing her, we almost overlook, with Sergeant Buzfuz, the fact that Mrs. Bardell was ill and had just fainted away. Indeed, it is not surprising that the verdict went to the plaintiff. Now what happened here intentionally can occur accidentally from an ignorance of a part of the facts. There are in general but two ways of refuting a proposition: overthrowing its supporting argument and proving the contradictory. They are not mutually exclusive, for a speaker can employ both methods in attacking one proposition. The opposed structure is destroyed first, and the new one is erected upon its ruins. You can find a good instance in Burke's speech on American taxation. He stated that there are two modes of discussing the subject, one narrow and simple, another broad and historic. He answered the arguments offered in the restrictive mode, and then expounded the comprehensive view which he thought was the proper one.

In overthrowing an argument already advanced in support of a proposition, the reasoner may point out errors in the syllogistic process. Is there an error in distribution of terms? Are there two negative premises

or two particular premises or some formal defect in structure? If so, the argument will fall. Again, are both premises true? In case one is doubtful, is it supported by evidence? Is the evidence offered relevant, material, and competent? Failing here, it can be concluded that the proof is inadequate and the premise presumably false; for a proof which does not succeed, raises, indeed, a strong presumption against the proposition it seeks to defend. In refuting a proposition by overthrowing the argument it is generally advisable to show not only where the faulty process lies, but, in addition, exactly how it can be supposed to have arisen.

Suppose the point at issue—to illustrate the second method—is supported by a syllogism which is logically sound, and the premises of which seem true; still it may happen that an opponent can find sufficient evidence to prove a proposition which will contradict the one attacked. While the method in such a procedure is constructive in that it proves a new proposition, it is destructive in that the proposition proved is incompatible with that of the opposite side. The proof of an alibi, for instance, by a man charged with murder upon circumstantial evidence is just as complete a refutation as if the evidence were shown to be "irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent." Perhaps, usually, it will appear that where this method is employed the opponent's argument is not strong in probative force. The chief value of the method lies in the fact that it is practicable when no other form of proof can be procured. Not only, however, may the proposition in issue be refuted by direct opposed argument, but also the premises (of which the proposition in issue is the conclusion).

Special types of argument, useful in refutation—*reductio ad absurdum*, the dilemma, and the method of the residue—have been considered under the argument from example.

CHAPTER V

EVIDENCE

The Proof.—The word proof, according to Best, "seems properly to mean anything which serves either immediately or mediately to convince the mind of the truth or falsehood of a fact or proposition."

Evidence and argument are parts of proof. Any fact from which another fact or proposition can be inferred may be called evidence, may *prove* the matter in question. Any operation of reasoning, by which we proceed from one fact to another fact, or from a number of facts to a generalization, or by syllogism through two assumptions to a conclusion may be called an argument, may tend to *prove* the matter in question. The lawyer, for example, customarily acquaints the court both with the evidence and the logical processes by which he would establish or disestablish the matter in issue. On an issue of fact his brief contains generally not only a statement of the facts but also an argument based upon them. The sum total thus presented is called by the lawyer the *proof* of his case. It may appear also that evidence and argument are not only parts of proof but the chief means or instruments employed in making proof.

The difference between evidence and argument, easy enough to recognize in practice, is a little more difficult to express accurately in words. Argument is a form of expression of the processes of the mind in arriving

at a conclusion from a given premise or datum; while evidence, though it often does furnish or provide this premise or datum, is always outside these mental processes.

Meaning of Term.—Primarily, the word evidence signifies the state of being "evident, plain, apparent, or notorious," but it also has a causative force as that which renders evident, makes proof. In general, any matter of fact or principle offered to prove a doubtful matter is evidence as to that matter.

The word is in law used in a restricted sense. "Evidence means," says Stephen, "(1) statements made by witnesses in court under a legal sanction in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; (2) documents produced for the inspection of the court or judge"; these two forms of evidence being called, respectively, oral and documentary. Evidence, says Greenleaf, is "that which is legally submitted to a competent tribunal as a means of ascertaining the truth of any alleged matter of fact under inquiry; means of making proof; the latter, strictly speaking, not being synonymous with evidence, but rather the effect of it." According to Best, it is "that which generates proof. . . . It is any matter of fact, the effect, tendency, or design of which is to produce in the mind a persuasion affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence of some other matter of fact." We shall note that the phrase "matter of fact," which appears in each of these definitions, serves to exclude the use of evidence in connection with a matter of law. A precedent cited to establish a legal principle is not, in the legal sense, evidence. It is called an authority.

The Need of Evidence.—We must, of course, reason in making proof and reason soundly; this is not the

full requirement. Now, in formal logic, it is not regarded as necessary that the premises of an argument should be true. They are simply taken for granted. The syllogism denoted thus: All B is C, All A is B, All A is C, may be expanded so as to read: Assuming that All B is C, and assuming that All A is B, it will follow that All A is C. We can entertain, that is to say, the question of the correctness of an argument quite apart from the matter of the truth of its premises. The assumptions made will enable us to see more clearly exactly how we can arrive at a conclusion. We make such assumptions in debating, as we say "for the sake of the argument," when, for instance, we wish to expose a fallacy in our opponent's reasoning.

But in constructing a proof, it is just as important that the premises or steps of an argument should possess truth or reality as that the relation between the premises should warrant the conclusion. The legal rule is that nothing, material to the issue, shall be taken for granted and that whoever asserts must prove. Every one who has had any experience in debating, most likely has witnessed the wreck that comes of an argument composed of statements which are false or unsupported—it amounts to the same thing. Very probably the antagonist upset the conclusion in a sentence by merely denying the unwarranted premise. His denial being as good as the original assertion, the reasoning founded on the latter simply went for nothing. Recently, in an intercollegiate debate it was argued that if the speaker of the House of Representatives were deprived of certain specified powers which were said to facilitate legislation, the United States would be rid of the evils of overlegislation. The argument was refuted by a denial

that the United States are suffering from overlegislation, the evil being arbitrarily assumed and not proved. Or, again, quite probably we have seen an adversary actually prove that the very opposite of a statement, employed in an argument, was the real truth of the matter. Fully armed with the facts, he constructed his counter-proof. Then, the premise in question being false, it was argued that the conclusion was false also, and the whole argument fell with a crash. An argument raised on such premises is a house built upon the sand.

The debater must be ever mindful of the danger of sheer assertion. The result has no value as evidence, no place in any scheme which aims at conviction. For observe that, when free rein is given to the practice, it is not possible to draw any conclusion about the truth of the points in dispute. The whole contest is reduced to a question of logic, and—what is worse—of bad logic usually. For the speaker's effort to defend some rash statement, not infrequently in the heat of controversy, gives rise to personalities and the various kinds of sophistry—offenses against taste as well as judgment. And so the trouble deepens.

The habit of assertion, like all bad habits, is not acquired with difficulty; sometimes it comes from carelessness or laziness, sometimes from prejudice. Therefore we may insist that the debater should make a thorough investigation of his case, distinguishing the true from the false, and assessing ideas at proper values. He should not only know what the real facts are, what their proper weight and force are, but for every doubtful declaration be prepared to produce his authority, his examples, his statistics, that is, his evidence. In making his investigations, moreover, he should main-

tain as far as possible an impartial attitude so as not to prejudge his conclusions. Doctor Johnson's failure as a literary critic has been ascribed by Macaulay to prejudice. "The judgments which Johnson passed on books," he says, "were in his own time regarded with superstitious veneration; and in our time are generally treated with indiscriminate contempt. They are the judgments of a strong but enslaved understanding. The mind of the critic was hedged round by an uninterrupted fence of prejudices and superstitions. Within his narrow limits he displayed an activity which ought to have enabled him to clear the barrier that confined him. How it chanced that a man who reasoned on his premises so ably should assume his premises so foolishly, is one of the greatest mysteries of human nature. The same inconsistency may be observed in the schoolmen of the Middle Ages. Those writers show so much acuteness and force of mind in arguing on their wretched data, that a modern reader is perpetually at a loss to comprehend how such minds came by such data. Not a flaw in the superstructure of the theory which they are rearing escapes their vigilance. Yet they are blind to the obvious unsoundness of the foundation. It is the same with some eminent lawyers."

The Need of Assumptions.—We have been speaking of assumptions as if they were altogether unwarrantable, as if assertions must always be supported by evidence. We were dealing, however, only with that class of evidence which is derived from experience. You must know that experience supplies to us not only most of the questions of public debate but most of the data upon which we rear our arguments. It is the events which go on about us, that we can see with our eyes

and touch with our hands—the knowledge of the senses —from which in practice our reasoning perhaps most often starts. But there is another way of discovering truth and hence of deriving our premises. We know some things with certitude without the presence of external evidence. Such knowledge as we get through our intuitions we do not have to prove. They carry their proofs in themselves. We know directly, for instance, such things as that we exist, that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, or that a lie is morally bad.

Argument is hardly possible without assumptions, for our intuitions offer a basis of proof that is more ultimate than experience. Let us take a single instance in illustration of this. A man is accused of murder. Trustworthy witnesses testify to his presence in some other place when the deed occurred, and he is therefore discharged. Now it is quite true that the testimony was sufficient to establish the fact of the alibi; but the alibi warranted the acquittal because we know intuitively that a person cannot be in two places at one and the same time. This assumption is necessarily involved in the argument.

Such assumptions may be expressed or merely implied. The beginning of the Declaration of Independence was supposed, at the time, to proclaim self-evident truths concerning natural equality. There is, indeed, an advantage in setting out from an *a priori* truth, for it affords at once a common ground, a common point of sight, for the contrast of truth and error add an illumination of differences. In the great orations, you can find illustrations that assume such premises as a universal love of liberty, desire for happiness, and so

on. Burke called himself a "philosopher in action," meaning the emphasis to fall upon the final word. But his well-known dislike for abstract principles in political debates did not prevent his use of religious and moral sentiments when enforcing a maxim of civil prudence.

Classes of Evidence

Direct and Circumstantial.—According as a fact offered to produce an immediate or an ultimate conviction concerning the point at issue, the evidence is said to be direct or circumstantial.

The statement of a policeman that he saw the accused do the shooting charged, the revolver taken from him immediately after the shooting, and the written confession made by him later in his cell is, in each instance, direct evidence connecting the accused with the commission of the deed. In the suit of Shylock *vs.* Antonio ("The Merchant of Venice"), the plaintiff, by the terms of a contract, claims a forfeiture from the defendant for non-payment of a loan. The bond on which Shylock's argument is based is direct evidence. The document, it will be remembered, becomes a boomerang, and makes the coveted forfeiture altogether undesirable to Shylock. Portia, in interpreting the contract, says:

> "This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood;
> The words expressly are a pound of flesh:
> Take thou thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh;
> But in the cutting if thou dost shed
> One drop of Christian blood thy bonds and goods
> Are, by the laws of Venice, confiscate
> Unto the state of Venice."

On the other hand, when the fact is such that another fact is to be inferred from it before a conviction can result, the evidence is circumstantial. If the policeman, in the instance previously cited, had said that he saw the accused in the neighborhood immediately after the shooting and had arrested him merely as a suspicious character, or if the revolver, instead of being taken from the hands of the accused, had been found in the street near by, we could hardly grant that the accused did the shooting without inferring in the first case, for instance, that he was present at the time and place of the occurrence, and in the second, that the revolver was in his possession when the shooting took place. It is expected, in circumstantial evidence, that the court or the jury will go through a process of reasoning and make inferences from the fact offered to some other fact in dispute. The character Eugene Aram ("Eugene Aram," by Bulwer) sought to free himself from the charge of murder, by arguing in his own defense that his past general good conduct was inconsistent with the commission of the crime of which he was accused.

"My lord, the tenor of my life contradicts this indictment. Who can look back over what is known of my former years and charge me with one vice—one offense? No! I concerted not schemes of fraud—projected no violence—injured no man's property or person. My days were honestly laborious—my nights intensely studious. This egotism is not presumptuous—is not unreasonable. What man, after a temperate use of life, a series of thinking and acting regularly, without one single deviation from a sober and even tenor of conduct, ever plunged into the depth of crime precipitately and at once? Mankind are not instantaneously

corrupted. Villainy is always progressive. We decline from right—not suddenly, but step by step."

Direct and circumstantial evidence may be conclusive or presumptive in force; yet, theoretically, the latter is the inferior mode of proof. This may have been supposed from the statement that in the one a conviction follows immediately, and in the other ultimately. Since the facts offered as circumstantial evidence are more remote from the issue, it is clear that a given portion of circumstantial evidence will have less weight than an equal portion of evidence that is direct. Circumstantial evidence may be regarded simply as a substitute for direct, to be employed to prove what otherwise it might not be possible to prove. Its force will depend on the "number, weight, independence, and consistency" of the various links making up the chain.

Jury Verdicts Upon Circumstantial Evidence.—There are instances where after a conviction on circumstantial evidence the prisoner has confessed his guilt. A good example is the case of Courvoiser, the valet and murderer of Lord Wm. Russell in 1840. Here there was no direct testimony whatever to connect the accused with the crime, and there were circumstances designed by the accused to suggest that it was the work of burglars. It was proved, however, that the accused had an opportunity of committing the crime, that some of the abstracted property had been concealed in his pantry, and that he personally had disposed of other portions of it. The evidence, besides, excluded the reasonable belief that any other than the prisoner was guilty, and upon these grounds he was convicted and afterward confessed.

On the other hand, there have been cases, exceedingly rare, in which a miscarriage of justice and the conviction of the innocent instead of the guilty have resulted from a reliance of the jury upon circumstantial evidence. The most remarkable of these that have occurred arose out of a burglary committed at the rectory of Edlingham in 1879. Two burglars, one of whom shot at the rector, were seen on the night by the rector and another person. Two men were arrested and tried for the crime at Northumberton Assizes in 1879. Neither the rector nor the other person who had seen the burglars was able to identify the prisoners, and the defense was that the case for the prosecution was entirely one of mistaken identity. But a chisel found in the room where the crime was committed was traced to the possession of the prisoners; a piece of newspaper picked up in the same room was found to correspond with a piece in the coat of one of the prisoners, and footmarks found near the scene of the crime corresponded with those of the prisoners.

The jury, on this evidence, found them guilty, and they were sentenced to penal servitude for life. They served in the convict settlement at Portsmouth for nine years, when, in 1888, the true burglars, two men other than those that had been convicted, confessed to the crime. Inquiries were made by the authorities, with the result that the men who had been convicted on the evidence of the chisel, the newspaper, and the footmarks were set at liberty.

Personal, Real, and Documentary.—There are three sources of evidence: persons, things, and documents. On this basis, Best has classified legal evidence as personal, real, and documentary. In judicial matters the

most useful division of evidence is undoubtedly that into direct and circumstantial; but an examination of the second classification may serve to clear up some doubtful matters.

The evidence of witnesses—persons who inform the tribunal respecting facts—is (1) *personal evidence.* Such evidence in general must concern matters of knowledge rather than opinion or hearsay. Expert witnesses, however, are allowed to give their opinions upon facts of which they have no personal knowledge. They are persons specially skilled in the matters upon which they testify.

It is extremely difficult for the ordinary witness to separate *opinion* from *knowledge.* He is, indeed, a very good witness who when testifying as to what he saw or heard is able to eliminate his personal views and inferences. There are tests for the credibility of the ordinary witness, such as his veracity, interest, physical soundness, and so on, but nowadays the average person is deemed competent to give testimony in the courts.

It should not be overlooked that the degree of skill, reputation, or experience possessed by expert witnesses is a matter of considerable importance; for where expert witnesses are employed by both sides, they, as a matter of course, give conflicting testimony, in which case their "expertness" may be called in question.

Expert testimony of an interesting scientific character was brought out in the trial of the person accused of poisoning by arsenic a certain Mary Stannard. Now, the accused admitted having bought an ounce of arsenic from a drug-store on the day the girl died, but stated he had deposited it in his barn, where it could be found intact. The State claimed that this arsenic was pur-

chased and placed in the barn subsequent to the arrest, and hence could not have been that bought of the druggist by the accused on the day of the girl's death. Professor Edward S. Dana, of Yale University, was called in as expert witness for the State. He procured a sample of arsenic from the druggist's jar[1] and also a sample of that found in the barn, and endeavored to determine whether or not they could have come from the same source. By means of a microscope he noticed (1) certain differences in the constituent parts of the two samples, *e. g.*, in the size and lustre of crystals, lumps, dust, etc. He then examined ninety-two samples of arsenic representing a number of different sources and found (2) that all samples from the same source showed uniformity in composition. Hence he inferred that (3) the drug-store and barn samples could not have come from the same source, and hence that the barn sample could not have been taken from the druggist's jar.

From this illustration it is clear that expert testimony is quite different from the testimony of the ordinary witness. If it had happened that some one had actually witnessed the purchase of the barn arsenic at another place, this person might have testified as an ordinary witness to such a fact. In the case in question, however, Professor Dana merely expressed an opinion to the effect that the barn sample could not have been taken from the druggist's jar. This opinion was a conclusion drawn by an expert after a careful investigation of facts. To observe and explain these facts, moreover, required skill of a very special character.

The term (2) *real evidence* explains itself (from *res*, a thing). This division of evidence into personal and

[1] "Commercial Arsenic," Edward S. Dana.

real, it may be observed, is analogous to the usual legal classification of property (personal and real). Real evidence means "all evidence of which any object belonging to the class of *things* is the source; persons also being included in respect of such properties as belong to them in common with things."

The use of things in effecting proof is of so common an occurrence as to make illustration almost superfluous. The signals of the weather bureau may be mentioned as indicating usually the kind of weather predicted for the day following, or the sight of flags at half-mast the death of a prominent person. Moreover, it is the basis of business transactions, where inspection precedes the purchase of goods, the goods being real evidence as to their character and worth. We may refer, also, to the daggers in "Macbeth," the rent in Cæsar's cloak in "Julius Cæsar," the handkerchief in "Othello," and, indeed, if you like, the thumb-prints in "Pudd'n-head Wilson." In Caine's "Shadow of a Crime," when the arm of the witness Lawson was examined in court and disclosed "three clear marks of an iron-brand," the marks were real evidence showing that he had been branded.

In criminal practice, real evidence has usually only a probable or presumptive force, and appears in connection with circumstantial evidence. The weapon with which an alleged murder was committed; in a case of robbery, the marks of a key with which the robber struck the prosecution witness, corresponding to the key found in the robber's possession; a part of a knife-blade left sticking in the window-frame through which a burglar had entered, corresponding to the remnant found in the burglar's pocket, are instances of circum-

stantial real evidence. In such cases the force of the evidence will depend very largely on the speaker's insight and powers of interpretation. It should be said, however, that, in criminal cases of this sort, the lawyer frequently employs the services of a detective, whose special duty is to give assistance in the discovery and explanation of details.

In connection with the legal rule that only "the best evidence of which the case in its nature is susceptible" is to be admitted into a court of law, (3) *documentary evidence* has been divided into primary and secondary. Any document may be said to be "primary evidence of its own contents," while "the term secondary evidence is used to designate any derivative proof of them, such as memorials, copies, abstracts, recollections of persons who have read them, etc." In general, secondary evidence is not receivable in a court of law until it is shown to be the best evidence that can be procured under the circumstances. Since the debater usually procures his evidence from a written or documentary source, he will find it worth while to remember both the legal rule about the best evidence and the legal distinction between primary and secondary evidence. But this is hardly as important for the debater as for the lawyer; for the secondary evidence of the former, it is not infrequently sufficient. But he will sometimes find it of advantage to be able to criticise an opponent for failing to refer to original evidence which it were reasonably expected he would cite. Such criticism will be especially effective if he is able to compare "the substitutionary evidence" employed by his opponent with the more original evidence, and to disclose some error in the former. At all events, the careful investigator

should be ever ready to go behind derivative evidence and study the source or sources from which it was derived.

The Law of Evidence.—What is known in the legal text-books as the law of evidence, consists of a body of rules more or less arbitrary, but as binding on courts, juries, and witnesses as the rest of the common and statute law of the land. These rules are under the control of the legislature except in cases of conflict with constitutional law. They prescribe such things as, that after a seven years' absence without having been heard from a man shall be presumed to be dead; that interest may render a witness incompetent; certain fixed periods of time when a debt is presumed to have been paid or satisfaction to have been received. A great many of these rules are so special, and embedded in the subject-matter of the law, that they are of little service outside of the courts or in connection with issues not of a legal character.

The rules which prevail as to the production of evidence in the courts have been reduced to the following points:

1. Certain matters may be judicially taken notice of without proof; *e. g.*, facts of general knowledge.
2. Evidence must correspond with the allegations in the pleadings and be confined to the point at issue.
3. Only the substance of the issue need be proved; that is, minor and unimportant issues need not be established as stated; *e. g.*, the time or place when an event occurred.
4. The burden of proof is with him who holds the affirmative; *e. g.*, he who makes an allegation which is disputed so as to be at issue must establish it by evidence.

5. The best evidence must be produced of which the nature of the case admits; *e. g.*, if primary evidence is accessible, it must be produced.
6. Hearsay evidence is in general inadmissible.
7. Testimony should, in general, concern matters of knowledge as distinguished from opinion. Exception is made in the case of an expert or one skilled in a particular trade, art, or profession; *e. g.*, superintendent of an insane asylum as to matters connected with the subject of insanity.
8. Certain evidence otherwise admissible is excluded on grounds of public policy; *e. g.*, confidential communications between lawyer and client.
9. In certain cases, principally by statute law, written evidence must be resorted to rather than oral.
10. Oral contemporaneous evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the terms of a written contract.

In a trial with or without a jury, it rests with the judge to determine whether the evidence is admissible under these rules.

Examining Testimony

Consistency—the One Great Test of Evidence.—The one great test of evidence is its consistency, external and internal. The facts presented should not be self-contradictory. They should, moreover, be consistent with the *general knowledge* we possess, derived from our intuitions and experience. They should be consistent also with the *particular* information derived from other testimonies and circumstances in the case.

1. *Internal Consistency.*—Is the testimony consistent internally—that is, is it consistent within itself? Are all the statements made by the witness reconcilable with one another? By means of cross-examination if the witness is present, or by close analysis of his testi-

mony if written, errors may be detected as follows: (1) Incidental or undesigned testimony which a witness gives without realizing its value in the case; (2) hostile testimony or the frank admission of some fact opposed to the witness's position, and (3) negative testimony or "the failure of a witness to mention a fact so striking that he must have noticed it, had it occurred," [1] or a failure to remember such fact. The latter is sometimes called testimony from silence.

Illustrations of this can be found in Erskine's speech in behalf of Hardy; for example, his remarks on the testimony of Lynam.

2. *External Consistency.*—Is the testimony consistent with our (1) *general knowledge,* derived from our intuitions and experience? Does it seem probable when compared with what we already know about such things? Statements which partake of the marvellous or are incompatible with ordinary experience are received with suspicion. Robert Burton in his "Anatomy of Melancholy" says: "The air is not so full of flies in summer as it is at all times of invisible devils; this Paracelsus stiffly affirms." If we should regard this as testimony offered in good faith, we should reject it on account of its external inconsistency.

This principle is so well recognized in all rules of jurisprudence that all courts of law and equity are said to "take judicial notice" of certain facts the existence or truth of which is so well-known and established as to be considered facts of general and every-day knowledge. For example, "matters which must have happened according to the ordinary course of nature," as the time of sunrise or sunset on a certain day and the

[1] "Practical Rhetoric," Genung.

succession of the seasons. Or again, "matters of such general and public notoriety that every one may fairly be presumed to be acquainted with them," as the ordinary duration of human life, the usual length of time for a voyage across the Atlantic, the usual time to run trains between large cities,[1] etc.

And (2) is the testimony in question consistent with our *particular information*, derived from other testimonies and circumstances in the case? So far as our investigation has gone, Richard Roe—to be concrete—has testified, let us say, in language which is straightforward and uncontradictory, and his testimony seems probable on the face of it. But suppose there is another witness, John Doe, to the same circumstances. The testimony of these witnesses, then, will have to be compared. If we should find that their testimony is in substantial accord, our belief in the facts alleged by Roe would be strengthened. And it would doubtless be strengthened still more if it is apparent that there had been no collusion between the witnesses. Hence, when there is more than one witness and their testimony is substantially the same, the force of the proof will depend not only on *consistency* (internal consistency, general external consistency, and the interconsistency of the several testimonies), but also in *the number* of testimonies and their *independence*. This mode of proof is sometimes called corroborative testimony.

If, on the other hand, we should find that Doe's testimony contradicted that given by Roe, we should in all probability look for other circumstances in the case, such as the characters of the two witnesses and the conditions under which the testimonies were given. If

[1] Stephen's "Digest of the Law of Evidence."

it is established that Doe was prejudiced or incompetent through intellectual, physical, or moral reasons, or that his testimony is given under compulsion, we should feel justified in rejecting his testimony. If the opposite is shown of Roe, our belief in his testimony would be still further strengthened.

When a mass of conflicting testimony is presented, in determining the correct value to be given to any particular source of evidence, all these tests as to truth and probability are necessary. The same may be said of course in regard to the final conclusion to be arrived at after considering all the testimony and attributing to each its proper force and weight.

This classification, it should be remembered, is only a test for arriving at the truth or probability of testimony. Before, however, a conclusion can be arrived at, the weight and force of the testimony presented must be determined. Any attempt to classify the force of testimony and the conclusion to be drawn therefrom must necessarily fall short of absolute completeness. The conclusion arrived at from conflicting testimony depends so much on that illusive factor which, for lack of a better name, we call "the personal equation," that it is impossible to lay down any general rule as to the probable force and weight of evidence; for it can readily be conceived that certain facts and circumstances may be considered of great importance by some persons exercising judicial functions, which by others acting in the same capacity would be regarded as of little weight and consequence. This field is as varied as the minds and temperaments of men.

Use of Evidence Outside the Courts.—From what has been said, it appears that the law of evidence deals

with rules governing the production of testimony in courts. These rules have been established for the sake of "facility in disposing of complicated questions or on grounds of public policy." In non-judicial tribunals, however, there are, strictly speaking, no rules governing the *admissibility* of evidence. The judges or audience have no actual power to exclude or admit evidence, but must base their decision on the evidence produced, which may fall within the legal rules or without them. The speakers must decide for themselves what facts should be proved and what sort of evidence should be employed. The rules which apply in a debating contest are the unformulated rules of universal evidence, the employment of which in particular cases rests in the judgment of the debaters themselves.

In regard to the sort of evidence employable in non-judicial tribunals, three important exceptions to the legal rules should be noted: (1) Immaterial collateral evidence; (2) hearsay or second-hand evidence; (3) opinions not emanating from experts. The ordinary debater employs such evidence, however, not upon the ground that it is strong but merely that it may be taken for what it is worth. Such evidence is rarely conclusive; indeed, the presumption which it establishes is usually very slight.

In manner of proof, many differences between the legal and ordinary procedure appear. The most striking of these, perhaps, arises in connection with witnesses. Witnesses may be compelled by law to attend court and give their testimonies in person. In other tribunals (where such practice would be inconvenient and incapable of enforcement, as before deliberative bodies generally), the speaker usually presents the evidence.

It is, perhaps, much as if the lawyer should declare the facts to the jury without the previous appearance of witnesses. In this view, therefore, the debater can be regarded as his own witness giving hearsay or second-hand testimony—reported evidence.

The Debater's Chief Source of Evidence—Authority.—What is usually known as the argument from authority is "based upon the statements of others concerning matters of *opinion* which they have reached by rational processes and is to be distinguished from testimony which consists of the statements of others concerning matters of fact." This distinction between authority and testimony does not hold literally or with any degree of exactness for arguments in non-judicial tribunals. The debater derives not only opinions but facts from authorities. He can, of course, derive the latter from the testimony of witnesses, but he is much more likely to obtain it from scientific treatises or other works of an authoritative character. The debater uses the term authority to apply both to the author and the work itself.

Two Classes of Authority.—Authorities may be of two kinds: (1) That based on our confidence in the *knowledge* of the authority quoted, and (2) that based on our confidence in his *judgment.*

(1) Any declaration as to facts derived from books or documents may, if disputed, need verification by comparing it with more original sources. Such comparison may be made either with original written evidence or with original testimonies given when the deed, event, or course of action took place. If unnecessary issues of this sort are to be avoided, the source quoted in the first place should be trustworthy. The question is

whether or not the State of Wisconsin has a referendum in the particular case of banks. Now if the debater should come across the following in Bryce's "American Commonwealth" (Vol. I, p. 452)—"Wisconsin refers it to the voters to decide whether or no banks shall be chartered"—he would probably consider the question settled. He would hardly seek for original written evidence—the original draft of Section 5, Art. XI, Constitution of 1843—or for the testimonies of those legislators who had the matter under consideration. He is content to decide the point affirmatively upon the authority of one whose knowledge in such matters can be trusted. Thus we assert that Wordsworth was born in 1770, on the authority of Knight's "Life of Wordsworth"; that Burke died in 1797, on the authority of Morley's "Edmund Burke"; that Washington crossed the Delaware, on the authority of Bancroft's "History of the United States"; or that the British were at one time in possession of Havana, on the authority of Johnson's "Universal Cyclopedia." These works are authorities in the special matters upon which they are quoted; and while our acceptance of their statements need not go so far as to imply confidence in the reasoning or judgment of their authors, it would necessarily express confidence in their knowledge of those particular matters upon which they were cited.

(2) Authority, which has weight because of our confidence in the *judgment* of the person quoted, concerns matters of opinion—conclusions from facts, generalizations, truths. The issue of a debate is a policy of expansion *versus* a policy of isolation for the United States. Washington's celebrated warning in the Farewell Address and parts of Monroe's famous message to Con-

gress in 1821 are quoted; such extracts would concern "matters of opinion" which Washington and Monroe respectively had reached by rational processes. The argument from authority is highly valuable in ascertaining the causes of known effects. For example, is it advisable to amend our laws of immigration? Now it is admitted by the parties to the dispute that there has been recently an increase of immigration from southern Europe and a decrease from northern. Is this admitted change due to our immigration laws or to other causes? Obviously, the debater on either side would find it to his advantage if he could support his position by the opinion of experts on immigration.

The general of an army, it may be supposed, would be more of an authority on the management of a campaign than a private in his service. A newspaper advertisement containing letters from unknown persons as to the merits of a cure for liver trouble would have little weight against the opinion of a good physician. But an authority in one department may not be an authority in another. The President of the United States would be competent to speak on most questions of statecraft but not necessarily in regard to theatrical matters as would Henry Irving. Even in such allied departments as chemistry and medicine an eminent chemist might not be an authority on medical practice. Nor could an oculist necessarily speak authoritatively upon the throat.

Moreover, when the opinion cited is that of a specialist in the department within which the subject lies, it is important to know his standing and reputation. In economic matters would you follow Henry George or John Stuart Mill? In art would you prefer Ruskin to

Philip Gilbert Hamerton? In natural history would you follow Pliny or Mandeville rather than Darwin or Huxley? There are degrees of standing among specialists.

Examining Evidence from Authority

It has been previously shown that the debater's statements which come from others are taken, as a rule, not from the testimony of eye-witnesses but from the testimony of authorities. The classification of tests to be applied in examining evidence from authority is, in general, the same as in examining ordinary testimony. The one great test of evidence is consistency: (1) Is the evidence cited consistent internally? That is to say, are there incidental, undesigned admissions—are there frank admissions, open concessions—and are there missing statements of fact so striking as to throw doubt upon those made? (2) Is the evidence cited consistent externally with our general knowledge derived through our intuitions and experience? Extraordinary statements, even if they emanate from an authority, may be examined by this test. And (3) Is the evidence consistent externally with our particular information obtainable from other authorities and circumstances in the case? When a number of authorities agree in stating substantially the same fact or opinion, we have what is called corroborative testimony from authority. It is important, moreover, that such statements should possess independence; in the case of facts, that they should not have come originally from the same source; in the case of opinions, that they should have been separately determined. Here, as in ordinary testimony, number and independence may have to be considered before a final conclusion can be arrived at.

If, however, there are several authorities and their testimonies disagree, we should look for other circumstances in the case which would throw light on the competence of the authorities. If the statements under examination can be considered as concerning a matter of *knowledge* (as, for example, the exact time of the delivery of Webster's speech in reply to Hayne), a decision may be possible after a determination of the standing of the authorities in question—their scholarship, methods of investigation, and opportunities for research. If, on the other hand, the statements undergoing examination concern a matter of opinion (as, for example, Webster's usual habits of preparation for a speech), it is necessary to determine not only the knowledge of the several authorities, but also their relative competence to draw conclusions from circumstances ascertained. Are the authorities cited competent through intellectual power, training, and experience to ascertain circumstances correctly and to have trustworthy opinions upon them? And are they unprejudiced by personal or professional bias?

A comparison of the several testimonies and a determination of the relative competence of the authorities, if their statements were made from personal observation, may be sufficient to warrant a final decision, after applying the other tests of consistency, number, and independence. And, indeed, in case the conflicting statements are of a secondary character, a decision may be reached which is practically sufficient. But the scientific or scholarly investigator will look at once at the sources of the authorities, the primary evidence (if such be available) upon which the statements were based. For example, Marsh in his "Webster and His

Contemporaries" assumes that Webster's great speech was delivered on a single day, Tuesday, January the twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and thirty; while Everett in his "Life" tells us that its delivery occupied parts of two days; namely, the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh. The relative competency of these conflicting authorities, if determined, would not settle the matter absolutely. At all events, the historical investigator would seek at once for such evidence as Gales and Seaton's "Reports" or Benton's "Debates of Congress." Such an investigation, if made, will verify Everett's statement. In examining primary evidence the following questions are of great importance: (1) Is the document authenticated? And (2) Was it made by a person fulfilling the requirements of an expert? The Gales and Seaton "Reports," just mentioned, fulfil these tests; so, for example, does Thucydides' "History of the Peloponnesian War." The story of William Tell's marksmanship, on the other hand, rests upon a documentary basis which cannot be authenticated. It is, of course, neither a contradictory nor an impossible story, but is externally inconsistent with certain particular facts established in regard to it. Substantially the same story is related of other heroes; for example, Toko and Egill, in manuscripts equally trustworthy.[1] The second-hand testimony of an authority need not, it may be supposed, depend upon documents. It may indeed sometimes depend upon more remote testimonies given when the deed, event, or course of action took place. When such occurs, the test previously given for examining testimony may need to be applied. But, as a matter of fact, it should not be too strongly emphasized that

[1] Vide Paul's "Grundriss der germanischen Philologie," II, 62.

documents form the almost exclusive basis of historic proofs.

The historian works with documents. Documents are the traces which have been left by the thoughts and actions of men of former times. Of these thoughts and actions, however, very few leave any visible traces, and these traces, when there are any, are seldom durable; an accident is enough to efface them. Now every thought and every action that has left no visible traces, or none but what have since disappeared, is lost for history; is as though it had never been. For want of documents the history of immense periods in the past of humanity is destined to remain forever unknown. For there is no substitute for documents; no documents, no history.[1]

In a word, in determining the particular external consistency of testimony from authority, the other circumstances to be considered may concern two things: the competency of an authority and the original source. And in determining the weight of any particular testimony and circumstance, all the tests as to truth and probability are necessary. This is equally true of the final conclusion arrived at after comparing all the testimonies and circumstances in the case, and attributing to each portion of evidence its proper force and weight. What has been said, moreover, of the personal equation as rendering impossible a complete general classification of the *force* of ordinary testimony is true of every species of evidence.

The following classification of authorities, together with the questions which may be asked in examining a particular class of authority, should be useful.

I. Authoritative statements of a secondary character based on documents.

[1] "Introduction to the Study of History"; Langlois and Seignobos.

A. Competency.

1. In a matter of *knowledge:* Is the authority competent through general ability, training, and experience to ascertain circumstances and facts correctly?

In a matter of *judgment:* Is he competent through general ability, training, and experience to ascertain circumstances and facts correctly, and to base trustworthy opinions upon them?

2. Is he unprejudiced?

B. Primary source.

1. Is the document authenticated?
2. Was it made by a person competent to *know* and to *judge?* Was he unprejudiced?

II. Authoritative statements of a second-hand character based on ordinary testimony.

A. Competency.

(Same as the preceding.)

B. Source.

Do the testimonies fulfil the tests given for ordinary testimony?

III. A document—primary evidence.

1. Is the document authenticated?
2. Was it made by a person competent to *know* and to *judge?* Was he unprejudiced?

IV. A person—authoritative statements based on personal observation. (Expert testimony.)

In a matter of knowledge and judgment; is he competent? (Same test of competency as in I., *A.*)

Of these classes, I and II are the most usual sources of evidence employed in debating; III and IV are the best evidence theoretically considered; but, as has been shown, I and II may under certain circumstances be as good as III, may be sufficient for practical purposes.

Rules for the Interpretation of Documents.—1. The presumption is always in favor of the plain, obvious meaning of the language.

2. In all cases of uncertainty and ambiguity, that interpretation should be adopted which other circumstances indicate as the intention of those who had the authority to fix the phraseology.

3. A document is its own best interpreter. Its obscure passages are to be constructed in harmony with those whose meaning is plain.

4. The design the author had in view will aid in determining what his intention was in using his words.

5. The spirit and temper of the author must be considered.

6. The daily language of an author must be understood to understand his writings.

7. Documents are to be interpreted in harmony with the surroundings of their authors.[1]

Suggestions for Reporting Evidence.—The debater knows that his opponent or the judges will generally be aware of the truth concerning important matters and discover inaccuracies. Hence, fear of detection by the judges and exposure by an opponent with the consequent damage to the speaker's reputation and his side are most important checks upon error. The chief check, of course, is the debater's own responsibility as respects the truth.

If he is to get the most out of his evidence, he must possess such an intimate acquaintance with it and the source from which it comes that he can during a contest recall his knowledge at a moment's notice. Now an opponent may question either the accuracy of a statement, the source from which it was taken, or the authoritative character of that source. Hence, in preparing for a contest, the debater should remember exactly

[1] Hay's "Every-Day Reasoning," pp. 155 *et seq.*

what his authority said and where it was said, and why it or he may be considered as an authority. He should be prepared (1) to quote *verbatim*, (2) to cite the authority quoted, and (3) to describe its or his character.

(1) *Verbatim Quotation.*—In reporting the words of others for the purpose of evidence, the debater should always quote substantially or word for word. This means practically that he should always take pains to understand and to repeat exactly what was said. It is not to be supposed that a speaker would intentionally misquote, but, through carelessness in the examination of the authority or an unrestrained partiality for his own side, misrepresentation may be the result. Hence the value of verbatim over substantial quotation. Burke, laborious in everything, was exceedingly particular, perhaps tediously so, in the matter of quotation whether for ornament or evidence. The great orators and statesmen through this practice have usually developed wonderful memories. Such was Webster's habit in this respect that it has been said of him: "Anything once well taken into his mind was never afterward absolutely forgotten." William Pinkney's memory was "a bed of steel." And what a triumph did the latter's memory score for him in the supreme court! On one occasion Pinkney happened to remark that he believed such an author gave such an opinion, quoting it substantially; whereupon the counsel on the other side interrupted him with a flat denial. "Pinkney turned toward him with the greatest apparent fury. 'Hand me the book,' said he. 'Never in my not short juridical life have I attempted to mislead the court, and certainly I would not attempt it with a court of such wisdom and lore as this; if I did, I should be sure of being exposed, and

I hope I think too much of my reputation for such an artifice.' Then again turning to the startled adversary, 'Pass me the book,' he exclaimed, 'and now before I open it, I shall tell your honor the page, and the part of the page where this authority is stated, and let me begin by repeating it to your honors.' He then opened the book and pointed to the very page he had indicated and the authority was found to correspond *word for word* with what he had stated."

(2) *Citation of Authority.*—Of course the debater must be prepared to cite authorities upon disputed points. He may be called upon in actual debate, it should be remembered, to do so at any time and at a moment's notice. He may, like Pinkney, moreover, have to do it with considerable warmth and minuteness. Hence, in preparing his case, for every quoted statement he should always make a point of remembering not only what was said, but the work and the place in the work from which the statement was taken. The experienced debater knows that facts which seem incontrovertible when he is making up his case will in some way during an argument occasionally become an issue. In connection with apparently indisputable facts, Burke frequently referred in his speech upon Conciliation to the journals of the House, giving volume, month, and year. A constant reference to authority, it should be said, has a good effect upon the judges, by increasing their confidence in the speaker.

(3) *Description of the Authority.*—When Burke was discussing the commerce with America, in his speech on Conciliation, he stood with two accounts in his hand: one, a comparative statement of the export trade of England to its colonies as it stood in the year 1704 and

as it stood in the year 1772; the other, a statement of the export trade of this country to its colonies alone, as it stood in 1772, compared with the whole trade of England to all parts of the world (the colonies excluded) in the year 1704. He then adds: "They are from good vouchers; the latter period from the accounts on your table, the earlier from an original manuscript of Davenant, who first established the inspector-general's office, which has been ever since his time so abundant a source of parliamentary information."

The Reasonableness of an Opinion.—It is not to be overlooked that in matters of opinion the force or weight of a cited authority rests primarily on the *reasonableness* or *convincingness* of an *opinion*, and only secondarily on the general character or reputation of the one who expressed it. The debater should be especially cautioned against quoting a man loosely as an authority on his side of a question *without stating the authority's expressed reasons* for the position ascribed to him. The following (from the "Principles of Rhetoric," by A. S. Hill, p. 13) will serve to illustrate the correct use of another's opinion:

> The real question is, Are the United States—so far as language is concerned—still provinces of England, or do they constitute a nation?
>
> The true doctrine appears to be that expressed by the late Edward A. Freeman, whose opinion on this point is valuable because he was an Englishman of Englishmen. After discussing several cases in which usage differs in the two countries, Mr. Freeman goes on to say: "One way is for the most part as good as the other; let each side of the ocean stick to its own way, if only to keep up those little picturesque differences which are really a gain when the substance is essentially the same. This same line of thought might be carried out in a crowd of

phrases, old and new, in which British and American usage differs, but in which neither usage can be said to be in itself better or worse than the other. Each usage is the better in the land in which it has grown up of itself. A good British writer and a good American writer will write in the same language and the same dialect; but it is well that each should keep to those little peculiarities of established and reasonable local usage which will show on which side of the ocean he writes." [1]

But to say that the force of argument from authority rests primarily on the reasonableness or convincingness of an opinion, and secondarily on the character or reputation of the authority quoted, is not to state all of the truth. An *ipse dixit*, for instance, will sometimes be conclusive through its appeal to authority *qua* authority, to habit, or to imitation.

The Danger of Partial Quotation.—In reporting evidence, the debater should be especially warned against the danger of partial quotation. It usually happens, for instance, that an authority may be loosely "quoted on both sides," as it is called. This is particularly true of public questions which are new, but there is no excuse whatever for the deliberate attempt sometimes made by debating teams to "steal" an opponent's authorities for one's own side. Thus, it is both improper and hazardous for a debater to use what is really a qualifying remark or a remark made in some special or minor part of the discussion as if it really represented the authority's true position. Public men have sometimes been flagrantly misrepresented in this way; and the honest debater must be ever on his guard against such trickery or carelessness, and be prepared to supply when necessary the full and complete statements of the authority

[1] *Longman's Magazine*, November, 1882, p. 90.

in question and to supply them so effectively as to secure his opponent's downfall. Whether the cause of the misrepresentation be studied or accidental, certainly a debater in his preparation should be so thorough and exact that his own authorities cannot be improperly appropriated by an opponent without his being able to expose by specific citation the misrepresentation.

The Card System.—The importance of system in note-taking when gathering evidence for a debate can hardly be overestimated. In the thorough preparation demanded in our intercollegiate debates, hundreds of volumes, magazines, or periodicals must frequently be examined, sifted, and classified. With such a mass of material, debaters have, almost without exception, found it necessary to adopt the use of small cards which can be easily sorted and shifted from hand to hand. The notes on them usually show the subject, the statement of fact or opinion, name of authority, and reference, thus:

Subject.....

Statement	Authority	Reference

Exercises

The subject of brief-making, accompanied by a study of evidence and of argument and the delivery of at least one oration, may well occupy the first term in a course in debating. It should include the drawing of three or four briefs of arguments, found in a book of specimens, so as to develop in the student the habit of accurate and thorough thinking, that is, through co-ordination and subordination. The following questions on argumentative theory may be suggestive.

1. Distinguish between the following: argument, evidence, proof; assumption, presumption; persuasion, conviction.

2. What are the two important laws of structure? Give the main syllogism of any two of the specimens studied and show how they conform to these laws.

3. Define the several classes of evidence. Mention the chief tests used in the examination of ordinary testimony.

4. What important differences can you point out in the employment of evidence in a court of law and before deliberative bodies?

5. Give the rules for the interpretation of documents.

6. Define *argument*, and (*a*) show how all arguments in their final analysis and when carried to completion will involve an inference from the complex relations of association, resemblance or contrast, particular and general, and cause and effect.

7. What, in your opinion, is the relative importance of observation and inference in reasoning about ordinary affairs? (*b*) Show that sign argument may vary in force from slight probability to certainty. Illustrate.

8. When may a cited case be said to be relevant to a matter under inquiry? Illustrate. (*c*) Mention the most common fallacies in the use of argument from example. Illustrate.

9. Indicate the important steps which may be employed in the process of arguing from example.

10. Show the use of the *reductio ad absurdum*, made by Mansfield in the "Evans Case," by Macaulay on "Copyright," or by Beecher when speaking at Liverpool. Give an effective way of answering the *reductio ad absurdum* cited.

11. From the specimens studied, give an illustration of the development by the speaker of a *common ground* as a basis for argument to people hostile in their mental attitude.

12. Describe, as far as possible, the method you would naturally follow in getting a person to change his mind.

After brief-drawing and argumentative theory have been sufficiently stressed, there should be provided ample opportunity for practice in actual debates, in which the student is permitted to draw his own material from varied sources. This practice accompanied by a study of presentation may well occupy the second term of a college year.

The questions may be posted at the beginning of the term and debaters assigned to them from week to week; a reading-room set apart in the university library, and the reference librarian requested to place every Monday on the shelves all material necessary for an intelligent investigation and discussion of the question under debate for that week. In this library room the debaters may be given an hour for preliminary conference in groups with the instructor in charge. The

material is then carefully examined, and the case for the affirmative and negative analyzed and distributed among the speakers, each speaker being given a central idea, fundamental to the case, and told to image it effectively on the minds of his audience. There should be no requirement of a formal brief from the speakers in this debate, but rather a dependence placed on previous systematic training in brief-drawing. Every encouragement should be given for original and individual thinking.

Obviously, good debating means the ability to think on one's feet and to talk quietly to an audience, anticipating objections and answering them, conciliating rather than antagonizing, in order to secure approval. The debater must speak extemporaneously in rebuttal; he should also be required to do so in his first speech. For this purpose, special supplementary exercises in extempore speaking are sometimes found advantageous. In a literary society or a class of a dozen men, a list of topics on current events may be gathered from the head-lines of the morning paper, or from a weekly or a monthly magazine, and numbered in order. At the meeting, the presiding officer may call upon a member to speak, whereupon the clerk announces the topic after the speaker has taken the floor. The clerk, of course, announces each topic, in the order in which it appears on the list. By organizing the class into a congress or other deliberative body for the discussion of resolutions, familiarity may also be had with the rules of parliamentary law. Always following a debate, a vote should be taken first on the merits of the debate, and then the resolution should be thrown open for general discussion, and finally voted up or down. All members of the class

other than the assigned debaters, usually six, are required to hand in a brief on the question to be debated. This adds interest to the general discussion on the merits of the question.

This actual practice in speaking should, of course, be accompanied by a study in presentation, stress being laid on the imagination and also on suggestion, voluntary and involuntary, conscious and subconscious, as being essential and logical elements in the development of the process of effective thinking. In other words, the aim is to develop, first, logical accuracy and sound thinking, and afterward the other qualities, imaginative, rhetorical, and practical, and always in connection with a valuable subject-matter. Debate lends itself peculiarly to educational purposes because it demands of a man that in self-defense he think soundly and effectively under fire.

PART II

THE PRESENTATION

CHAPTER VI

IMAGINATION IN ARGUMENT

Whether the means or aims are those of description, narration, exposition, or argument, the chief problem in conveying our ideas to others is one of imaginative suggestion.

Suggestion is the broadest term used to describe the act of influencing others, whether spontaneous or deliberate, by word or by gesture. Any act mental or physical used to awaken or to direct in others mental or physical activity is suggestion. This implies, of course, that thinking always involves molecular or physical changes.

Imagery, too, has a peculiar power as an agent of suggestion upon the attention, interest, sympathy, and thinking of an audience, over its mental activity, its processes, conclusions, and actions.

I. Need of Imagination in Argument

Great progress has been made in the development of public speaking in the last few years. A more pleasing and more durable edifice is being artistically built on the old logical, rhetorical, and elocutionary foundations, in accordance with newly recognized vital principles;

and we are, I think, coming to see more clearly both the need of developing the imagination of the speaker and the way to do it. There arise before us new vistas in investigation, knowledge, and methods. Important explorations have already been made, and good ore is being found and reduced to practical use. There is, first of all, need of a new emphasis in the training of the imagination of the student of argument and debate.

Since all language is, of course, only suggestive, and since argument at best is imaginatively suggestive (since it is impossible to argue without assumption), one cannot but feel the danger, to certain types of students, which would result from too formal processes of reasoning. For instance, the model of a brief-form made by older men may be held up by us before younger minds for emphasis of the rational basis of conviction, to give an idea of the need of firmness of structure, to illustrate the logical characteristics of unity and sequence; but shears and measuring-tape are needed in fitting the suit of the older son to his next younger brother. Indeed, the theory of argumentation, as laid down in some of our text-books, is at times unsuited to college classes, in which the students are unacquainted with inductive processes, unused to making careful generalizations and comparisons, and have had no earlier courses, for example, in logic or philosophy, or no large background of knowledge upon which to draw. And does not the separate treatment of "persuasion" smack of the ancient teaching that the mind is a series of water-tight compartments? At all events, such compendiums of "principles" or "elements" are of value only in the hands of an experienced instructor, who, in using them, takes account of the fact that they are not adapted to persons

of all ages, nor indeed to all types of mind. Charles Lamb remarked of Scotsmen that he had been trying all his life to like them, but had given it up in despair.

Principles, methods, and forms should be taught only in so far as they are readily assimilable by the student, and are used with freedom and enthusiasm in parallel original work in writing and speaking. The university wit, Nicholas Udall, of Eton, wrote a play, modelled after Plautus, called "Ralph Royster Doyster," the first English comedy. Two younger gentlemen of the Inner Temple, Norton and Sackville, presented before Queen Elizabeth a play called "Gorboduc," patterned after Seneca, and now venerated as the first English tragedy. But, valuable as this classic influence was, no one would think of saying that without the addition of the more original imaginative or romantic elements we could ever have had a consummate expression of life in Elizabethan drama, such as was reached in Shakespeare's plays. It is a long time now since Professor Baker of Harvard separated argumentation from the older rhetorics and performed a great service by giving it distinct and separate prominence as a form of composition. The older rhetorics, from which it was taken, have long since passed away, chiefly because they did not allow for individuality in men. Argumentative formalism has survived the longest, partly because the theory is the hardest to perfect, and partly because of the desire to recognize the supremacy of reason in influencing affairs in the world.

We should welcome to-day the serious efforts being made by what may be called the new psychological school of expression. It not only opens a stimulating field of thought and investigation, but bids fair to succeed where the older methods failed, namely, in allow-

ing for individual growth and development. I believe, in particular, in the opportunity which this line of thought offers to the student of argument; for, while it recognizes reason as a stabilizing force, it teaches clearly that man is not to be reached by it alone, and that in applying the laws of reasoning for the purpose of influencing the thoughts of others, there are deeper considerations to be taken account of. Not that we have not heretofore paid some heed to association and inhibition, nor recognized the importance in expression of attention, imagination, memory, and feeling; but never before have we realized so fully the value of the psychological elements and at the same time possessed sufficient and accurate data for their effective exploitation. Or, again, recognizing the constant diversification of the attention of individuals in modern life, and the ease with which our consciousness may be flooded with feelings on matters of principle or of interest or of no consequence at all—with or against our wills—or recalling the different memory associations of different men, we perceive at once how valuable to the trained student of argument or debate is that illuminating eminence of view-point which enables him to see his field anew in the clear air of imaginative suggestion. We should never forget, too, that the imagination is the vanguard, the pioneer of all progress in the world, of which reason is only the explanation. It has, I think, been sufficiently shown heretofore that reason does not exist apart from, and cannot proceed independently of, the imagination; and perhaps I may add that there is an abstract as well as a concrete imagery. Mathematics, for instance, is as much imaginative as it is intellectual.

It is a distinct gain for the thinking and for the power

of expression of the student of argument when he learns, for instance, to image a concept in its relations; that is, with its implications, whether the purpose be coldly to explain or warmly to impress. Certainly he must learn to see the content in the form and the form in the content, the part in the whole and the whole in the part, the means in the end and the end in the means, the principle in the fact and the fact in the principle, cause in effect and effect in cause, similitude in example, and the reverse. Imagination, indeed, is a light shining from afar which beckons us on; reason is the road built by an engineer to enable us safely to reach it. It is subject to error, of course, may prove an *ignis fatuus;* but so, too, may the intellect. And, finally, inasmuch as language is a chief medium of expression employed in argument, the words which are used as symbols must be symbolic of something, must be suggestive of meaning to the persons addressed. The teacher of argument should thus be, not a mere mental undertaker, but an inspiration to original creative thinking and revealing. This is the high meaning of the word "educo."

From what has been said, it is apparent that the debater may examine with profit the psychological point of view from which an argument may be regarded, and the processes through which the imagination functions in a well-presented argument, as well as the various imagery types.

II. Psychological View-Point and Processes

The Logical and the Psychological.—Perhaps we may see even more clearly the difference between the logical and the psychological view-points from which an argument may be regarded if we examine such a passage

as the following from Hall Caine commenting on President Wilson's "Peace Without Victory" address to the United States Senate:

President Wilson probably knows by this time that the first expression of French and British opinion on his speech to the Senate has been that of scarcely disguised disdain.

He has no reason to be seriously troubled on that account. So bold a challenge could hardly have failed of any other immediate effect. From the days of Joseph downward ridicule has been the first heritage of all exalted dreamers.

The dreamer is the marked victim of what is called the practical mind. The loftier the theme and the more idealistic the form the easier the play of satire. The world has never thought it a proof of genius, even in the works of men of genius, to make sport of the Angel Gabriel or of yet the Blessed Trinity; on the contrary, it has often found proof of sublimity in the ideas that have excited derision. It was the exaltation as well as the excess of Euripides which created Aristophanes. Warmth and glow of mind and heart are a natural challenge to icy natures. When red-hot iron is plunged into freezing water it always goes off with a hiss. Let President Wilson take heart from the first reception of his remarkable speech.—(*N. Y. Times, January* 24, 1917.)

Logically, the writer shows why the President "should take heart from the first reception of his remarkable speech." He argues that from the days of Joseph downward, ridicule has been the first heritage of all exalted dreamers, for, indeed, the dreamer is the marked victim of the practical mind. He applies the *reductio ad absurdum* to the case of the Angel Gabriel and of that of the Blessed Trinity, and then cites directly the fact that Aristophanes is due to the exaltation of Euripides. He has made his point by examples or, if you like, inductively, by bringing instances under a class, and he

has made it causally, by showing that an exaltation of mind creates exalted results.

Psychologically, however, the passage may be regarded as imaging the concept of the world's view of the "exalted dreamer" by bringing forward a few chosen portraits from the gallery of memory. True, there is here no fulness of descriptive detail, no richness of epithet, but in the act of associating a league of peace with the Angel Gabriel and the Blessed Trinity, the writer has fixed the attention startlingly on the exaltation of dreaming and set the mind to thinking on the inconsistency and the limitations of that type of mind which scoffs at a world league of peace. The other memory picture, that of Euripides and Aristophanes, is not so rich in ideal association, but it fixes attention on a more definite and a nearer conclusion, namely, that an exaltation of mind may produce fortunate results. In the concluding sentences we will notice, too, the vividness and force due to the perceptual and emotional appeals in such phrases or words as "warmth and glow," "icy nature," "red-hot iron," "plunged," "freezing water," "goes off," "a hiss."

An argument viewed as a logical process has been said to be one of sign, example, or analogy, causation, and classification. As a psychological process, it is a concept imaged on the attention with its proper implications and in its readily recognized relations. The logical relations thus employed in the imagery of argument, therefore, may be causal; general or abstract as well as particular or concrete; exemplative or analogical; and, indeed, sometimes so simple or minute as to be unanalyzed, or so complex or elusive as to be almost unanalyzable. Broadly speaking, the myriads of minute

elements which go to make up the background of an argument and give it its general tone or character, and which are before the mind of the creative artist but an instant in the act of writing or speaking, are mere accompaniments or associations and may be regarded as reasonings from sign. They emphasize to us the importance of little things, and contribute immeasurably to the argument by imparting to it a sense of completeness, richness, and reality.

Images Are a Psychological Inference.—We may use the term psychological inference to apply to any inference which depends for its cognizance upon other states of consciousness than the logical reason. Thus an imaged statement offered as a reason supplies a ground of psychological inference, for it makes the idea perceptual. So Lincoln argues against slavery that it "closed the door of hope." It may also appeal to memory and feeling. So President Wilson speaking for preparedness, emphasizing the spiritual over the commercial, said: "We do not hang a yardstick over the mantelpiece, but we do hang a musket, for somehow it is associated with the lad's sacrifice and has come to be revered in the family." When the debater offers a reason for a proposition phrased in vivid imagery, it is usually a conclusion which he has previously reached by careful methods of investigation and by sound logical processes.

We are morally justified in the use of psychological inference for such ideas as we may regard as having been previously proved or which are profoundly believed to be true and valuable. We rightly condemn the demagogue for his insincerity, but for any sound belief sincerely held, we may unhesitatingly and will al-

most instinctively seek support by appealing to perception, feeling, and memory to assist the thinking.

Psychological inference is really the process of making a logical inference psychological. If logical inference be regarded as necessarily involving the class idea, psychological inference is an intuitive perception. It differs from logical inference in the fact that, at the time and so far as we are then conscious, the process is immediate rather than mediate. The syllogism is a mediate inference; that is, from one proposition to another by means of a third. The immediate process, on the other hand, takes the character of a mental flash. *Effective argument*, indeed, may be described as a mental process of which imagination is the major premise, perception the minor premise, and common sense the ground of inference. By common sense is meant the perception of nature as it is, by a person of well-balanced mind.

Mental Processes.—The debater will perhaps understand better the nature of some of the processes which he employs if we note a few simple distinctions made by psychologists in elementary terms: *First*, the psychologist distinguishes between the reproductive and the productive imagination. The reproductive imagination is really memory, for it actually repeats what was formerly in consciousness; while the productive imagination contains images "not before in our minds in their present order and form." This makes possible the artistic character of literary composition. The imagination of poets, novelists, and orators is productive, or, as the artists call it, creative.

Second, the psychologist distinguishes between an image and an idea. "So far," says Angell, "as we have in mind the sensuous content of a thought, as, for ex-

ample, its visual or auditory character, we use the term image. So far as we wish to emphasize in addition to or in distinction from this fact of sensuous constitution the purport, significance, or meaning of an image, we use the term idea. Images merely represent on the cognitive side the more substantive moments in the onward outflow of consciousness." So Jaques images his idea of life in—"All the world's a stage."

A *third* distinction of the psychologist is that made between an image and a perception; the latter being the "consciousness of a particular material thing present to sense," while an image is the consciousness of a thing *not* present to sense. We *perceive* a star or a flower which is actually before the eye: it rises before the consciousness later as an *image*. The poet *perceives* a sunrise, but, being a creative artist, he *images* it thus:

> "Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day
> Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain-tops."

Obviously, imagery is both conceptual and perceptual. Either characteristic may be exaggerated and abused by an orator or debater. If it is too ideational, the audience will miss the meaning; if too sensory, it will possess no meaning.

The Creative Imagination.—Ruskin makes the art process in general depend on the eye, the head, and the hand, which Bliss Perry renders for poetry into vision, transforming imagination, and expression. The imagery of our best prose, too, is the result of real vision and creative power in the image-making process. Vision, that is, perception, whether conducted by external observation and selection, or by introspection, supplies material

from an individual's own experiences, which the associative processes of his mind transmute, through imagery and suggestion, into forms of memorable beauty.

Illustration.—Professor Goodrich cites the following as "one of the finest amplifications in English oratory, justified by the importance of the subject which it embraces and admirably suited to produce the designed impression." The central idea was probably suggested by a remark of Burke, whose writings Mr. Erskine incessantly studied: "It is the nature of all greatness not to be exact." Defending Stockdale from the charge of libel, and seeing the evils of a too great restriction on the press, Erskine said:

> From minds thus subdued by the terrors of punishment there could issue no works of genius to expand the empire of human reason. . . . It is the nature of everything that is great and useful, both in the animate and inanimate world, to be wild and irregular, and we must be contented to take them with the alloys which belong to them, or live without them. Genius breaks from the fetters of criticism, but its wanderings are sanctioned by its majesty and wisdom when it advances in its path; subject it to the critic and you turn it into dulness. . . . Tempests occasionally shake our dwellings and dissipate our commerce, but they scourge before them the lazy elements, which without them would stagnate into pestilence. In like manner, liberty herself, the last and best gift of God to his creatures, must be taken just as she is; you might pare her down to bashful regularity and shape her into a perfect model of severe scrupulous law, but she would then be liberty no longer; you must be content to die under the lash of this inexorable justice which you have exchanged for the honor of freedom.

The Poverty of Mere Facts.—"It would not be a bad conjecture but an obvious truism," says William Hazlitt, "to say that all the great changes which have been

brought about in the moral world, either for the better or the worse, have been introduced not by the bare statement of facts which are themselves already known and which must always operate nearly in the same manner, but by the development of certain opinions and abstract principles of reasoning on life and manners, on the origin of society and man's nature in general, which being obscure and uncertain, vary from time to time and produce correspondent changes in the human mind. They are the wholesome dew and rain, or the mildew and pestilence that silently destroy. To this principle of generalization all religious creeds, the institutions of wise lawgivers, and the systems of philosophy owe their influence."

There are moments in the great debates when the orator feels impelled to go beyond the precise mechanics of logic and express the instincts of the race, or of individuals, which will light the fires of understanding and kindle the common enthusiasm and beliefs of humanity. Reduction of reasoning to mere genus and species by palpable facts is utterly fruitless without a manifestation of the insight of the soul into the wider spaces of the imagination which point, as unerringly as the needle of the compass, because guided by the subconscious, the involuntary—by instinct, if you like—by whatever goes to make up truth and belief. The mere logician would depreciate all this with the phrase, "Mere imagery," but we must speak with intuition as well as with precision.

The Vision of New Ideas.—Perhaps one may indicate briefly how in general new ideas come into the mind. The law of association has been defined as the tendency of ideas which have been in the mind together to come

up together, but we have seen that the imagination is more than memory associations; we have the suggestions of new images. The imagination is continually offering to consciousness the sensations, experiences, and reactions from new stimuli, or from old stimuli in new circumstances. From the slightest subconscious hint, the mind may perceive an image which will incline it in a new direction, and which if followed intently and with determination, may result in discovery, invention, and progress. All such experiences have been called by psychologists anticipation images.

Anticipation Images.—Thus, while it is of course true that images bring back past memory associations, it is equally true that presentations are constantly arising in consciousness as images, which find their way eventually into new combinations of value and interest. Creative art also is the result of the suggestion of new images. New images depend on the laws of suggestion.

The mind is constantly obliged to sail uncharted seas for an unknown, imagined port. The western voyages of Columbus, the Cabots, and Verrazzano, or the search for an earthly paradise which occupied the thoughts of the Middle Ages, are paralleled daily in the hypothesis of the scientific investigator, the plans for new enterprises in business, and the ambitions, aims, hopes, and expectations of the average man in the smallest affairs of life. Rely upon past experience we must, in testing and perfecting all new ideas; otherwise, we shall go astray and be lost in the quagmires of fancy and falsehood. Columbus, for instance, when sailing for the western world used the sailing ships of his day and all the knowledge of navigation with which astrology and superstition could provide him. But he had a vision,

a purpose, a hope, which enabled him from Genoa to see "land"; a land, moreover, which he was determined to see, and which he so ardently desired to see that he was willing to bear any burden of sacrifice that would enable him to experience the joy of accomplishing it. Perhaps, indeed, the original suggestion to make the voyage came to him from Marco Polo. The world is full of such adventurous spirits in every field, to whom the vision of a new idea is more real than the known and familiar objects of perception.

The debater, too, intently pursues his vision (be it the reform of prisons or the success of our army) until he moulds the fleeting suggestions which come before his mind into the single image of a well-defined, constructive plan. He pursues his vision further, and employs the imagery of words to express this plan so suggestively to others that they will perceive it, believe in it, and perhaps be willing to act upon it.

Perceptual Aspect of Imagery.—The perceptual aspect of imagery may always be pointed out with profit to that type of mind which is accustomed to generalizations and to abstractions, as, for example, to students of mathematics and philosophy. Moreover, an appreciation of this fundamental basis of imagery often needs to be awakened anew in debaters who have worked assiduously on the logic and form of a brief or have spent much time in the library. A boat in the trough of the sea may not observe the stars. Effectiveness in speaking usually means the bringing of our ideas within the listener's experience or life. I shall now show that an important part of this imaging process involves psychologically, the reduction of our ideas to sense-perception.

We recognize the value of the concrete or the particular in driving home an argument, but we do not understand fully the nature of the process. We do not sufficiently realize, for instance, that the function of the concrete or particular in driving home an argument is to bring it before the senses of the listener, and that it is this sensory appeal of imagery which gives it its clearness and force.

Language itself is of course primarily a perception; auditory when it greets the ear as sounds, visual when it strikes the eye as sights, as, for example, on the printed page. But words may produce other sensations than the purely auditory or the purely visual, for we may speak or write of a *hot* day, a *fragrant* rose, a *luscious* apple, and so on. Thus words or phrases may suggest the sensations of past tactile, olfactory, gustatory, or other experiences. The literary artist, in his endeavor to create in another a consciousness of things not actually present to sense, recognizes this and makes indirectly a varied sensory appeal.

No image, however, should be expected to bring to mind the same perception in all individuals, but the perceptual character of imagery may be illustrated a little further, at least suggestively. Portia's appeal in behalf of Bassanio begins: "The quality of mercy is not strained." Take the word "quality"; a word in my mind opposed to quantity, which I know about concretely either by observation or by the feeling of touch, as when I speak of the quality of a piece of cloth. The image "quality of mercy" may therefore be regarded by some, as visual and tactile. "Is not strained" suggests remotely the absence of muscular energy. Its falling "like the gentle rain from heaven" brings a pic-

ture to my eyes of things in motion but falling silently. The second line is therefore to me visual and auditory in its suggestions. "It is twice blessed" brings before me the picture of a minister or bishop holding out his hands in benediction. "It blesses him that gives and him that takes" fills in the picture by adding the two objects of the benediction. "'Tis mightiest in the mighty. It becomes the throned monarch better than his crown," suggests the prerogative of the King in exercising the pardoning power as prominently illustrated later by King James's pardon of Sir Francis Bacon. You probably did not recall the particular material things which this imagery suggested to me, you may even have assigned some of the images to different senses; but you will admit the suggestiveness of the imagery, and the vividness, and force, of its varied sense-appeal.

Or turn to another well-known illustration and examine its sense-suggestions. "Well, honor is the subject of my story"—an indirect suggestion to give ear to the tale. "I was born free as Cæsar. We both have fed as well," brings a picture to the eye with a distinct gustatory implication. "For once upon a raw and gusty day" instances the comparison concretely; but notice that the adjectives "raw and gusty," used to describe the day, contain in the first case, a tactile suggestion and in the second case, auditory and visual suggestions, and perhaps even muscular force. "Cæsar cried, 'Darest thou, Cassius, now leap in with me?'"—obviously auditory and visual. In such wise does Shakespeare commonly express his thoughts with concrete details and image them with a varied and indirect suggestiveness of sensory appeal.

Obviously, imagery rests on a past sense-perception,

and its power is conditioned by its ability to recall to the eye or ear the sensations experienced when past particular, material things were in some order or form previously before the senses. Indeed, an artistic image produces the illusion of a real perception, and the artist in his enthusiasm may actually so regard it. Henry Ward Beecher, for instance, once spoke of a diamond sceptre, and, on being reminded later that no diamond had been found as large as a sceptre, replied: "I saw it."

Imaging a Concept.—We have said that since objects and things to which ideas refer cannot always be present to the senses, we are in the habit of calling them to consciousness by suggesting the image of our ideas with its natural associations. The image-making process is therefore a process of reducing abstract or general ideas to sense-perception. It has a basis in feeling as well as in memory and furnishes the true method of gaining interest and attention as well as of producing conviction and belief.

General or abstract ideas make little impression on the average mind accustomed to think in particulars and by means of comparisons. All such ideas need to be brought within the listener's experience and imaged concretely. The more conceptual an audience is, the more abstract or general may be the presentation, but even with educated audiences we gain in interest by the specific, concrete, detailed, illustrative methods of imagery.

The debater must learn, if he does not know it already, that he will be dry and uninteresting if he restricts himself when speaking to processes which are as purely formal as those of his brief. He must know, for instance, that he may quite properly make use of exposition, narration, or description when appealing to

grounds of belief or to motives of action. He should recall Lincoln's story-telling habit, his graphic descriptive powers, and his lucid expositions. How ineffective, indeed, would Lincoln have been in his debates with Douglas had he presented his arguments in an unimaginative or purely logical way! Webster was called the Great Expounder, it being said of him that his very exposition was argument. Nothing is more erroneous than the idea that an argument must always be in an argumentative form. Even a talk may be adorned with a moral. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, uses an apt anecdote in a dignified Phi Beta Kappa address. Observe also the suggestive power of Colonel Roosevelt's analogy of "The Man with a Muckrake." The argumentative process should be obvious, but not tiresomely obtrusive.

We may regard any proposition (process or conclusion) as a concept for the purposes of imagery. We may also regard "affection and desire" as a concept and image that. Let us, then, illustrate the imaging (1) of an analogy, (2) of a cause, (3) of a conclusion, and (4) of affection and desire; (5) in a team debate and (6) in general.

1. **Imaging an Analogy.**—The trained mind of Alexander Hamilton, arguing on the adoption of the federal constitution at the New York convention of 1788, perceived a likeness in the strong attachment of the individual for the State to certain social and physical facts which he imaged thus:

> There are certain social principles from which we may draw the most solid conclusions with respect to the conduct of individuals and of communities. We love our families more than our neighbors; we love our neighbors more than our country-

men in general. The human affections like the solar heat lose their intensity as they depart from the centre and become languid in proportion to the expansion of the circle on which they act. On these principles, the attachment of the individual will be first and forever secured by the State governments; they will be a mutual protection and support.

2. **Imaging a Cause.**—The process of imaging the relation of cause and effect or of motive to deed may be illustrated by Hugo's description of the circumstances of poverty and struggle which made Jean Valjean steal the loaf of bread. The argument is, that a hungry man will steal; that Jean Valjean was hungry; therefore he burglarized the baker's shop.

Toward the middle of the night, Jean Valjean awoke. He belonged to a poor peasant family of La Brie. . . . At night he came home tired, and ate his soup without saying a word. His sister, Mother Jeanne, while he was eating, often took out of his porringer the best part of his meal, the piece of meat, the slice of bacon, or the heart of the cabbage to give to one of her children; he, still eating, bent over the table with his head almost in the soup, and his long hair falling around his porringer and hiding his eyes, pretended not to see it, and let her do as she pleased. . . . One Sunday evening, Maubert Isabeau, the baker in the church square at Faverolles, was just going to bed when he heard a violent blow dealt the wired and glazed front of his shop. He arrived in time to see an arm passed through a hole made by a fist through the wires and window-pane; the arm seized a loaf and carried it off. Isabeau ran out hastily; the thief ran away at his hardest, but the baker caught him up and stopped him. The thief had thrown away the loaf, but his arm was still bleeding; it was Jean Valjean. . . . Jean Valjean was sentenced to five years at the galleys.

In the following, the writer is endeavoring to image the evil *effects* of cigarette smoking in connection with its cause:

Have you ever seen a white, puny, stunted youngster, whose anæmic face has aroused the question why? Nicotine is like an evil, yellow god, which eats into the system, destroying the sensitive nerve-cells and life-giving vitality. Its use is prevalent in the form of cigarettes. Here to the terrible danger of the poisonous nicotine is added the poison carbon monoxide which arises from the incomplete combustion of the cigarette-paper. This poison is taken into the system by the very effective process of osmosis. Now to answer the question why? Before the delicate age of twenty-one is reached, the life-giving white blood-corpuscles are not fully developed, and when the strong nicotine-laden smoke is inhaled, the growth of the white blood-corpuscles (which are essential to good health) is stunted, and as a result we see the white, puny, anæmic faces (resembling prison-walls) of those most unfortunate and foolish youths who have started the vitality-sapping use of tobacco before physical full development has taken place. Thus, does the all-powerful, grasping nicotine sap the weak vitality of our whelp.—(*Student's Composition.*)

3. **Imaging a Conclusion.**—Burke's imagery of his admiration of the American character, as shown by the growth of the whaling industries of New England, is expressed in sublime eloquence:

As to the wealth which the colonies have drawn from the sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter fully opened at your bar. You surely thought those acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your envy; and yet, the spirit by which that enterprising employment has been exercised, ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised your esteem and admiration. And pray, sir, what in the world is equal to it? Pass by the other parts, and look at the manner in which the people of New England have of late carried on the whale fishery. Whilst we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits, whilst we are looking for them beneath the arctic circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under

the frozen serpent of the south. Falkland Island, which seemed too remote and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting-place in the progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. We know that whilst some of them draw the line, and strike the harpoon on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude, and pursue their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil. No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries. No climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise, ever carried this most perilous mode of hardy industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people; a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone, of manhood. When I contemplate these things; when I know that the colonies in general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that they are not squeezed into this happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious government, but that, through a wise and salutary neglect, a generous nature has been suffered to take her own way to perfection; when I reflect upon these effects, when I see how profitable they have been to us, I feel all the pride of power sink, and all presumption in the wisdom of human contrivances melt, and die away within me. My rigor relents. I pardon something to the spirit of liberty.

Mr. Charles Kendall Adams points out that this passage is based on substantial facts. "Massachusetts had 183 vessels carrying 13,820 tons in the North, and 120 vessels carrying 14,025 tons in the South. It was in 1775, the very year of Burke's speech, that English ships were first fitted out to follow the Americans into the fisheries of the South Seas."

Thus, our best arguments are usually illuminated judgments tempered with feeling. In debating, we frequently illustrate this process in our first speeches, leaving it to the rebuttal speeches to supply, when nec-

essary, the statistical facts previously gathered during our investigations and tested in practice debates. For example, in a debate on preparedness according to the Swiss plan subsequently mentioned, the size of the army of 11,000,000 men and the small cost of such an army were imaged at length in the first speeches. These concepts, however, were conclusions which had been previously derived from painstaking investigations. Their further justification, if necessary, was left to the work of rebuttal. Debaters should learn that audiences, though they expect accuracy, do not take kindly to dull statistics or needless facts. All imaged concepts which are conclusions from previous investigations must of course be logical reasons for believing in the main proposition.

A timely illustration may be found in a passage from Fisher Ames, setting forth in sympathetic language the sanctity of treaties:

> What is patriotism? Is it a narrow affection for the spot where a man was born? Are the very clods where we tread entitled to this ardent preference because they are greener? No, sir, this is not the character of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object. It is an extended self-love, mingling with all the enjoyments of life, and twisting itself with the minutest filaments of the heart. It is thus we obey the laws of society, because they are the laws of virtue. In their authority we see, not the array of force and terror, but the venerable image of our country's honor. Every good citizen makes that honor his own, and cherishes it not only as precious, but as sacred. He is willing to risk his life in its defense, and is conscious that he gains protection while he gives it. For, what rights of a citizen will be deemed inviolable when a state renounces the principles that constitute their security? Or if his life should not be invaded, what would its enjoyments be in a country odious in the eyes of strangers and dishonored in his own? Could he look with affec-

tion and veneration to such a country as his parent? The sense of having one would die within him; he would blush for his patriotism, if he retained any, and justly, for it would be a vice. He would be a banished man in his native land. I see no exception to the respect that is paid among nations to the law of good faith. If there are cases in this enlightened period when it is violated, there are none when it is decried. It is the philosophy of politics, the religion of governments. It is observed by barbarians—a whiff of tobacco smoke, or a string of beads, gives not merely binding force but sanctity to treaties. Even in Algiers, a truce may be bought for money, but when ratified, even Algiers is too wise, or too just, to disown and annul its obligation. Thus we see, neither the ignorance of savages, nor the principles of an association for piracy and rapine, permit a nation to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could be a resurrection from the foot of the gallows, if the victims of justice could live again, collect together and form a society, they would, however loath, soon find themselves obliged to make justice, that justice under which they fell, the fundamental law of their state. They would perceive, it was their interest to make others respect, and they would therefore soon pay some respect themselves, to the obligations of good faith.

4. **Imaging Affection and Desire.**—Just as concepts may be regarded as generalized percepts, so the emotions may be regarded as generalized feelings or sensations. There are, of course, intuitive ideas such as religious feelings, but all concepts, whether emotional or intellectual and in whatever way derived, may be suggestively imaged. Concepts such as joy, sorrow, hope, mercy, love, have so decided an emotional connotation that they are commonly regarded as emotional concepts, but even they may be imaged intellectually.

Everything of importance in experience, over which men differ and about which they argue, has a basis in human feelings and human wants. It is almost impossible to eliminate our feelings and wishes when arguing

on matters of conduct or policy. For example, Webster's argument for the Union was not only a constitutional justification of his position, but an appeal to the growing desire of the people to become a nation. Likewise, in the debate on Swiss preparedness for America alluded to above, both sides admitted and made incidental appeal to the feeling for an adequate defense of America. Too often, however, we image our likes and dislikes in a self-deceived rationalism. We are so constituted that it often seems that all that is needed to secure support for a proposition is a reasoned groundwork for a desired action. A mere bauble dangled before the eyes of a child will prompt the desire to reach for it. What we feel an impulse to do, we are apt to feel is justified in reason; what we like, we are apt to approve; what we dislike, to disapprove. And so an argument is presented for approval and disapproval. At all events, the coincidence of reason and desire may be needed to secure a fully satisfied judgment and a confident action. Argument may exist without desire, it cannot exist without reason. Argument is primarily intellectual in aim and method.

Daniel Webster's address to the supreme court of Massachusetts in 1817, in defense of the Kennistons, is noted for its simplicity and vital directness of style. The following extract contains only a few words of slight emotional suggestion:

> From the time of the robbery to the arrest, five or six weeks, the defendants were engaged in their usual occupations. They are not found to have passed a dollar of money to anybody. They continued their ordinary habits of labor. No man saw money about them, nor any circumstance that might lead to a suspicion that they had money. Nothing occurred tending in

any degree to excite suspicion against them. When arrested, and when all this array of evidence was brought against them, and when they could hope in nothing but their innocence, immunity was offered them again if they would confess. They were pressed, and urged, and allured, by every motive which could be set before them, to acknowledge their participation in the offense, and to bring out their accomplices. They steadily protested that they could confess nothing because they knew nothing. In defiance of all the discoveries made in their house, they have trusted to their innocence. On that, and on the candor and discernment of an enlightened jury, they still rely.

It is in the perorations of arguments or debates, however, that we usually find emotional concepts imaged with undisguised directness for the purpose of awakening feeling and securing action—*e. g.*, the desire for happiness, the wish to avoid unhappiness, the hope of success, the dread of failure, or the binding obligations of duty—all, of course, as applicable to the thesis attacked or defended. An illustration from a modern jury address may perhaps be taken as typical. After analyzing the evidence and recapitulating with great clearness, Mr. Henry L. Clinton concluded thus:

Gentlemen, I have now discharged my duty—my duty to my client, my duty to you, my duty to my own conscience. The responsibility of this case is with you. Do your duty. There is no enjoyment so great, no consolation so sweet, as the consciousness of duty performed. With entire confidence I commit my client to your hands. Though you obey the stern behests of duty and acquit him promptly, you cannot undo the injury done him through the instrumentality of that wife whose vows at the holy altar to love and honor him he fondly believed would guide her, as he determined that his vows should guide him, until death. Hereafter, though he may live a life of spotless purity, though he may practise every virtue known to man, though in all the relations of life he be without fault, or the

semblance of fault—in a word, though his whole future life be the incarnation of every excellence, of even absolute moral perfection, yet hereafter his enemies will be too ready to proclaim that his wife charged him with this crime, and that he was tried upon the charge. And, gentlemen, let it be added that a jury of twelve upright, intelligent, conscientious citizens of Westchester County, mindful of their oaths to render a true verdict according to the evidence, pronounced him "NOT GUILTY!"

5. **Imaging in a Team Debate.**—In the training of a debating team, the case may be first separated into several main ideas. And then after the facts are all gathered and the arguments formulated, the real problem of presentation is—how to image most effectively these main ideas or concepts, with essential matters of proof, on the minds of the audience. With an exact knowledge of the facts and of the work to be done by each debater, the latter must now bridge the chasm between subjective library work and adjusted objective presentation. He must, with all the power that imagination can summon, conceive his audience and apply his technic.

If he is to present his arguments with success, he must take special pains to image effectively his fundamental concepts or reasons. Moreover, all imagery of such fundamental concepts must be accurate and interesting. They will be accurate if they are consistent with the things to which they refer in nature, history, conduct, or affairs, and are also consistent with one another. The student who has carefully put his arguments into the form of a brief, it is believed, will usually speak with accuracy. His reasons are likely to be interesting if they are really suggestive to his listeners.

In a debate on the adoption of the Swiss military

system of compulsory service for the United States, the negative, speaking at Princeton, imaged the *absence of any necessity* for it thus:

Consider the position of Switzerland, one of the smallest of sovereign states, with an area of about fifteen thousand square miles—just twice the size of this State of New Jersey—with a population less than that of our single city of New York. Switzerland's largest city is but half again the size of our neighboring metropolis of Trenton. She is, moreover, surrounded by four warlike and powerful neighbors, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy, with a combined war strength of over eighteen million. We are a powerful state with thirty times the population of Switzerland. Instead of being surrounded by dangerous rivals, we are supreme upon two continents. It is absurd to suppose that a people so blessed by fortune in strength and location should be forced to make sacrifices in proportion to those necessary in a tiny state whose situation is as unfavorable as ours is favorable.

The *size* of the vast army was imaged thus:

Under the Swiss system about eleven million would be trained and liable to service. But the numbers are the astonishing thing—eleven million trained men in the United States. Do you fully grasp the enormity of these figures? Can you conjure up even in the wildest flight of your imagination a situation in which we would need such a force? Do we contemplate conquering the world? A force this size would be larger than the combined total trained strength of both Germany and Russia at the outbreak of the present war. New York State alone would have a force more than two-thirds the size of the war strength of Japan. Illinois, eight hundred miles from any coast, would have a force of seven hundred thousand trained men.

The affirmative endeavored to offset this by imaging the *magnitude of our ideals and of our country* thus:

We are the greatest democracy in the world. Our military system must therefore be democratic in every sense of the word. It must recognize the fundamental duty of every citizen of a democracy to defend his nation. We are proud of the fact that

our system provides a large reserve force. We are proud because we are proud of the magnitude of our country, of her enormous wealth and resources. It is idle to speak of our national defense in terms of thousands when we have three millions of square miles of area, one hundred millions of population, and two hundred billions of resources. California is three times as large as England; all Germany could be put in Wyoming and Colorado. We have ten thousand miles of boundary, vulnerable at almost every point. Does the negative hope to protect such a country with a few hundred thousand men?

Modern wars are fought in terms of millions, and nations employ not only one army but several armies; we must face these conditions. How does the negative expect to defend both Boston and San Francisco against invading armies? And yet it is quite possible that both shores will be attacked by a powerful alliance. How would they protect both the Canadian and the Mexican borders, or either alone, with a few hundred thousand soldiers? Your army must be either concentrated or scattered; if concentrated, what enemy would be so foolish as to attack at the point of concentration? If scattered, what sort of resistance force could it give at the point of attack? We must face the issue squarely; half-way measures will not do. Modern wars are fought on a large scale; our protection must also be on a large scale. Such protection will be much more than preparedness for war: it will be the best possible preparation for peace.

Verily, in debate, there may be a battle of imagery as well as of arguments. Moreover, the affirmative used the preceding as a prelude to showing that the *cost* of such an army of 11,000,000 men would not be excessive, but would be an insurance premium of less than one-tenth of one per cent on our two hundred billion of resources. (Analogy.)

For vividness and directness, note further the imagery of the following shorter passages:

You ask what we would think of a fire-engine which reached a fire six months after the fire had started. That is not the ques-

tion. I ask what you would think of a fire department which pumped water on a fire two years after the fire was out.

In fact, with conditions in the two countries so diametrically reversed, we might just as well advocate the American plan for the Swiss navy as the Swiss plan for the American army.

The average American does not consider digging a trench under a blazing hot sun a recreation or a pleasure.

A sudden blow at this vital and exposed organ (New York) might well prove fatal.

The European nations will not come forth bled white.

No eagle scream of patriotism.

Would you have American patriotism carry the millstone of compulsory service about its neck?

In debating, an aphorism, epigram, paradox, metaphor—especially any vivid image of likeness or unlikeness—will often make extended proof unnecessary. It may not only arrest the attention and quicken the interest, but may awaken old and familiar associations, give the mind the challenge of a new idea, flood the consciousness with feelings, or decide the will. Mere phrases are potent psychological instruments used by a debater to make clear and obvious the perception of a truth so that it can be easily understood, identified, accepted, by a hearer and carried in memory.

6. **Imaging in General.**—Accuracy and interest are, perhaps, the chief characteristics of effective imagery. Interest is the cause of attention. Given an idea, there is no better way of arousing interest in it than by use of vital illustrations, no better practice for the student than that of searching for illustrative material which will start the listener's mind to thinking in connection with the idea advanced.

The moving scene which Lincoln draws of the growing "bondage of the negro" suggests to the mind a situa-

tion which no constitutional argument could ever confute:

Mammon is after him, ambition follows, philosophy follows, and the theology of the day is fast joining the cry. They have him in his prison-house; they have searched his person, and left no prying instrument with him. One after another they have closed the heavy iron doors upon him; and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key—the keys in the hands of a hundred different men and they scattered to a hundred different and distant places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and matter, can be produced to make the impossibility of his escape more complete than it is.

A narrative example of the power of imagery through suggestion is that of the Master, in Saint Matthew:

Therefore, whosoever heareth these sayings of mine and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock; and the rain descended and the floods came and the winds blew and beat upon that house, and it fell not; for it was founded upon a rock.

And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man which built his house upon the sand; and the rain descended and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon that house, and it fell; and great was the fall of it.

The images here are made more vivid through the use of contrast and skilful repetition. The assumed resemblances and contrast, too, are easily recognized and accepted. Their real force, of course, is due to the great Authority who uttered them.

"Suppose, sir," says Burke, "that the angel of this auspicious youth (Lord Bathurst) . . . had appeared to him in vision, . . .

and should tell him: 'Young man, there is America which at this day serves for little more than to amuse you with stories of savage men and uncouth manners; yet shall, before you taste of death, show itself equal to the whole of that commerce which now attracts the envy of the world. Whatever England has been growing to . . . in a series of 1700 years, you shall see as much added to her in the course of a single life!' Fortunate man, he has lived to see it."

This supposed case has no argumentative value. The older rhetoricians would have called it vision, a figure of emphasis. The final statement that he had "lived to see it" brings it back to reality. Burke, you remember, had already cited comparative tables showing the export trade of England and of her colonies in 1704 and in 1772.

Individual or concrete instances are often used to make plain a general statement, and have a special interest when they lie within the listener's experience:

Political economy consists simply in the production, preservation, and distribution, at fittest time and place, of useful, pleasurable things. The farmer who cuts his hay at the right time; the shipwright who drives his bolts well home in sound wood; the builder who lays good bricks in well-tempered mortar; the housewife who takes care of the furniture in her parlor, and guards against all waste in her kitchen; and the singer who rightly disciplines and never overstrains her voice are all political economists in the true and final sense; adding continually to the riches and well-being of the nation to which they belong.—(*Ruskin.*)

Finally, observe the effect of the linguistic strokes of Senator Thurston in his speech preceding our war with Spain. He introduces the theme—"God's force"—by a sorites or chain of reasoning in the first three sen-

tences. Then notice how he gains something more than unity and clearness by repeating "force" as the subject of each clause in the second paragraph. And note particularly, how from this subject numerous and varied illustrations radiate. No fatigue or loss of attention, but kaleidoscopic change of thought and a gradual increase of interest. When, at the end, the music and drum-beat stop, we are left with the sensation audibly evoked, that God is marching on:

Intervention means force. Force means war. War means blood. But it will be God's force. When has a battle for humanity and liberty ever been won except by force? What barricade of wrong, injustice, and oppression has ever been carried except by force?

Force compelled the signature of unwilling royalty to the great Magna Charta; force put life into the Declaration of Independence, and made effective the Emancipation Proclamation; force beat with naked hands upon the iron gateway of the Bastille and made reprisal in one awful hour for centuries of kingly crime; force waved the flag of revolution over Bunker Hill and marked the snows of Valley Forge with blood-stained feet; force held the broken line at Shiloh, climbed the flame-swept hill at Chattanooga, and stormed the clouds on Lookout Heights; force marched with Sherman to the sea, rode with Sheridan in the valley of Shenandoah, and gave Grant victory at Appomattox; force saved the Union, kept the stars in the flag, made "niggers" men. The time for God's force has come again. Let the impassioned lips of American patriots once more take up the song:

"In the beauty of the lilies Christ was born across the sea,
With a glory in His bosom that transfigures you and me;
As he died to make men holy, let us die to make men free,
For God is marching on."

Logic makes clear only to him who is interested and will follow. The trouble with logic is its monotone,

which, if long continued, produces fatigue. We need variety to rest and stimulate the attention.

Concrete suggestions, such as the imagery of speech figures, parables, fables, allusive stories or anecdotes used to point a moral—analogies, drawn from history, literature, science, art, religion, or from every-day life—may be used to enrich and fertilize barren places, to illuminate dull themes, or when occasion arises to raise the winds like Prospero, and if need be to cause the waters to subside as they did at the Red Sea. An encyclopædic knowledge without the power of association, without the impelling desire to bring facts together and weave them into new creations for the purpose of influencing thought and action, is a pump that holds water but does not give it out, a fourteen-inch-gun that will not go off, a football or debating team, an army, that goes down to defeat when it might have the power to triumph.

The Advantage of the Conceptual View-Point to the Debater.—The debater may regard any process or proposition as a concept for the purpose of imagery, and may exhibit all the arts of rhetoric when attempting to suggest the image of a concept to the minds of his audience.

After a thorough work in briefing, which involves a careful analysis, discrimination, classification, and arrangement of his material, the debater will often find it of advantage to sum up the main proposition of his speech in a single abstract word or phrase significant of meaning to himself. In a team debate, the case as a whole may be summed up in several such words, as, *e. g.*, democracy, security, permanency; causes, examples, consequences, etc. These concepts, of course, must

contain the fundamental reasons for the proposition to be proved, and the imaging of them must be the imaging of fundamental reasons.

This broad conceptual view-point, moreover, should give the debater the free hand needed for a suggestive, imaginative, handling of his material. Confident in the logical structure of his argument, and of his knowledge of facts and material, he is less constrained in the use of his own processes. He can also make his processes and conclusions more perceptual to others. He can, for instance, adjust his imagery to his audience, and to responses received while speaking, and can continue in his imaginative suggestions until the responses noticed indicate that his idea is understood and accepted. In a word, the adoption of the conceptual view-point by the logically trained student means freedom in the imaging process and in adaptation; and this means effectiveness. For the debater is thus enabled to give to his logical formulas detailed or expansive content, as occasion may require, to express his own individuality, to introduce a sincere, natural, personal touch, and to instil into his remarks atmosphere and reality. Facts and logic are made to appeal to human interest in experience and consciousness.

III. Types of Imagery

We are familiar with the fact that there is a classification of imagery made on the basis of the senses employed (see Perceptual Aspect of Imagery, this chapter). The types of imagery so based are considered further in Appendix B.

In conclusion, we should note that there is also a division of imagery based on past, present, and future.

Moreover, images of the past are of two kinds: memory images and imagination images. Memory images call to mind specific, actual experiences in the life of an audience. All other images are products of the creative imagination and are called imagination images of the past, present, or future. A twenty-six-year-old general, speaking in Italy, used *Memory Images* and *Images of the Future* as a means of inspiring confidence, courage, and hope in his men in the following proclamation:

> Soldiers, you have, in fifteen days, gained six victories, taken twenty-one stands of colors, fifty pieces of cannon, several fortified places, made fifteen hundred prisoners, and killed or wounded over ten thousand men. You are the equals of the conquerors of Holland and of the Rhine. Destitute of everything, you have supplied yourselves with everything. You have won battles without cannon, crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without spirituous liquor and often without bread. The republican phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty, were alone capable of enduring what you have suffered. Thanks to you, soldiers! Your country has a right to expect of you great things. You have still battles to fight, cities to take, rivers to pass. Is there one amongst you whose courage flags? One, who would prefer returning to the sterile summits of the Apennines and the Alps, to undergo patiently the insults of that slavish soldiery? No, there is not one such among the victors of Montenotte, of Millesimo, of Diego and of Mondovi! Friends, I promise you that glorious conquest: but be the liberators of peoples, be not their scourges.[1]

Not always, of course, are the emotions and will so dominant as here with Napoleon. Indeed, a sweet reasonableness and a quiet library calm are better adapted to the average occasion and the mood of the

[1] "The Orators of France," by Timon, translated by J. T. Headley, p. 80.

average person. It is a better way to sell bonds or insurance, or to adjust the price when buying a house and lot.

Or, we may refer in illustration to the twenty-third Psalm. The effect of this beautiful lyric is a feeling of sympathy with David's confidence:

1. As he recalls the contentment of green pastures (imagination image of the past).
2. As he suggests the spiritual comfort which he experiences, with God actually present by his side. "For Thou art with me" (immediate image), and
3. As he exclaims in Faith and Hope, "I will dwell in the house of the Lord forever" (imagination image of the future).

The ability to suggest to the consciousness of an audience scenes, events, and happenings of the past, or to prophesy the future consequences of a proposed plan, policy, or course of action is constantly demanded of the debater. In the reply to Hayne, Webster's eulogy of his own State is an imagination image of the past, while his description of the consequences of disunion is an imagination image of the future. Indeed, whether the image used is an image of past or future, of imagination or of memory, the debater must manifest his logical, psychological, and artistic skill. He is more likely perhaps to "ride the winged horse" when imaging the future, as, for example, when he is describing in his peroration the consequences of the organization of a society of nations to enforce peace after the war.

Since the word "present" may mean an hour, a day, a year, a decade, or a century, the length of time suggested by an image of the present will vary with cir-

cumstances. Images of the present refer to happenings in the more or less remote present as distinguished from past or future.

In the most limited sense, however, the present exists only as a nexus between past and future. We no sooner utter the word "now" than it is gone. The present in which we live is ever moving; what is thought to be with us is with us only in a world of motion. There is only a theoretical present, consisting of the moment of time in which we are thinking; and there is always, of course, the possibility of shutting out both the past and the future for an absorbing contemplation of that which is immediately before us in time and space. We may, therefore, in a sense regard all effective images as present images; so that the function both of images of the past and of the future is simply to bring to the focus of immediate attention the other experiences of other times. Moreover, the creative imagination through the infinite suggestions and implications of imagery simply brings, with a conscious or subconscious logic, other experiences to bear on a matter at hand.

Summary.—The present chapter calls attention, *first*, to the need of the imagination in argument. This is believed to be necessary, on account of the dangers arising from an overemphasis of the logical, and is believed to be desirable because of the opportunity for originality afforded, and the resulting higher degree of excellence attainable, through the use of the imaginative powers. It sets forth, *second*, the character and function of the imaging process in argument; distinguishing between the logical and psychological view-points from which an argument may be regarded; and explaining the processes other than the logical which are employed.

It appears that in presenting an argument a debater may exercise his creative imagination, and may use the skill of the real literary artist, if he wisely allows himself a greater freedom in his mental point of view when speaking or writing. Imagery is also shown to have both a perceptual and a conceptual aspect, and the problem of communicating our ideas to others in order to image them on their consciousness is declared to be a process of reducing concepts to sense-perception. Assuming, then, that argument is the perceptualization of a concept, the process of imaging a concept is illustrated variously and at length, logically and broadly, and applied to debating and general use. *Third*, the last topic, types of imagery, suggests the wide scope of the imaging power through its ability to bring to immediate perception images of the past, present, and future.

CHAPTER VII

SUGGESTION IN ARGUMENT

We have defined the presentation as a problem in imaginative suggestion, and have examined the imagination from the standpoint of the speaker. We are now to examine the subject of suggestion (which is the other side of imagery) as the process and means of communicating our ideas to others. This carries us into the difficult territory of the hearer, for suggestion is to be defined in terms of response, effect, or reaction.

Argument, it may be said, is an appeal, through the imagery of words and gestures, for immediate and strong response; and makes use either of the concealed, indirect methods of persuasion, or the open and consciously logical method of conviction. Our immediate purpose is to assist the debater to an understanding of the mental operations by which the decisions in argument are consciously or subconsciously reached. The present discussion, therefore, is restricted to two topics: (1) The laws of mental suggestion and their use in debating, and (2) the instruments of suggestion as applied to the delivery and rhetoric of argument. Gestures, voice, and manner are images of ideas used to convey meaning to others and are, therefore, instruments of suggestion. Words, sentences, paragraphs, whole compositions are also images of ideas used to convey meaning, and likewise must be regarded as instruments of suggestion.

I. Laws of Suggestion and Their Use in Debating

The *Laws of Mental Suggestion* proclaim the dynamic power of the image to produce response. They assert the tendency of the mind to act in line with a suggested idea unless interfered with by a contrary or inhibiting idea. They have been summed up in two definite statements, as laws, thus:

1. Every idea of an action (or function) will result in that action unless hindered by a competing idea or physical impediment.
2. Every idea that is suggested to the mind is held as truth unless inhibited by some contradictory idea.

The value of these laws for the speaker depends chiefly on "limiting the consciousness of the minds of the hearers to the idea suggested, and the avoidance of the ideas in their minds which invalidate or hinder the idea suggested." [1]

Let us, in explanation, start with the simple fact that when a speaker images an idea so that it can be visualized by another, the suggested image awakens in the hearer a mental activity in a particular direction (1) of thinking, *e. g.*, What? Hark! If—but; and (2) also in a particular direction of acting, *e. g.*, "Do you see that sign?" prompting one to turn his head in the direction of a spot indicated.

The second law is recognized in the popular idea of "believing what we are told," and of "accepting as true what we see in print."

On the other hand, when a hearer does not follow out a suggested idea either in his thinking or his acting

[1] "Psychology of Public Speaking," W. D. Scott, p. 156.

or does not believe something that he is told or sees in print, it is because of obstacles rising in that mind in the shape of inhibitions to compete with or interfere with the carrying out of the process.

In general, it is apparent that any vivid image of an idea or action tends to produce a quick and strong response in others. The clever advertiser endeavors to make his suggestions compelling, thus:

1. *Go* to the Big Store.
2. Visit the store you have *always* visited.
3. *Everybody* goes to the Big Store.
4. *Bargains* at the Big Store.
5. The *Patriotic* Store.

If you will examine these statements a little closely, you will notice that there is an attempt to make the mind go forward in thinking about the store, through the responses given to a command, and through appeals to habit, imitation, opportunity of advantage, and finally, I may say, to idealism. There was also an expectation on the part of the advertiser, that the idea so vividly fixed in the thinking, will be accepted as truth by the reader, and that we may become sufficiently interested in what the store may hold out for us to incline us to find out more about it. Vividness, frequency, and recency are psychological principles, of which those who are most successful make constant use.

It will be noticed, however, that the first statement, "Go to the Big Store," is not so much the imaging of an idea which can be regarded as a reason, as the imaging of a command to action. All the other sentences contain a vivid imagery of reasons. The orator, like the advertiser, may appeal openly for action, but the

debater cannot do so unless his appeal for action is well grounded in an imaging of reasons.

The debater's problem, indeed, is more difficult than either that of the orator or the advertiser. For he no sooner suggests his own case than an opponent seeks to inhibit it and to suggest another of his own. In the privacy of his study, he may have placed his argument in a secure, logical form by which he hopes to start and give direction to the thinking—

Proposition.....because
A.....since
I.....for
a.....

But practically and in action, he finds that his suggested ideas are in constant conflict with others. They may come, indeed, not only from his visible opponent but also from his audience to block, retard, or change the direction of his ideas, as well as to facilitate them. Such inhibitions and suggestions may spring from the ill-defined regions of the subconscious, as well as from the better known or conscious experiences. Let us illustrate.

In an expressed argument, the debater at the outset suggests the proper mental attitude of his audience toward the proposition as he sees it by such phrases as "I propose to show," "I commend," "I approve," which inclines the minds of his hearers in the desired direction. Then an opponent takes the floor and inhibits the thinking and leads it in another direction with "I object," "I oppose," "I hesitate," "I fear." And then, one speaker will tell us, for example, that the United States should not enter a league to enforce peace after

the war by a reminder of Washington's warning against foreign alliances. This is primarily an appeal to authority, but there may be in it also a hidden appeal, for Washington is an authority whom we habitually accept and whom we like to imitate. An opposing speaker then reminds us that "President Wilson and former Presidents Taft and Roosevelt are all in favor of our joining such a league." We have now raised a doubt as to the wisdom of Washington's advice, and introduced into the mind a new notion involving conflicting authority and incidentally, and, perhaps, subconsciously, appeals to habit and imitation. And so the problem deepens and continues. Indeed, whether we are debating with ourselves or with others, or merely listening to a debate, the mind is continually facilitating and retarding our initial suggestions by other suggestions or inhibitions of its own, so that there may be a constant vacillation between a feeling of certainty and doubt until a decision is definitely reached.

This, then, is the nature of the process and the material on which the debater must impress his views; active, living minds, with varying antecedent experiences, and differing present capacities, operations, attitudes, and views. He naturally strives to win the goodwill, sympathy, and confidence of his hearers in order to get their co-operation; he also strives to find a common ground, in thought as well as in feeling—real, vital grounds of belief. But he may fail, unless he is able, through insight and imaginative power, to *get within the inner circle of the consciousness of his hearers*, in order to interest them and to set them to thinking, so that their minds will naturally and of themselves go forward in the proper direction.

The debater's primary responses are in interest and in belief. Indeed, the first law of mental suggestion, given above, as applied to debating, seems to assert the need of interest; and the second law, the need of proof, if the suggested idea is to be held in the mind as a truth more than temporarily, and not brushed aside by an immediate denial or contradiction.

1. Interest is a prerequisite of all successful speaking or writing. The factors of interestingness have been variously described, and are said to include such things as the vital, the unusual, the uncertain, the similar, the antagonistic, and the animate.[1]

In general, anything which will attract the listener's mind and incline it to think for itself about the reasons given, is of value in securing and holding interest when presenting an argument. The responsive is the interesting.

2. The nature of proof has been considered under logical organization. It was shown that an effective argument should be imaged within an accepted class concept of a hearer, so as to bring it within his experience. Professor Phillips points out the great value of the principle of reference to experience,—

> because it enables the speaker to attain his purpose along the right psychological line—that of allowing the listener to use his own powers. The use of this principle gives the listener or reader the pleasant feeling that he is not driven or cajoled, but that he sees, feels, accepts, or does the thing desired of his own free will and through his own processes. To illustrate: When my friend entered his home the sky was cloudless. An hour later I come in and say there will be a storm. He contradicts me. I then tell him that heavy black clouds are rolling

[1] "Effective Speaking," Phillips, A.B., p. 63.

up from the west, that flashes of lightning can be seen and that the wind is increasing. He now agrees with me. What did I do? I gave him three facts that were like his own experience in respect to the conditions generally preceding a storm. He came to his own conclusion by means of my reference to his experience. I simply called up part of his stock of knowledge applicable to the case, he did the rest. I recalled to his consciousness some of his subconscious knowledge. I held up to him the mirror of his own experience, and he himself came to the conclusion.

He notes further, that, when the end is belief, as in argument, it is very important to show that the matter in question is like something we already believe. "Belief, then, demands references to experience that show the thing for which acceptance is sought, is like something already accepted as truth—reality. And the most powerful reference will be that accepted actuality which most resembles the thing to be believed." Not only likeness, however, but all the principles of association, likeness and unlikeness, cause and effect, or the inclusion of the thing offered within a more general principle or class concept already known or accepted. For there is great variation among men in their modes of associating ideas. As Doctor McCosh has noted: "One mind ever tends to repetition, another rather to correlation. One man delights in poetical images, another in scientific classes of causes. One intellect is inclined to observe resemblances, another exceptions and differences." We must, however, make our suggestions along the proper psychological lines—employing so far as we can the processes, facts, and manner that a hearer would most likely be able to follow.

Avoiding and Removing Inhibitions.—A few specific, practical suggestions may be given, namely: (1) That

a speaker should not inhibit his own case by hurtful admissions; (2) that in an actual debate the inhibitions introduced by an opponent should be removed at the earliest opportunity; (3) that logical fallacies may act as inhibitions, and (4) that an inhibiting wish, always difficult to handle, may sometimes be removed by the image *ad absurdum.*

1. **Hurtful Admissions as Inhibitions.**—In the nature of things, the debater cannot keep inhibiting ideas from entering the mind of his audience, for assertion is met by denial, proof by counter-proof or distinctions.

He must, in the *first* place, avoid introducing inhibiting ideas himself into his own argument. Indeed, if they are unconsciously permitted to enter, they may be regarded as hurtful admissions and made the basis of attack as in the following:

GERMAN DECEPTIVE EXPERIENCES

The phrase is from the Berlin *Kreuz-Zeitung.* It was reporting the chancellor's belief that the submarine campaign would end the war quickly, and said: "We must hasten. Five or six months will suffice." But then it added, perhaps with more significance than it was aware of: "God grant that we do not renew with our submarines our deceptive experiences with Zeppelins."

2. **Immediate Removal of Inhibitions Introduced by an Opponent.**—The debater should also, in the *second* place, remove inhibiting ideas which have been introduced by an opponent *the instant* he has the opportunity. When Patrick Henry made his famous remark, "Cæsar had his Brutus, Charles the First his Cromwell, and George the Third—" he was interrupted, it will be remembered, by cries of "Treason"; but equal to the occasion he

defiantly answered: "If that be treason make the most of it." Though the inhibited idea was permitted to enter, it was quickly expelled. An objection raised by an opponent is, of course, an inhibiting idea and will hinder the acceptance of new arguments in the mind of a hearer until that objection is removed.

In a team debate, the first speaker in the negative should at the outset remove the interfering ideas advanced by the first affirmative, and then also introduce inhibiting ideas on his own part concerning the affirmative case presented. All speakers other than the one assigned to speak first on the affirmative side, who begin immediately with their constructive speeches, by paying no heed to what has been previously said, fail to remove an inhibition, and so lose the attention of the audience. Even if a speaker cannot answer or does not care to answer an objection fully at the moment, he should at least parry or notice in some way an important objection before presenting an entirely new or different argument. Once a university debater, fearing surprise and wishing to gain time, wrote down a sentence to be used at the opening of any speech: "Against the argument which you have just heard, we of the —— side throw the whole force of our position." Speakers in debating cannot be "ships that pass in the night." The side that does not speak to an opponent or that continually ignores evidence presented, deserves to lose. Its members may be orators, they are not debaters or practical psychologists. The enthusiasm or joy of an audience, frequently manifested during the rebuttal speeches, is largely due to the clear perception of the alternate processes of suggestion and inhibition in rapid succession. The intruder evicted returns again

and again for admission. Ejected by one door he appears at another, or at a window. Lucky for him if he remains on the inside when the last bell rings!

A volume might be written in illustration of the function of suggestion and inhibition in the handling of an opponent and of an audience in varying moods and circumstances. Sometimes, even logic and truth are factors of inhibition, for there are none so deaf as those who will not hear; and, of course, a luckless glance, gesture, or allusion may raise a whirlwind which a mere nothing will cause to subside.

The debater plays upon the emotions less than the orator, but he touches an emotional chord, as through the turn of a phrase or a flash of wit, more often perhaps than he is aware. Complex though laughter is, it is at least a means of preventing fatigue and relieving tension. Laughter liberates the energies, sets the soul free, and refreshes it. Irony, sarcasm, and invective assist reasoning by turning the emotions against another, while mere amusement or entertainment, which causes a *spontaneous* expression of the emotion joy in smiles and laughter, inclines one to follow the suggestions of a speaker through the sheer pleasure of listening.

3. **Logical Fallacies as Inhibitions.**—The discovery of a logical fallacy in an argument may act as an inhibition. It is easy to show, for instance, that in case the imaginative processes are dominant in the mind of the speaker and the logical in the mind of the hearer, the acceptance of imaginative data is inhibited through the discovery of an improper or inadequate logical organization of the thought. Consider, for instance, (1) an accidental association of images such as occurs in figures of

speech. In the following, Bryan's association is purely fatuous:

> Mr. McKinley was the most popular man among the Republicans, and three months ago everybody in the Republican party prophesied his election. How is it to-day? Why, the man who was once pleased to think that he once looked like Napoleon—that man shudders to-day when he remembers that he was nominated upon the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo. Not only that, but as he listens he can hear with ever-increasing distinctness the sound of the waves as they beat upon the lonely shores of Saint Helena.

The orator here simply used a metaphor to image a conclusion which he had reached on other grounds. But as we read it to-day apart from the context, its power of appeal is lost through the absence of logical connection. There is no inherent or necessary relation shown between McKinley and Napoleon in the matter referred to. Or notice again (2) how an emphasis of the concrete without orientation may interfere with the intended effect of an imaginative appeal. The question involved the merits of the Canadian plan of a mandatory investigation of labor difficulties before strikes or lockouts could take place. A negative team had planned a campaign of opposition through an elaboration of the specific instances in which the plan had failed. Instances were cited again and again with full detail, in which strikes actually occurred during the period of investigation, and the audience was duly impressed with the futility of the plan. When, however, the audience discovered the small proportion of failures to successes, the greater number of instances in which there had been no strikes during the period of investigation, and the gradually diminishing number of strikes

in the past few years, all the intended effect of the accumulated images, with their display of detailed knowledge and indirect appeal to the emotions, failed at once, for they were logically inhibited. In this way, too, a public executive who is the recipient of propagandist literature, all emanating from one source, sometimes gets an erroneous impression of political opinion. As a logical fallacy, the instances are not typical and taken at random, or one is led to mistake a part for the whole.

4. **Removing an Inhibiting Wish by the Image *ad Absurdum*.**—"How shall I get rid of the inhibiting wish in the mind of the audience?" is often the most troublesome problem in debating. "I have a good case, but there is an undercurrent of feeling against it which I fear it will be impossible to overcome." Realization of the problem, however, is the first step toward its solution. When Edmund Burke talked with the wind, he was hailed as the greatest orator of his time; when he spoke against it, he became the dinner-bell of Parliament. There are times in the experience of every orator and debater when the wind is dead ahead. Argument avails nothing, for the audience can hardly be induced to follow, much less to heed; it is mastered by its own desires and purposes now in conflict with that of the speaker. Diversion of attention, by holding up for appeal a new object of desire, has failed as utterly as argument. The favorite recourse of most debaters in such an emergency is to image the opposed feeling with new concrete examples which will bring the audience to laughter and ridicule of itself. Beecher often used this device (*reductio ad absurdum*), as at Liverpool, when he accused his audience of sympathizing with the South,

because they were in the minority, and reminded them that they should also sympathize with a thief in the hands of three constables. It was a favorite method of Lincoln's when he felt compelled to grapple closely with his opponent.

> But you will not abide the election of a Republican President! In that supposed event you say you will destroy the Union! And then you say the crime of having destroyed it will be upon us! That is cruel! A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear and mutters through his teeth: "Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and then you will be a murderer."

You will find in debating that your opponent is not averse to letting out all his sail when going with the wind. You should, therefore, take time to discover this probable source of appeal and to find out if possible the most effective way of removing it. It is fortunate if, like Lincoln, you can dispose of it quickly and decisively by an analogy of the meteoric sort. In a debate on ship subsidies, the negative had made a strong case against it on economic, political, and moral grounds, but felt that the affirmative had gained much influence through a covert appeal to the desire for a larger merchant marine. The situation was serious, but how was it to be met? In this case the last speaker, in summing up, broke the spell thus: "We sympathize with the affirmative in their desire for a larger merchant marine. We feel much pleasure in seeing the American flag flying from the stern of vessels when we are in foreign ports," and then leaning forward gravely, "but, ladies and gentlemen, let me warn you lest your pockets should be picked while the band is playing the 'Star Spangled Banner.'"

Conclusions.—A debate may be defined as a psychological process of admitting ideas properly associated to secure interest and belief and of avoiding and excluding all ideas of whatever character or description which tend to interfere with this purpose.

Whoever, when speaking, can prevent serious inhibitions from arising in the minds of his hearers, and can also secure quick and strong responses for the fundamental reasons which he suggests, possesses the qualifications of an effective debater.

The word inhibition is a valuable addition to the debater's vocabulary. Anything which stands in the way of or prevents the acceptance of an idea by another, may be called an inhibition. There are inhibitions of fact and of logic; of style, sentence, or word; of manner, voice, and gesture. Whatever, indeed, may be supposed to be offensive or disagreeable to others, which may be avoided—in taste, sentiment, feeling, perceiving, thinking, or believing—may act as inhibitions, may prevent the acceptance of our ideas. The debater must, therefore, possess and manifest, in no small degree, a power of consideration for others, a delicacy of feeling, a courtesy, a spirit of consideration, fair play, tact—in a word, the characteristics of the educated gentleman.

II. Instruments of Suggestion

In the process of influencing by suggestion, the debater uses the two instruments of ordinary intercourse: gesture images and word images. He usually visualizes his ideas and touches them with feelings, at the same time co-ordinating the muscular or motor functions with the mental and emotional. Body and mind act

together. "Don't" is a word of prohibition, to which an even clearer and stronger meaning is attached if its utterance is accompanied by a frown or backward wave of the hand. Indeed, the mind, as we have seen, tends to act in line with a transmitted suggestion, so that he who argues must continually take heed of the psychology of the one with whom he argues, and of those who listen. No expression can be effective unless it is impressive; and all reactions between giving and receiving minds—the minds of speaker and hearer, or writer and reader—which look toward agreement or difference, are produced through mental suggestion. The suggestions of argument call for an immediate and direct response. As to the long-mooted question—"how far an actor must feel his part"—modern psychology tends toward a belief in the existence of an actual feeling on the part of the actor. There are words like *bubble*, for instance, which we can hardly think of without a slight feeling in the lips or a muscular impulse to pronounce the word. Speech, indeed, is an *ex*-pression, a pressing out.

All gestures and words used must be images of meaning in order to become effective instruments of suggestion. Indeed, if they are so chosen or so placed as to add nothing in clearness, force, or ease to the presentation, they may easily inhibit meaning and prevent the acceptance of our ideas. Word images, moreover, are not only suggestive of meaning but of old associations.

Gesture Images as Instruments of Suggestion.—Historically, it is deemed likely that gestures preceded speech, and that the labials *m* and *p* were the first spoken utterances. This at least is a fair inference from the analogy of child development. All movements of the

human body—face, head, trunk, and limbs—have an image value in suggesting our ideas to others. For example, the image of the clinched fist suggests determination; the finger gesture, the idea of close or logical distinctions; the open palm, the approval of ideas, and the inverted palm, their rejection or disapproval. A movement of the arms toward the speaker calls attention to himself; outwardly, or away from the speaker, it attracts notice to others or to objects in nature. Such movements, like the images of words, may be personal or impersonal, but again, as with words, the person speaking before an audience is a person feeling and willing through physical or motor power as well as one thinking and conveying ideas. Certainly all such physical movements are suggestive of ideas. Gestures appear to be less arbitrary and more based on reason than the meaning assigned to many words, but there is also a recognized conventional use of gesture, as shown in formal treatises.

Professor Houghton, in an excellent work on delivery, uses the term "action" as the foundation of all bodily expression and defines it as a muscular response to mental or emotional stimuli. He says:

> The student of psychology is familiar with the influence of the mind over the body, with the marked effect that each mental or emotional stimulus has upon the muscular organisms. The inexperienced speaker is often astonished at the unexpected exhilaration that he feels as he faces an audience. He finds that the mind is singularly alert and acts much more freely than he had expected; that the blood flows faster; that he has a sense of unusual physical vigor; and that there is an insistent call from the brain for muscular response to the lively activities of the mind. This is the true foundation for all bodily expression. Any voluntary action that is not a direct response to such

prompting is necessarily false and purely mechanical. To be sure, there is a great deal of action that is not the result of voluntary prompting. Various emotions such as timidity, fear, impatience, or anger express themselves through the muscles involuntarily in a way no less mistakable to an audience than voluntary action. But, whether voluntary or involuntary, the fundamental cause is the same—the telegraphic message sent out to the muscles from the brain. The entire problem of platform deportment, therefore, resolves itself into two fundamental considerations:

I. Is the bodily action of the speaker the result of mental or emotional stimuli?

II. Does the bodily action resulting from these stimuli look well and contribute to the general effectiveness of the speech? [1]

It is here implied, of course, that the kind, degree, and quality of the reactions which are awakened in others are dependent upon the kind, degree, and quality of the stimuli employed by a speaker.

Word Images as Instruments of Suggestion.—As it is natural to suppose that gesture preceded speech, it is also likely that speech came before writing; but why, in the beginning, a chair was called a chair rather than a table, we do not know. All speech utterances, of course, have a physiological basis, and speech organs and development must have been greatly influenced by such elementary muscular actions as eating, swallowing, and ejecting.

Verbal nouns seem to have been assigned to things at first more or less arbitrarily, until certain names became associated with certain meanings. These names with their meanings, through constant changes and variations, have gradually obtained a customary, con-

[1] "The Elements of Public Speaking," Harry Garfield Houghton, p. 58.

ventional, and established use. Indeed, words are so largely records of past experiences that for scientific purposes the great German scholar Ebbinghaus[1] has invented a series of nonsense-words in an effort to get rid of the uncertain and variable elements of memory.

The arbitrary character of many conventional names which have become attached to things, and so have acquired definite associations almost startles us when we read, for instance, sentences like the following:

"The *ghost* is willing, but the *meat* is weak."
"As harmless as *pigeons* and as wise as *snakes*."

It is the function of linguistics and of lexicography to record the correct and established uses of words. The best key to the meaning of words is in a study of languages, classic and foreign. Doctor Austin Phelps thus emphasizes the importance of a patient groping after the right word:

"Do we not," he asks, "often fret for the right word, which is just outside the closed door of memory? We know that there is such a word; we know that it is precisely the word we want; no other can fill its place; we saw it mentally a short half-hour ago; but we beat the air for it now. The power we crave is the power to store words within reach, and hold them in mental reserve till they are wanted, and then restore them by the mental vibration of a thought. *Nothing can give it to us but study and use of the language in long-continued and critical practice.*" Again he says: "By such studies, when combined with scholarly use of language of a laborious profession, a man masters words singly, words in combinations, words in varieties of sense, words in figurative uses, and those forms of expression which always lie latent in original uses of one's mother tongue." [2]

[1] "Memory," by Hermann Ebbinghaus, translated by Henry A. Ruger.
[2] "The Making of an Oration," C. M. Brink, p. 109. (McClurg.)

There are few neutral words in our language, that is, words without the experiences of past associations. Indeed, neutrality in words is almost as rare as neutrality in patriotism. Professor L. W. Smith gives the usual division of words into impersonal words and personal words, and shows that the words which give a writing its literary character are personal. Impersonal words are used for clarity, simplicity, and precision; but personal words are used for strength (orientation, energy, dignity, weight), for emphasis, and for beauty (harmony, euphony, speech figures). He continues:

> We should always strive to write clearly, and we should also strive to write as simply as is consistent with writing concisely. If a subject is difficult, it may not be possible to deal with it in a simple manner and yet achieve accuracy. In the degree in which the subject and our interest in it permit, however, we should be clear, simple, and precise in everything we write. Evidently, then, the qualities that make a writing personal, that give it literary character, are additions to the simple qualities when purpose does not go beyond that of establishing understanding of the author's meaning.[1]

Likewise, in the speech of the normal man, personal words are as natural as the light in the eye, the smile on his countenance, or his gesture of hand or body.

Words are as temperamental as the individuals who employ them. They may be regarded, theoretically, as counters in a process of intellectual exchange; but practically, such symbols of thought usually manifest personality and feeling, and appeal to old experiences. Even general or abstract words, such as *faith*, *power*, *duty*, *enemy*, *soldier*, have emotional associations, as

[1] "The Mechanism of English Speech," Lewis Worthington Smith, p. 12. (Oxford.)

well as simple or concrete words, like *father*, *mother*, or *home*. Indeed, impersonal terms hardly exist outside the sciences; and in public speaking, they do so only in those occasional instances where *clearness only* is needed, as in addresses before purely technical bodies. There is no feeling, for instance, in the abstract statement that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. On the other hand, take such a random list of words as the following:

Tartar, Hun, Vallombrosa, Mesopotamia, Tophet, Paradise, Eden; copperhead, jingo, protectionism, pension, free trade, civil service, Monroe Doctrine; rose, alcohol, cabbage, turkey, tobacco, apple, roast pig; reeking, rollicking, working, playing, hunting, fishing, crying; eat, swim, dive, run, blow, rest, sleep.

Such words produce overtones of suggestion which cause emotional judgments, and the bare mention of their names may awaken in others in varying degrees the experiences of earlier associations. Thus, literature, art, business, and all forms of public speech are largely, though often unconsciously, dependent for effectiveness on the hidden emotional associations which lurk in our common speech.

Variability of Meanings.—The ever-changing character of the meanings of words is sometimes due to the speaker himself, and sometimes to the listener.

I. *Due to the speaker.*

Vocal Shadings.—Obviously, a different color of meaning may be imparted to words through the manner of their utterance. You have probably heard an Irishman say, "Good morning," in such a manner as to remember it all day. You have also no doubt occasionally heard a speaker who, through egotism or vanity, through

ignorance or spurious art, has displeased or disgusted you. I shall do no more here than to mention the great possibilities for shading in the use of that marvellous musical instrument—the voice—and the equally marvellous capacity of the brain to analyze and interpret auditory impressions.

Negatively, the most common faults in speech utterance which may inhibit meaning are, perhaps, poor articulation and enunciation, throaty constringency, nasality, and monotony of tone. The most pleasing voice, therefore, and the voice most likely to convey the intended meaning, possesses freedom, flexibility, and variety; and in quality is pure, clear, round, fairly musical and fairly deep and rich.

II. *Due to the listener.*

a. The mental level.

b. The psychological moment.

There is also a variation of meaning due to the listener. Since word meanings are so dependent upon experience, it remains to be pointed out how word meanings will vary on this account with different listeners. Meanings are not constant either among individuals at the same time or among the same individuals at different times. Thus, there is the law of the mental level as applied to words. *Illustrations:* The Indo-European family of languages includes eight branches, as follows: The Aryan, the Armenian, the Hellenic, the Albanian, the Italic, the Celtic, the Balto-Slavic, the Teutonic.[1] A mention of these names opens trains of associations to the linguistic scholar which floods them with significance; while to the uninformed reader they are as de-

[1] "The History of the English Language," O. F. Emerson. (Macmillan.)

void of meaning as if they were written in Choctaw. Again, this may be illustrated by the use of learned or technical terms. In speaking of the vagueness and unintelligibility of some German writers, Boris Sidis ridicules Hegelian philosophical speculation by quoting from Hegel's chapter on perception:

"The *this* is thus given as *not this*, or as *sublimated*, and therewith not nothing, but a definite nothing, or a *nothing having* a *content*, namely the *this*." The italics are Hegel's. The sense is chiefly in the suggestive power of the italics. Such metaphysical speculations are recommended by some Hegelians as the profoundest wisdom of idealistic philosophy. One is reminded of the semi-Platonic, semi-Hegelian definition of love: "Love is the ideality of the relativity of reality of an infinitesimal part of the infinite totality of the Absolute Being." [1]

Another important consideration is the verbal law of the psychological moment, for words, like fashions in dress, have their seasons. I feel sure that *ice* and *coal* bear a different significance in summer than in winter. Football terms, which are readily bandied about in the autumn, become almost obsolete during the athletic periods of baseball, rowing, and tennis. There are, indeed, words of the hour, which for some special reason are suddenly lifted bodily out of the dictionary and translated as if by magic into meanings of transcendent power. In this class was the word *peace*, when President Wilson, in February, 1917, proposed to all the European belligerents the formation of a league to enforce peace after the war. By April, however, of the same year, it was *war*, which had become capitalized in the public mind, and peace was being written with a small letter. I doubt if the word *coincidence* was ever more

[1] "The Psychology of Laughter," Boris Sidis, p. 22. (Appleton.)

fraught with meaning than on July 4, 1824. On this day, which was the semicentennial anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson and Adams both passed away. The name of the hero of the hour is usually expected to elicit a demonstration.

Thus, the meaning values of images suggested will vary with speakers, and will vary with the experience of listeners; which, in turn, vary from time to time, as does the bullion which goes to make up the silver dollar. Moreover, the shadings and adjustments given to gesture images and to word images demand for their effectiveness the consideration of such factors as the mental receptivity of the particular listener and the inevitable emotion-bearing element hidden in words of the particular moment. Some plants grow only in certain soils, while some blossom best in particular seasons of the year.

Imagery an Imperfect Means.—The best we can ever do with such an imperfect means as word imagery is to arrive at approximate truth. Moreover, in our theory of reasoning, it seems we must strike an average between the logic of categories and pure empiricism. We must admit the inherent capacity of the mind to reason, but then we must admit, also, the necessity of explaining this process by an objective reference. Even Aristotle's association laws are merely an explanation of the sort of "hunt" he would go on in order to call to mind something which he had forgotten. He asks what is its like, what is its contrary, or what it was next to in space or time.

Fundamentally, we start with an idea, we give it an objective reference or test; but the words used to image the idea will remain an indefinite variable, ever open

to error and correction. Fortunately, in argument it is sufficient if we employ sincerely such means as we are provided with, and so are enabled to resolve differences of opinion by overcoming probable error or by establishing probable truth. The end of education indeed is not only to know the truth, but to make it known. Learning is not a light hidden under a bushel, but a torch to be held aloft. These limitations of imagery, moreover, hold to a certain extent for the finding and statement of knowledge, as well as for its dissemination.

Two further remarks may be made. *First*, that it is precisely this plasticity of imagery which gives to the speaker or writer his opportunity for freedom and individuality, and enables us to dignify his best products by the name of art in the higher sense at once difficult and interesting to create. *Second*, that the attainment of success in debating demands sterling honesty and sincerity—in a word, character.

CHAPTER VIII

INSTRUMENTS OF SUGGESTION

The debater should acquire a discriminating use of words. He needs not only accurate or precise words but suggestive words, words rich in associations, emotion-arousing words, and, of course, a copious vocabulary. For this purpose, he may pursue any line of reading or study which will lead him to consider for himself such things as the connotations of words, the synonyms and antonyms of words used by great writers and speakers, and the history and etymology of words. He should know the primal or root meanings of words, and be able to compare them with their customary meanings, so as to keep as close as possible to these primal or root meanings. In accomplishing this, Latin of course is the great linguistic study, but translating from the Greek and modern languages is of great assistance. Indirectly, good reading and the study of languages; directly, a study of the dictionary; books of synonyms are especially commended.

Verbal meanings and tonal meanings, which are derived from antecedent experiences, will generally do more in getting attention, and in impressing others with the interesting and solid character of one's ideas, than verbal commonplaces which are only precise. A man's speech, however, is the mirror of himself. Indeed, it is

so largely a product of his education, environment, and natural ability, so individual and personal, that any advice given must recognize as fundamental the inalienable right of an individual to choose his words as he chooses his friends.

Let us, then, return to the elementary notion of regarding words as images of ideas, not only that we may present them effectively, but in order to keep our vocabulary from becoming impoverished. The business man who writes, "Yours of even date received. In reply, I would state . . . Yours very truly," is likely always to be a man of limited vocabulary. The words of a speaker, however, are not mere automata, but vital energies of human thought and life, possessing an infinite variety of meanings in their nuances of etymological significance, customary or special usages, and practical applications. The speaker must know his words as the engineer the strength of his materials and the stability of his structures; he must also know them as the harpist knows his strings and the painter his colors. He is both scientist and artist. Words, in fine, are the most important elements in the instrumentation of ideas by civilized man. Word imagery, tonal and illustrative, always essential to effective presentation, is equally important to personal growth in the use of these instruments, in imparting, in receiving, and in interpreting the meanings intended to be transmitted. They express the finesse as well as the solidity of thinking.

1. *Tonal Imagery.*—This term is used (in contradistinction to illustrative imagery, or imagery of the content) to describe all those subconscious influences upon the thinking which are due to sounds, and includes *onomatopœia* and *rhythm.* Their primary function is

æsthetic or emotional, so that they are more important to music, the dance, poetry, and certain forms of oratory, than to argumentative discourse.

Onomatopœia is only an auxiliary of argument. A word or phrase used to illustrate the content of an idea is more striking if the vowel or consonant combinations which go to make it up imitate or tonally suggest the object or action referred to. It intensifies an auditory suggestion. Ordinarily, moreover, we prefer euphonious to cacophonous words. Ex-President Roosevelt's message in the spring of 1917 was summed up in the striking phrase: "Arm and Farm."

Rhythm is the recurrence of accented and unaccented, of emphasized and unemphasized, words or syllables. In poetry, there is a definite unit of measure called a foot, but the rhythm of prose possesses much greater freedom, and is more noticeable in spoken than in written forms.

Prose passages which are most regularly rhythmical are usually those which are most emotional; *e. g.*, Dickens's description of the death of Paul Dombey. In his classical collection, "British Eloquence," Professor Goodrich twice makes note of the *rhythmus:* once in the speech by Henry Grattan on "Irish Rights," and again in Lord Erskine's "Defence of Stockdale." The former is slow and dignified, while the latter possesses a more rapid, iambic movement:

(1) "Hereafter, when these things shall be history, your age of thraldom, your sudden resurrection, commercial redress, and miraculous armament, shall the historian stop at *liberty*, and observe that here the principal men among us were found wanting, were awed by a weak ministry, bribed by an empty treasury; and when liberty was within their grasp, and her temple opened

its folding doors, fell down and were prostituted at the threshold?"

"I might, as a constituent, come to your bar and demand my liberty. I do call upon you by the laws of the land, and their violation; by the instructions of eighteen counties; by the arms, inspiration, and providence of the present moment—tell us the rule by which we shall go; assert the law of Ireland; declare the liberty of the land! I will not be answered by a public lie, in the shape of an amendment; nor, speaking for the subjects' freedom, am I to hear of faction. I wish for nothing but to breathe in this our island, in common with my fellow subjects, the air of liberty. I have no ambition, unless it be to break your chain and contemplate your glory. I never will be satisfied so long as the meanest cottager in Ireland has a link of the British chain clanking to his rags. He may be naked, he shall not be in irons. And I do see the time at hand; the spirit is gone forth; the Declaration of Right is planted, and though great men should fall off, yet the cause shall live; and though he who utters this should die, yet the immortal fire shall outlast the humble organ who conveys it, and the breath of liberty, like the word of the holy man, will not die with the prophet, but survive him."

(2) "Gentlemen, I think I can observe that you are touched with this way of considering the subject, and I can account for it. I have not been considering it through the cold medium of books, but have been speaking of man and his nature, and of human dominion, from what I have seen of them myself among reluctant nations submitting to our authority. I know what they feel, and how such feelings can alone be repressed. I have heard them in my youth from a naked savage, in the indignant character of a prince surrounded by his subjects, addressing the governor of a British colony, holding a bundle of sticks in his hand, as the notes of his unlettered eloquence. 'Who is it,' said the jealous ruler over the desert, encroached upon by the restless foot of English adventure, 'who is it that causes this river to rise in the high mountains, and to empty itself into the ocean? Who is it that causes to blow the loud winds of winter, and that calms them again in summer? Who is it that rears

up the shade of those lofty forests, and blasts them with the quick lightning at his pleasure? The same Being who gave to you a country on the other side of the waters, and gave ours to us; and by this title we will defend it,' said the warrior, throwing down his tomahawk upon the ground, and raising the war-sound of his nation. These are the feelings of subjugated man all round the globe; and depend upon it, nothing but fear will control where it is vain to look for affection."

It has recently been asserted, that while rhythm is primarily æsthetic in aim and function, secondarily it "assists the thinking." This is true only if the emphasis in speaking is properly made dependent on the *sense* of the passage, on the thought groups rather than on sound groups.

In keeping time with rhythm our muscles contract with the accented and relax with the unaccented part of the foot or line. This contraction of the muscles is an influence beneficial in producing a rise of the attention. Our attention is best employed when periods of activity are followed by periods of rest.[1]

Similarly, while writing in another connection, another psychologist refers to "expectancy" as resulting from our "flow" of speech:

The articulate voice per se seems, then, to have a function of pointing, *i. e.*, of leaving us expectant and ready, even when there is no content pointed to. Every one has the experience of listening to others conversing in an unknown tongue (Chinese laundrymen, for instance), where there is not the remotest conception of the subject in hand, yet a feeling of significance accompanies *the flow of uncomprehended talk.* Those who do not understand French or Italian well enough to follow the connection in a play, will leave the theatre with the impression of having understood every word said. In these cases the expectancy,

[1] "Psychology of Public Speaking," W. D. Scott, 101.

the pointing consciousness has been there, the feeling of otherness or of significance, although there was no subsequent content to fill it up.[1]

When the emphasis is placed on sound groups rather than on thought groups, the effect is likely to lull rather than to arouse.

2. *Illustrative imagery* or imagery of the content may be classified as objective or subjective, according as it omits or expresses the emotions of the speaker.

Classical illustrations of the *impersonal objective image* which are formed by analogy are Gibbon's description of Byzantium in the form of an unequal triangle ("Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, XVII"), Victor Hugo's battle-field of Waterloo presented in the form of the letter *A* ("Les Misérables"), and Stevenson's likeness of the Bay of Monterey to a bent fishing-hook ("Across the Plains").

Every public speaker soon learns the value of a mental sketch-map as an aid to the understanding of an audience. Webster presents a vivid picture of the opening situation in the Hayne-Webster debate by referring to the fact that when the mariner, after being tossed at sea for many days, attains a glance of the sun, he immediately takes his latitude, and learns his true position. So Webster argues that before we float farther on the waves of this debate we should ascertain where we now are, and concludes by calling for a reading of the resolution before the Senate. In debating, the function of an image is just as properly to convey information which implies a conclusion as it is to secure atten-

[1] *The Psychological Review*, Monograph Supplement No. 30, by Eleanor H. Rowland, p. 7.

tion and interest through an emotional reaction. Unless reliance is placed upon reason, in controversial matters the process, indeed, becomes one of persuasion, and is not argument at all. The debater, therefore, should acquire skill in the use of the objective image. He may use this skill in the introduction, where impartiality is requisite without implying a conclusion, as in imaging the terms of the proposition under discussion, or in excluding irrelevant matter, or in explaining by analogy what the issue is like. Moreover, during the debate, whenever the reasoning is to be set forth impressively, such objective images have place. But there is also an effective expository type of argument, where conclusions are not formally drawn but implied through the association of ideas well imaged. Thus, signs and examples have force and convey meaning in the presentation of those ideas which we know rest ultimately upon unstated but remotely suggested inductions or causal relationships. That which we perceive, we know; seeing is believing. Such images used with argumentative effect express the relation of simple association and resemblance, and imply those of particular with general or of antecedent with consequent.

Avoiding Personalities.—Argument, moreover, presupposes sufficient emotional color to enable a listener to reach a sound judgment. The tendency, however, to personalities which lower the intellectual tone of an argument is always to be avoided. If, at length, personal charges are found to be necessary, they should, of course, be made as free from feeling as possible and always with a full consideration of an opponent's point of view. In the passage beginning "Matches and Overmatches," Webster met the personal taunts of Hayne

with a reserve of feeling, a dignity, and exaggerated courtesy which intensified the power of his sarcasm. In the heat of debate, even Lincoln, who was calmness itself in his second inaugural, sometimes went too far in his earlier days, as in his personal attacks on President Polk. Certainly his Framed Timber Analogy in the House-Divided-Against-Itself speech possesses more argumentative merit than such a passage as the following:

> But if he cannot or will not do this—if on any pretense or no pretense he shall refuse or omit it—then I shall be fully convinced of what I more than suspect already—that he is deeply conscious of being in the wrong; that he feels the blood of this war, like the blood of Abel, is crying to Heaven against him; that originally having some strong motive—what, I will not stop now to give my opinion concerning—to involve the two countries in a war, and trusting to escape scrutiny by fixing the public gaze upon the exceeding brightness of military glory—that attractive rainbow that rises in showers of blood—that serpent's eye that charms to destroy—he plunged into it, and has swept on and on till, disappointed in his calculation of the ease with which Mexico might be subdued, he now finds himself he knows not where. How like the half-insane mumbling of a fever dream is the whole war part of his late message!

Something, however, may perhaps be here pardoned to the temper of the times.

Subjective images are the commonest type, even in debating. They tend to awaken in the hearer personal feelings, either favorable or unfavorable. Feeling begets feeling. It is very difficult to describe a thing, let us say, as beautiful or as just, without manifesting quite unconsciously some pleasure concerning it, or as ugly or unjust, without evincing some feeling of dislike, aversion, or even contempt. With some persons a beautiful

view is always a "charming" one, and a thing ugly in appearance may quickly become hideous and hateful. Thus, there is value in learning, through a study of synonyms, the temperaments of words.

In the following, the italicized words give it an emotional quality:

> We can organize an army on either the plan submitted by the majority of the Committee on Military Affairs or that of the minority. Both provide conscription, but that of the majority makes the stronger appeal to me. It does not *insult* the young men of the country by assuming that they will not do as the young men of England did, come voluntarily to their country's assistance. My contention is that the drastic method, the *odious* conscription plan, should not be resorted to until a chance has been given for getting men into the army on a basis that is generally regarded as *honorable*. Even advocates of the conscription system say that it is inadvisable to have volunteers and conscripts in the same army, because the former are thought to have a more honorable status. I fancy this must be true, for certainly they will be the men of spirit, who do not require compulsion to bring them to the defense of their country.

In a recent debate on the compulsory investigation of labor troubles before strikes and lockouts should take place, an affirmative speaker imaged his main contention vividly as follows: "The economic forces of our country may be likened unto a sword, one edge of which is capital, the other labor. Periodically, the public is asked to take hold of this sword, with the result that it gashes its hand. We of the affirmative have provided a hilt for that sword. The hilt is ready—compulsory investigation. Will you reach for it and grasp it?"

As emotions have been classified broadly into ap-

proving and disapproving, so subjective images may be classified as approving and disapproving images. So we have the imagery of the eulogy and that of the philippic. It should be remembered, however, that we will sometimes seek approval for a cause, object, or person, by awakening a dislike or disapproval of the opposite. Some political campaigns seem to be conducted on this principle. Obviously, the suggestions offered on the affirmative and negative sides in a debate need not always be, for the affirmative one of approval, or for the negative one of disapproval. Neither side need confine itself to one set of emotions or harp too continually on one string. The affirmative, for instance, will image evils in an existing system to be remedied, or will suggest objections to the negative case; while the negative side may seek not merely to establish a negation but to secure approval for a substitute plan.

Personal Adjectives.—The excessive use of personal adjectives is especially to be avoided in argument, for, of all the parts of speech, adjectives seem most commonly to possess "an affective coloring." No words expressive of feeling are really justified in argument unless that feeling is also justified by evidence and reasoning. The word *odious*, for instance, in the phrase "the odious plan" above, really begs the question at issue. The characterization of an argument by an adjective of feeling (after the argument has been clearly established) is another matter, provided it expresses the reaction also clearly experienced by others.

In studying synonyms, therefore, to enrich one's vocabulary, attention should always be paid to this distinction between subjective and objective adjectives. A synonym, it may be said, is not a word whose mean-

ing is identical with that of another, but similar. It possesses a family rather than an individual likeness, the points of difference at the moment being regarded as unimportant.

Many speakers have their characteristic adjectives. Referring to Rufus Choate's use of adjectives, it was once said that he "drove a coach and six," each new adjective applied adding something new to the picture, giving it an increased vividness and the hearer a new delight. On the other hand, William Pinkney, for many years his rival for legal supremacy during the adjudication of marine cases arising out of the War of 1812, was at times as sparse in adjectival imagery as Choate was copious.

The student might profitably read some argument and make a report of it on the following plan: *First*, write down in one column a list of the adjectives used. *Second*, record in another column, opposite each word, a list of its synonyms. Then he should consider the relative appropriateness of the several words to the context, and also their intellectual or emotional quality. Similar investigations may be made as to the other parts of speech, particularly concrete nouns, verbs, and adverbs.

All the parts of speech, it would seem, may be considered as imagery, expressing a state of mind having an objective reference. We should cultivate the habit of imaging nouns as concrete objects, and verbs as actions. Adjectives and verbs are imaged as modifiers, respectively, of things and actions; the preposition *with* suggests the accompaniment of things; *over* and *under* the position of things; the conjunction *and* the connection, and *or* the alternative of things, etc.

The very experience of a concrete noun involves associated images. It is the part of speech devoted to that unusual habit of mental imagery, especially visual. As soon as we ignore our images, or for some reason have but few, our vocabulary is impoverished of concrete nouns.

Observe the concrete nouns and adjectives by which the chief justice proves to Falstaff that he is an old man:

Do you set down your name in the scroll of youth, that are written down old with all the characters of age? Have you not a moist eye? a dry hand? a yellow cheek? a white beard? a decreasing leg? an increasing belly? is not your voice broken? your wind short? your chin double? your wit simple? and every part about you blasted with antiquity? and will you yet call yourself young? Fie, fie, fie, Sir John!

The motor response to verbs, especially in the imperative form, is too well recognized to be dwelt upon. Doubtless it is often because of this that, when we wish to avoid bluntness of speech invoking action, we give the verb adverbial or other modifiers.

The Apostle Paul's remarks to the Corinthians, upon the abstract virtue charity or love, illustrates concrete suggestion through verbs:

Charity suffereth long and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.

The verbs of the man of science grow in significance when they are imaged concretely:

From the time that the first suggestion to *introduce* physical science into ordinary education was *timidly whispered,* until

now, the advocates of scientific education have *met with opposition* of two kinds. On the one hand, they have been *pooh-poohed* by the men of business who *pride themselves* in being the representatives of practicality; while, on the other hand, they have been *excommunicated* by the classical scholars, in their capacity of Levites in charge of the ark of culture and monopolists of liberal education.—(*Thomas H. Huxley.*)

But most of all, perhaps, the debater should pay attention to his use of adjectives, for they express the mental attitude and the emotion of the speaker. Characterization, however, is not argument, though often an important aid to it. Excessive characterization is quickly detected, and defeats its own ends.

Adjectives seem to be more intimate, more personal words than any yet given. . . . We find that the adjective function in general is that of expressing the intimate effect of stimuli on organism and at the same time of pointing to an object as possessing these qualities, and it is more likely than the other parts of speech to have an affective coloring.[1]

The following passage from Sidney Smith may illustrate imaginative suggestion in general, marked by a peculiar richness of diction:

Take some quiet, sober moment of life, and add together the two ideas of pride and man; behold him, a creature of a sphere high, stalking through infinite space in all the grandeur of littleness. Perched on a speck of the universe, every wind of heaven strikes into his blood the coldness of death; his soul floats from his body like melody from the string; day and night, as dust on the wheel, he is rolled along the heavens, through a labyrinth of worlds, and all the creations of God are flaming above and beneath.

[1] *The Psychological Review, Monograph Supplements*, No. 30, by Eleanor H. Rowland, pp. 19, 23.

It has been well said that "there are three great words in expression—imagination, sympathy, and suggestion." To the literary artist, the greatest of these is imagination, for the imagination is the mental source of suggestion. It suggests feeling, it suggests thought. Through its dynamic power it awakens the mental activity of others, which under guidance and control seems of itself to reach the anticipated goal—whether that goal be the perception of a truth or the performance of an action desired. Thus the verbal image is the natural agency of the mind in conveying its ideas. Nothing is simpler, except gesture and facial expression.

"The eye it cannot choose but see,
We cannot bid the ear be still,
Our bodies feel where'er they be
Against or with our will."

The Phrase.—Fortunate, indeed, is the debater who is able to image such concepts as necessity, advantage, and danger, when they are fundamental to his case, in interest-arousing, memorable phrases. Failing in this, like most political orators, he lays stress on the power of the quoted phrase or epigram which appeals to a cherished attitude or a familiar ideal. Indeed, even the main issues of a debate have sometimes been so stated as almost to beg the main question at issue. This happened quite unconsciously, for example, when a negative team, opposing the participation by the United States in a league of peace to be formed after the war, defined the issue as freedom and independence of action *versus* a formal alliance. All such phrases appeal to emotional judgments.

The power of the phrase has been emphasized by Emerson in his "Essay on Eloquence" as follows:

> The orator must be, to a certain extent, a poet. Condense some daily experience into a glowing symbol, and an audience is electrified. . . . It is a wonderful aid to memory, which carries away the image, and never loses it. A popular assembly, like the House of Commons, or the French Chamber, or the American Congress, is commanded by these two powers—first by a fact, then by skill of statement. Put the argument into a concrete shape, into an image—some hard phrase, round and solid as a ball, which they can see and handle and carry home with them—and the cause is half won.

An effective artistic image must appeal as an actuality or truth and give the impression of spontaneity, obtaining its effects instantly or not at all. It is simple, not stilted or overwrought, is drawn with a free but sure hand. It has the force of an intuitive perception whose implications and suggestions are so obvious and compelling as to be inescapable. It is a psychological bow-shot at the bull's-eye.

Great truths which have influenced the policies of this nation have, on great occasions, been imaged vividly as a mental flash. Washington fixed the foreign policy of the United States for over a hundred years in his Second Inaugural through his use of the term "Entangling Alliances." Lincoln defined the issues which saved the Union through his application to slavery of the Biblical quotation that a "house divided against itself cannot stand." And more recently, President Wilson justified America's entrance into the great European War by a phrase whose truth was instantly perceived, recognized, and accepted, namely, that we must "make the world safe for democracy." Throughout

the century, indeed, slogans of parties in succeeding campaigns have figured prominently in their triumphs or defeats. The mottoes of our States, and in ancient times those on the coats of arms of families, served as the rallying cries for loyalty, devotion, and sacrifice.

Sentence Forms.—In making argument effective, there is much to enlighten us in the psychology of grammar and rhetoric. Chief, among the sentence forms used to awaken and intensify interest, is the interrogatory.

(1) Our best oratory fairly bristles with the rhetorical question: "Is life so dear or peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God!" Such a direct appeal has an advantage over the declarative form, in that it starts the mind of the listener to thinking and, even though the question suggests the answer, seems to permit it to reach its conclusion by its own processes. Interest is secured by setting the listener's mind to work under the speaker's control. In the debate on the Swiss military plan, notice further how the negative massed a series of interrogatories in a summary, to implant the doubt that the affirmative had proved their case:

> You have heard the whole case of the affirmative. Have they shown what tremendous change has come about in our condition that we are forced to forsake sober thought and turn to so radical a proposal? Have they shown why, when we consider the problem of defense, we are to find its solution in a slavish imitation of a system used and developed by a little landlocked European state the size of Massachusetts? Have you heard any reason why we are to lay such tremendous emphasis upon that branch of our defense which is secondary in character, namely, our land forces? Have they justified by necessity their proposal to compel every normal American to let his time be confiscated

by the state for this type of defense? Have they shown how it is economical to train eleven million men? Have they proved why we must expose ourselves to the dangerous national psychology which universal military training develops? Have they proved that under the system they propose we will at least have adequate, real defense? Will their plan, whatever its faults and exaggerations in principle and application, stand the acid test of war, and guarantee us at least safety against a possible foe? The answer, ladies and gentlemen, is emphatically "No."

Notice, too, the compelling force of the skilfully phrased questions in this British "War Poster," almost brutal in their directness:

FOUR *QUESTIONS* TO MEN WHO HAVE NOT ENLISTED

1. If you are physically fit and between 19 and 38 years of age, are you really satisfied with what you are doing to-day?
2. Do you feel happy as you walk along the streets and see other men wearing the King's uniform?
3. What will you say in years to come when people ask you: "Where did you serve in the great war?"
4. What would you answer when your children grow up and say: "Father, why weren't you a soldier too?"

ENLIST TO-DAY

The interrogatory may suggest the answer yes as well as no, and interest the mind in the most difficult and important phases of any subject. It is intended to bring a strong reaction.

(2) When the experienced lawyer says to the court, "Turn to folio 304 and you will find," so and so, he hopes to prompt the court to obey his suggestion and examine the evidence. Likewise, the seasoned debater knows that when he tells his audience to follow him figuratively to a certain quarter of the globe, it will usually be in-

clined at least to the mental act. The imperative form, however, is often varied with the more courteous or concessive "If you will turn, if you will follow me, you will find," etc.

(3) It must not be supposed from this, however, that the hypothetical sentence form always or even usually implies courtesy or agreement. Indeed, the over-argumentative "If, therefore," style often awakens opposition and combativeness, for it may imply quite unintentionally some distrust in the listener and actually raise the doubt which it would down. In speaking to an audience which is antagonistic, as, for example, to a body of hyphenated Americans on "Foreign-Born Americans Real Americans," you might imply distrust by saying: "*If* you believe in the greatness of our mission, then you *must* accept our problems as your problems and identify our life with your own." The danger of disapproval would at least be lessened by saying more diplomatically: "*Since* you believe in the greatness of our mission, then you *will* accept our problems as your problems and identify our life with your own."

Climax.—The most vivid imagery in an argument is often used for the purpose of obtaining a strong final impression, which is likely to be the most lasting. After clarifying the processes in a discriminatory way, an idea is sometimes effectively driven home by an analogy or a metaphor, thus:

The hand of Heaven appears to have led us on to be, perhaps, humble instruments and means in the great Providential dispensation which is completing. We have fled from the political Sodom; let us not look back, lest we perish and become a monument of infamy and derision to the world! For can we ever expect more unanimity and a better preparation for defense;

more infatuation of counsel among our enemies, and more valor and zeal among ourselves? The same force and resistance which are sufficient to procure us our liberties, will secure us a glorious independence, and support us in the dignity of free, imperial states. We cannot suppose that our opposition has made a corrupt and dissipated nation more friendly to America, or created in them a greater respect for the rights of mankind. We can, therefore, expect a restoration and establishment of our privileges, and a compensation for the injuries we have received, from their want of power, from their fears, and not from their virtues. The unanimity and valor which will effect an honorable peace can render a future contest for our liberties unnecessary. *He who has strength to chain down the wolf is a madman if he lets him loose without drawing his teeth and paring his nails.*—(*Samuel Adams.*)

Repetition.—Words, phrases, and sentences gain peculiar power through repetition, so that what at first we know not and care not for, will in time, through the sheer persistency with which it is forced on our attention, come to be accepted and embraced. Thus, articles of trade are successfully exploited by advertising, and political slogans and epigrams casually mentioned at first, come gradually to be accepted and extended beyond the occasion of their first utterance. Not only that, but recurrent sounds and forms, as in the litany or in many devices of poetry such as the refrain of the old ballads, or in Burke's "I impeach him," in his prosecution of Warren Hastings, have a peculiar effect of monotony which fascinates the listener into quiescence. In his Reply to Hayne, too, Webster uses the phrase, "I understand him to say," with a slightly ironical effect of disapproval.

No element of debating is more important than the keeping of the main ideas—arguments and facts—before the mind of the audience. Repetition of subject, repe-

tition of phrases, suggesting the main reasons! Indeed, debates have been won without much debating ability except such as is shown in a frequent restatement of the proposition supported by three main reasons as the unified scheme of proof. We may even forget the absence of further or supporting arguments in the consecutive din of the "three reasons." They alone, so melodiously phrased, so rhythmically uttered, so confidently proclaimed, will remain in our ears. This, of course, is more likely to happen if the question is such that neither side can prove anything about it with certainty. And in all debates on matters of public policy, it must be remembered that we can never establish anything more than a preponderance of probability. If, however, in debating, the intellectual is to predominate, it is far better that the main ideas should be emphasized through a development of consecutive proofs than that the emotions should be besieged by a quasi-poetic repetend. The debater must always recognize that reasons *qua* reasons are more important than language. This understood, skilful repetition is an important and proper instrument of effectiveness; for frequency of occurrence acquaints the audience clearly and fully with what is of most importance. Such acquaintance is a condition precedent to the acceptance of a case.

Variety.—Ideas arranged in good sequence may become tiresome, even if clearly imaged. Nothing is so fatal to interest and attention as monotony—monotony of subject, monotony of incident, monotony of style, monotony of delivery. Vivid imagery gives rest from the monotone of logical sequence and suggests, through the laws of association, obvious détours into bypaths of memory or feeling. Whether its purpose,

however, is to adorn, or simply to inform and make clear, the use of imagery must take into account this fundamental fact of the psychology of the human mind, that the holding of attention and interest demands variety.

Monotony is desirable for its impressiveness, but when we wish to avoid the fatigue it produces, we image our ideas in various ways. Indeed, repetition of phrase in general is more suitable to poetry than to prose. (1) There is, for example, an advantage in the parallel structure of sentences expressing an idea from the same viewpoint and relating to the same subject, as in the preceding paraleipsis of Lord Erskine. There is here no monotony, no exact repetition, only a suggestion of similarity: "It is not my purpose— I will not follow the example— I will not call your attention—." The classical illustration of such a parallelism perfectly clear and effectively varied is Burke's six capital causes why the Americans love liberty. For the varied literary expression of the main propositions of a brief, the debater will derive much profit from a study of this and similar masterpieces. (2) But even where there is exact repetition, the words may be differently spoken. Both manner and mood will vary meaning. Mark Antony, for example, frequently repeats the suggestion that Brutus is an honorable man in exactly the same words, but we know that he must have gradually altered his manner and voice, to be able to express finally the irony of his true meaning. Humor pleases us, as a relaxation from a serious strain. Thus, Falstaff is depicted in sharp contrast to the other main characters of Henry the Fourth. When he propounds to himself his catechism on honor, he fixes his attention on the theme and repeats the word honor often, but he holds our interest and attention by his

surprises and quick turns. We even find real amusement in a droll cynicism with which we do not wholly agree:

Prince. Why, thou owest God a death.

Falstaff. 'Tis not due yet; I would be loath to pay him before his day. What need I be so forward with him that calls not on me? Well, 'tis no matter; honor pricks me on. Yea, but how if honor prick me off when I come on? how then? Can honor set to a leg? no; or an arm? no; or take away the grief of a wound? no. Honor hath no skill in surgery, then? no. What is honor? a word. What is that word honor? air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? he that died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? no. Doth he hear it? no. 'Tis insensible, then? yes, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? no. Why? detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honor is a mere scutcheon; and so ends my catechism.

Proceeding further with an analysis of the sources of variety, we find (3) that we may hold or intensify interest and tend to reach a maximum of effectiveness by diversifying methods, proofs, and illustrations. Having shown from signs that a fact is true, we may give examples showing that it has often been true before, or state reasons why it must now in the nature of the case be true. Having shown one effect of a cause, we will specify additional effects; having supported an assertion by the opinion of one authority, we will add others with their varying opinions. Now we may appeal to habit, to imitation, to desire, to idealism; now draw illustrations from one field and now from another more or less remote. Now we are slow and minute in style or manner, now fast and sweeping as the need may be, for the eye may move as easily from crag to crag as from petal to petal. We usually like the speaker who holds his subject so firmly that he can, if need be, treat it

lightly, illustrating and proving, smiling and disapproving; simply letting the mind of the audience play naturally about the subject, sharply focussing the attention only on what is really important. When the attention is so strained as to be unpleasant, a varied appeal tends to bring rest and delight.

(4) Finally, a variation in the sources of sensory appeal may give increased power of effect. Speech is in its nature primarily auditory. Though the mental and emotional associations which it awakens are suggested to the ear, it converts to its use the other sources of sensory appeal. When it does not, its monotony may be due to a narrow range of suggestion. Certainly, the speaker is a word-painter, picturing objects to the sight by the use of salient characteristics and indicative words. But this is by no means all. He should on occasion intensify and diversify his appeals by the use of imagery which enlists the other senses. How instinctively, for instance, that master of expression and human nature, Shakespeare, varied his appeals in this way:

> "Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world
> Like a Colossus; . . .
> *Brutus* and *Cæsar:* what should be in that *Cæsar?*
> Why should that name be sounded more than yours?
> Write them together, yours is as fair a name;
> Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well;
> Weigh them, it is as heavy; conjure with them,
> *Brutus* will start a spirit as soon as *Cæsar.*
> Now, in the names of all the gods at once,
> Upon what meat doth this our Cæsar feed,
> That he is grown so great?"

The whole complex origin of our ideas of the outside world may be reflected in the purely audible.

Let us contrast speech briefly with a visual art. The moving scenes of the vitascope produce an illusion of reality and vividly portray action to the eye. Yet in a motion-picture of a great drama such as "Hamlet," how much we miss the power of the human voice, especially if we have heard the play rendered by a noted actor! The auditory art of speech does well in suggesting to the mind both action and visual objects. In fact, it has been found that the great orators use visual imagery more than all the other forms combined.

A public speaker may possibly become popular chiefly because of his pictorial power, as well as for his rhythmic and sonorous effects, his literary style, his argumentative skill, or his extensive knowledge, yet such popularity has been known to fade away as quickly as it came, because of a violation of the essential principle of change which underlies all sustained human interest. Just as statistics may be overdone, so may word-painting; in the end, variety itself may become monotonous. Indeed, there is a valid basis for the psychological principle of variety as well as for the psychological principle of monotony. Its effective use marks the climax of art.

Paraleipsis.—It is singular that the figure paraleipsis, or omission, so highly prized by the ancient orators, and so common in the public speeches of to-day, should have failed to receive a notice from modern text-writers. The student is doubtless familiar with the *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παραλείψω* of Demosthenes (but these things I pass by), the *præteritio* of Cicero, and the colloquial "not to mention" of modern speech. By paraleipsis, a speaker, while bringing ideas forward for the purpose of excluding them, fixes the attention on the apparently excluded

ideas in such a skilful way as to secure their full force and effect. Though negative in form, it is positive in meaning; it has the force of paradox, and aptness of irony.

So Webster says: "I will not accuse the honorable member of violating civilized war; I will not say that he poisoned his arrows. But whether his shafts were or were not dipped in that which should have caused rankling—there was not quite strength enough in the bow to bring them to their mark." This figure is quite frequently employed in the address to the jury, as, for example, in Lord Erskine's defense of Gordon as follows:

> It is not my purpose to recall to your minds the fatal effects which bigotry has, in former days, produced in this island. I will not follow the example the crown has set me, by making an attack upon your passions, on subjects foreign to the object before you. I will not call your attention from those flames, kindled by a villainous banditti (which they have thought fit, in defiance of evidence, to introduce), by bringing before your eyes the more cruel flames, in which the bodies of our expiring, meek, patient Christian fathers were, little more than a century ago, consuming in Smithfield. I will not call up from the graves of martyrs all the precious holy blood that has been spilled in this land, to save its established government and its reformed religion from the secret villainy and the open force of Papists. The cause does not stand in need even of such honest arts; and I feel my heart too big voluntarily to recite such scenes, when I reflect that some of my own, and my best and dearest progenitors, from whom I glory to be descended, ended their innocent lives in prisons and in exile, *only because they were Protestants.*

We may suggest our ideas through concrete illustrations and analogy, we may state them in highly suggestive rhetorical forms, but most important of all is

what we image—what we put into our imagery! Webster used paraleipsis in the eulogy of his State beginning, "I shall enter upon no encomium of Massachusetts," but the real power of the passage lay in its content, with its skilful allusion to that which existing easily in memory would quickly touch the feelings and sentiment. With what strong sense-appeal does Shakespeare image his reflections on the possibilities of a life beyond, in the following:

> "Ay, but to die and go we know not where;
> To lie in cold obstruction and to rot;
> This sensible, warm motion to become
> A kneaded clod; and the delighted spirit
> To bathe in fiery floods, or to reside
> In thrilling region of thick-ribbed ice;
> To be imprison'd in the viewless winds,
> And blown with restless violence round about
> The pendent world; or to be worse than worst
> Of those that lawless and incertain thought
> Imagine howling; 'Tis too horrible."

If any one should miss the lofty idealization in such passages or think that imagery is merely a use of fine words, let him first read Dorothy Wordsworth's rambles about Grasmere and then her brother William's "I wandered lonely as a cloud."

Confidence.—If a debater betrays doubt or uncertainty with reference to himself or to his case, or if he exhibits suspicion or distrust toward his audience, his state of mind may quite unconsciously react on his audience with disastrous results. Indeed, no principle of effectiveness needs to be more generally recognized than that confidence begets confidence. Mr. Roosevelt is noted as a campaign speaker for the vehemence and

force of his utterances. Speaking in Chicago in 1916 on National Duty and International Ideals, he said:

> Every nation in the world now realizes our weakness, and no nation in the world believes in either our disinterestedness or our manliness. The effort to placate outside nations by being neutral between right and wrong, and to gain good-will along professional pacifist lines by remaining helpless for self-defense, has resulted, after two fatuous years, in so shaping affairs that the nations either already feel, or are rapidly growing to feel, for us not only dislike but contempt.

On the other hand, Benjamin Franklin learned humility from a Quaker friend, and preached the doctrine of qualified assertion thus:

> I made it a rule to forbear all direct contradiction to the sentiments of others, and all positive assertion of my own. I even forbid myself, agreeably to the old laws of our Junto, the use of every word or expression in the language that imported a fix'd opinion, such as *certainly*, *undoubtedly*, etc., and I adopted, instead of them, *I conceive*, *I apprehend*, or *I imagine* a thing to be so or so; or it *so appears to me at present.* When another asserted something that I thought an error, I deny'd myself the pleasure of contradicting him abruptly, and of showing immediately some absurdity in his proposition; and in answering I began by observing that in certain cases or circumstances his opinion would be right, but in the present case there *appear'd* or *seem'd* to me some difference, etc. I soon found the advantage of this change in my manner; the conversations I engag'd in went on more pleasantly. The modest way in which I propos'd my opinions procur'd them a readier reception and less contradiction; I had less mortification when I was found to be in the wrong, and I more easily prevail'd with others to give up their mistakes and join with me when I happened to be in the right.

Much, of course, depends, as Webster says, on the man, the subject, and the occasion. Temperaments

differ. The orator, like the artist, may at times need to draw with broad strokes particularly in summaries, and at other times with a more delicate shading. Sometimes, too, the larger the audience the more positive and unqualified the assertion required. But whenever a debater gives rein to strong assertion, he should do so only from a profound sincerity of belief and a full knowledge of his subject based on investigation. Otherwise, his abilities may be put to a severe test, when called upon to defend himself by evidence and proof.

Indeed, the value of mutual confidence for practical results and the idea that we beget confidence in others by possessing it and exhibiting it in ourselves, is so undoubtedly true, that strong assertions which are utterly false sometimes receive wide credence on this account. Witness the personal rumors and stories which circulate during hotly contested political campaigns.

Interestedness.—The speaker cannot speak well unless he has the ear of his audience, nor will an audience listen long to a speaker who does not possess an interest in what he has to say. Any indifference in manner of speaking, or in treatment of subject shown in inept words or in poorly formed sentences, or in the use of commonplace ideas, tends to produce inattention and listlessness. What you give, that shall you receive. The speaker's concentration of attention on his subject and manifestation of interest in it may be made as contagious as confidence. Such a manifestation of attention will naturally suggest to the audience the attitude of listening. It will thus give a chance to the magnetic power of the speaker's personality to assert itself, which alone may fix the gaze and compel interest, and so make possible the necessary reaction of the audience from the

stimuli employed. At all events, it is by getting the attention of an audience, and, if need be, of holding it on the important ideas, persistently and consistently, that the speaker is able to communicate his ideas simply and with force.

Thus, after a debater has completely saturated himself with his material, and ordered it for the end in view, his presentation, as good or bad, will naturally depend on the effect which it produces on the audience. Or perhaps I should say on the unity or totality of its effects. He will be able to follow the scheme of his brief more effectively if he holds it in his mind neither too firmly nor too loosely and can regard it readily either as a whole or in its parts. Practically, a centrality of topic is needed for a suggestive development adapted to the occasion, of each phase of the larger theme. He should, for example, be able to say, "I propose to speak of the dangerous consequences of the proposed measures. At the outset I would picture the magnitude of the scheme," and so on. Great pains should be taken with junctures and transitions, or attention and interest will break down. However the latter may have been originally secured, they can hardly be maintained without rhetorical clearness and logical relevancy. Words colored with meaning, and collocated into sentences full of association or paragraphs of emotional elation, are but the romance of speech, of which logic and evidence are the stern realities. Indeed, a brilliancy of retort in debating, even if provocative of applause, is not likely to survive a misrepresentation of facts, whether accidental or intentional.

Avoiding Common Defects in Delivery.—The dangers in manner to be guarded against in debate, says Professor Winter, "are wearying monotony, overhammer-

ing—too frequent, too hard, too uniform an emphasis—too much or too continued heat, too much speed, especially in speaking against time, a loss of poise in the bearing, halting, or jumbling in speech, nervous tension in action, an overcontentious or bumptious spirit." [1]

To the same effect is the following criticism:

We have inherited wrong ideas about argumentative delivery. Ninety per cent of college debaters seem to have not the slightest knowledge of effective presentation. Their speaking is so "preponderantly boisterous and conclusive, so disfigured by volcanic fervor, for which the matter ejected affords no adequate excuse," that our sensibilities are paralyzed and rendered incapable of absorbing the evidence they produce.

I inveigh against the prevalent style of debate for several reasons. First, average debating is not good public speaking. Most modern authorities will accept as the definition of public speaking, "enlarged and dignified conversation." The virtues of good address are clearness, directness, and force. But what coach can have these principles in mind and allow his team to pound furiously for thirty minutes without pause or variety? Confused thinking only can result. How many debaters can look calmly at their audience and say implicitly: "I am talking to you and you and you. I want this idea to get under your skin"? No! There is a torrent of speech accompanied by violent shakings of the head, a flood of facts and quotations, a fifteen-minute speech in ten, and a "Thank you." Now the first end of all speech is to make itself clear. Lincoln accused Douglas of being like a cuttlefish, a fish that throws out a dark substance into the water to hide its exact position. Again, he said Judge Douglas reminded him of the little Frenchman he knew in the northwest whose legs were so short that when he walked through the snow the seat of his trousers rubbed out his footprints. These analogies characterize the average college debater. His speeches also lack force. Things are great or small only by comparison. Ideas are made important by contrast. The speech that strikes a constant key, that plunges along in

[1] "Public Speaking," Irving L. Winter, p. 47.

the same channel, orotund and extreme, lacks the first degree of force. Yes, average debating is not good public speaking. There is nothing of the human quality, no conversational style, no sincere personality. Should we not pay more attention to debate delivery?

Secondly, to allow this style of speaking is to lose the ideal of training a student to think on his feet. To roll forth automatically a mass of highly concentrated data, to grind along monotonously for ten minutes like a hand-organ, to recite parrot fashion, as most debaters do, is not thinking on one's feet. The chief concern of our profession—physical and psychical correlation—is totally obscured.

Last of all, we must face the evident lack of public interest in debating and overcome it. I again blame poor delivery. An instructor, asked recently to judge some class try-outs, said: "Yes, but I hate debates, they are bores." He served, and for two hours bravely endured the agony of senseless jargon that rattled upon us mercilessly as hailstones. I sympathized with him. Each of the twenty speakers except one labored under the delusion that because this was a debate try-out he must rant and yell and glare; that a high, sustained key and lightning rapidity was a proof of excellent skill and training. Shades of Cæsar! If they could learn to talk, just talk.

I plead, therefore, for more common sense in debate delivery, more of the "just human" quality, more of conversational style. I know that we are more intense and excited in a conversation over Roosevelt than over Longfellow, that barber-shop conversation contains more dynamite than after-dinner talk—in short, that genuine argument is the expression of deep feeling and strong conviction, but let us practise more moderacy.[1]

The most suggestive delivery is usually to be found in the man who (1) has reduced his case to the simplest terms, and (2) whose habit has been to speak extemporaneously rather than to deliver memorized orations. If, for instance, his own case and that of his opponent

[1] *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education*, IV, 3; article by C. F. Lindsley.

have been placed in the form of a syllogism, and he is properly trained in the value of the concentrated form of attack, his delivery is not so likely to be objectionable. The fewer the points the better. In both the first speech and in the rebuttal the audience will be more responsive if the propositions examined are limited in number. Of course, they must be fundamental and well imaged. No scattered fire or mere sharpshooting! In rebuttal, indeed, it is sometimes possible to limit an attack to a single point. The first speaker makes an objection which is followed up by the second speaker and then by the third, or, to make a football allusion, the first speaker starts "an opening" which the others enlarge until it "looks as big as a house." Thus, in opposing the formation of a league to enforce peace, I heard a negative team win a decision by a continuous bombardment of the contradiction contained in the phrase "enforce peace," and on another occasion, by an equally effective artillery-fire against "formal alliances."

If the debater has also been in the habit of speaking extemporaneously he will not be likely to yell, and rave, and fan the air. The training of a debater should include (besides an immersion in the subject-matter of his debate, and the logical organization of his case) such practice in speaking as will require him to think clearly and express his ideas effectively on his feet. Given a concept containing his fundamental reason, he should be told simply to image that on the mind of the audience. He will learn the value of natural, personal, and direct speech. He will learn to hold his subject in mind, but to look his audience in the eye, and to speak in a tone which means something. He will perceive and feel the

responses which come from meeting eye with eye, and from a really communicative tone. For, speaking is but a dialogue with an audience, whose responses, though silent and often subconscious, are instructive guides to the speaker. The extempore speaker, indeed, simply converses with his audience on his topic, until he feels sure that they have caught his meaning, and then, and not until then, passes on to something else. We image our ideas, according to Professor Winans, by centering the attention of the audience upon it. It is here in delivery that the "image theory" of argument as presented in this text meets the "attention theory" of Professor Winans.[1] Each supplements the other.

The Decision.—The decision of a board of judges records an opinion in favor of the affirmative or negative sides. The judges express an opinion as to which of the two sides has succeeded in satisfying certain reasonable expectations or standards. These include such ideas as that the debaters must be interesting, awaken sympathy, clarify the issues, illustrate view-points common to the speaker and audience, as well as be informing and show an extensive knowledge of the subject-matter. They must, of course, exhibit the powers of reasoning—analysis and discrimination, synthesis and abstraction. They must image effectively all fundamental reasons so that they will be vividly perceived and readily believed, and bring to their support, whenever necessary, reliable authority. They must exhibit proper platform manners and form, good literary finish and style, and always be quick, ready, and skilful to down an opponent in triumph, with fact, authority, reason, phrase, or flash of the eye. At length they must sum up, analyzing the

[1] "Public Speaking," J. A. Winans.

opponent's failure, touching on the weak spots and setting forth defects, in vivid contrast with the articulated proofs of their own side. These are some of the reasonable expectations, based on customary instructions to judges.

No exact valuation, so far as I know, has ever been fixed to the elements of good debating. Indeed, it seems doubtful if any can ever be made. The elements are too numerous and too uncertain in quantity, quality, and relation to make it practicable. As with the painter, one false detail, for instance in color, may change the *accent* of the entire picture. Facts and logic, however, should take precedence over style and delivery.

The decision should always be a measurement of the relative debating skill shown by the two contesting teams. Since the essence of the art of debating consists in assertion and denial, proof and counter-proof with distinctions, it must follow that memorized speeches may defeat the purpose of debate and are, therefore, a proper object of penalty.

Finally, we would note that all the elements of the problem of decision in debating are variables; and that the problem itself, abstractly considered, is indeterminate; except, perhaps, that we may say that a decision records a victory in a contest of supporting suggestions and attacking inhibitions—arising from facts, logic, style, and delivery—and modified further, quite subconsciously and unintentionally, by suggestions and inhibitions, arising in the minds of those exercising the judicial function. A decision is a *sincere personal opinion* on the "*merits of the debate.*"

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Specimen Briefs

THE FIRST JUNIUS LETTER

This letter has been chosen to illustrate brief-making because it is believed to be one of the most remarkable bits of argumentative composition in our language. The argument is particularly remarkable in that, while it succeeds in arousing the feelings, it adheres closely to strictly logical processes, ingeniously conceived and dexterously expressed. It is to be regretted that such a brilliant argument is sometimes marred by a disregard of the facts, as occurs, for instance, conspicuously in the vicious attack upon the character of Justice Mansfield.

It may be explained that the first two paragraphs of this letter contain the introduction, the third being transitional. The fourth paragraph presents the main proposition to be proved and the main syllogism. The main proposition is supported further by the proposition advanced in the fifth paragraph, to the proof of which the rest of the letter, excepting the last two paragraphs, is devoted. These two paragraphs sum up and enforce the conclusion.

A few points of divergence in the following brief from the method and form of the letter may be mentioned:

The brief follows the usual sequence, first proposition, then proof, regardless of the order in the letter. For example, the conclusion of the main argument is presented after the premises in the last sentence of the fourth paragraph; while in the brief it is, of course, stated first as the proposition to be proved, and is followed by the reasons marked *A* and *B*.

But Junius himself sometimes follows the order (1) proposition, (2) proof. For instance, the paragraphs containing the attack upon Mansfield are so compact and coherent, that it has been possible to insert in the brief the sentences of the letter without change of order or language. Here, therefore, the brief-maker has added only a classification of the proposition (as co-ordinate or subordinate).

Again in the letter, a conclusion is sometimes not formally stated but only implied from a chain of reasoning; in the brief, such an implied conclusion is formally expressed. Thus, the proposition at the head of the introduction does not appear in the letter, except as an *insinuation* from the four propositions of the first paragraph.

Finally, in all cases in the letter, where the opposite is said from what is meant, as in the criticism of Weymouth, the brief-maker has discarded the irony and used the direct form of statement.

The following brief is offered for use and criticism in studying the principles of brief-making: analysis, classification, arrangement, unity, logical sequence, and proportion.

BRIEF I

Introduction

The abuse of our loyalty naturally fills us with resentment, because—

[NOTE—This proposition is the conclusion of a syllogism, with reasoning supporting each premise.]

Argument

Our present ruinous condition is due to government, because

I. The condition of the people in a state is due to government,

II. Our people at present are in a ruinous condition, for

A. Perhaps there never was such an instance of a change as that brought about by the misconduct of the present ministry.

B. After a rapid succession of changes, we are reduced to that condition which hardly any change can mend, for

1. The King's folly and depravity are likely to have produced it.

2. The true cause of our misfortunes lies in the distribution of the departments of state, for

a. The treasury has been intrusted to the Duke of Grafton, who is incompetent.

b. Lord North, as chancellor of the exchequer, is without ability.

[NOTE—Similarly in this series are to be placed the attacks on *c.* Hillsborough; *d.* Weymouth; *e.* Granby; *f.* Hawke; *g.* Mansfield.]

Conclusion

The nation is in a deplorable condition, brought about by government by men without wisdom and capacity.

[*First draft*, drawn from the First Letter of Junius, to be studied and expanded. Note carefully, in the letter, the *assumption* of premises not stated, and the *insinuation* of conclusions not drawn.]

BRIEF I EXPANDED

Introduction

The abuse of our loyalty naturally fills us with resentment, for

A. In our own case, there has been an abuse of loyalty, for

I. A free people obey the laws, because

1. They enacted them—and

II. This obedience is cheerful and almost unlimited.

III. Such obedience to the guardian of the laws leads to a strong affection for his person.

IV. This affection has often been excessive among Englishmen who are peculiarly liable to a strong affection for his person.

B. (All) abuses of loyalty naturally fill us with resentment.

Body

Our present ruinous condition is due to government, because

A. The condition of the people in a state is due to government,

I. From a prosperous condition of the people we argue that their government is good, and

II. From a ruinous condition of the people that their government is bad, for

1. Such a ruinous condition does not depend originally on the patient multitude, for

a. Their indignation and excesses are effects of ill usage by government rather than causes of a ruinous condition.

B. Our people at present are in a ruinous condition.

I. "Perhaps there never was an instance of a change in the circumstances and temper of a whole nation so sudden and

extraordinary as that which the misconduct of ministers has within these very few years produced in Great Britain."

1. "When our gracious sovereign ascended the throne we were a flourishing and contented people."

II. After a rapid succession of changes we are reduced to that condition which hardly any change can mend, for

1. The King's folly and depravity must have produced it.

a. His plan has failed to produce salutary effects, is unwise, and bad in design, for

(1) It involved the idea of uniting all parties, of trying all characters, and distributing the offices of state by rotation.

(2) It showed a capricious partiality to new faces, a natural turn for low intrigue and the treacherous amusement of double and triple negotiations.

C. The true cause of our misfortunes lies in the distribution of the departments of state.

I. The treasury has been committed to the Duke of Grafton, who is utterly incompetent, because

(*A*) He is already ruined by play.

(*B*) He became minister by accident, and is an apostate by design.

(*C*) He has shown no business ability, unless a wayward inconsistency be a mark of genius, for

1. His view of finance is to distribute, not save, the public money, and

(*D*) A reliance by him on Lord North, chancellor of the exchequer, would not deter him from being as thoughtless and extravagant as he pleases.

II. Lord North as chancellor of the exchequer is without ability, for

(*A*) The absence of any proof of his talents cannot mean that he has voluntarily concealed them.

(*B*) There is such an absence of proof, for

1. Since he has been in office, no plan has been formed for the relief of the public credit.

2. He should think seriously of his plan to increase the public debt, for

a. The people will not bear, after a six years' peace, to see new millions borrowed without a diminution of debt or interest.

b. The attempt might arouse them beyond the sacrifice of a minister.

3. Moreover, the people expect that the debt upon the civil list will not be paid without a strict inquiry, for
   a. A lottery may be justifiable for war, but not for the prince's expenses.
4. The mismanagement of the King's affairs in the House of Commons would not be more disgraced.
   a. (Examples.)
5. Before he became chancellor he was not derided by his enemies or pitied by his friends.

III. At a most critical season, Hillsborough is made secretary to govern America, and he is without capacity, for
(*A*) The season was most critical when he was made secretary.
1. A series of inconsistent measures had divided the colonies, for
   a. This division resulted from the spirit and argument given the colonies by Lord Chatham's and Lord Camden's opposition to Mr. Grenville's policies.

(*B*) He is without capacity or superior knowledge, for
1. His despatches and measures determine this, for
   a. His despatches are bad,
   b. His measures are failures, for
      (1) The people have been driven into excesses little short of rebellion, for
         (*a*) Petitions have been hindered from reaching the throne, and
         (*b*) An "arbitrary condition" had been imposed upon the General Court of Massachusetts which, even if it had considered the temper of the people, would have availed nothing.
      (2) While at peace, our military may support him, but if it be withdrawn his dismissal would not console us, outraged and abused.

IV. Weymouth is made secretary for the Southern Department, for which he was wholly unqualified.
(*A*) Drawing lots would be a prudent and reasonable mode of appointment compared to a late disposition of the secretary's office, for
1. Lord Rochford was qualified for the Southern Department, Lord Weymouth for neither the Southern nor Home Department; yet, by caprice Rochford

was appointed to the Home Department, and Weymouth to the Southern.

(*B*) Weymouth is wholly unqualified for the Southern Department, for

1. In his first employment as secretary of the Home Department, by urging the magistrates to use the military if certain disturbances in the streets should continue, he acted with deliberation in carrying out a headlong passion.

V. The Marquis of Granby as commander-in-chief is incompetent, for

(*A*) The fashion of complimenting the commander-in-chief for his bravery and generosity is unwarranted, for

1. His bravery is marred by a total absence of feeling and reflection.
2. His generosity is lacking in disinterestedness, independence, or firmness in providing lucrative employments or in granting commissions in the army.

VI. Sir Edward Hawke as secretary of the navy is inefficient and should be retired.

VII. Mansfield as chief justice is pernicious to the whole country, for

(*A*) His administration has not been pure and impartial, for

1. The pure and impartial administration of justice is, perhaps, the firmest bond to secure a cheerful submission of the people, and to engage their affections to government.
2. It is not sufficient that questions of private right or wrong are justly decided, nor that judges are superior to the vileness of pecuniary corruption.
   a. Jeffries himself, when the court had no interest, was an upright judge.
3. A court of justice may be subject to another sort of bias, more important and pernicious, as it reaches beyond the interest of individuals, and affects the whole community.
   a. A judge under the influence of government may be honest enough in the decision of private causes, yet a traitor to the public.
      (1) When a victim is marked out by the ministry, this judge will offer himself to perform the sacrifice.
      (2) He will not scruple to prostitute his dignity and betray the sanctity of his office when-

ever an arbitrary point is to be carried for government or the resentment of a court to be gratified.

(*B*) These principles and proceedings, odious and contemptible as they are, in effect are no less injudicious.

1. A wise and generous people are roused by every appearance of oppressive, unconstitutional measures, whether those measures are supported openly by the power of government or masked under the forms of a court of justice.
2. Prudence and self-preservation will oblige the most moderate dispositions to make common cause, even with a man whose conduct they censure, if they see him persecuted in a way which the real spirit of the laws will not justify.
3. The facts on which these remarks are founded are too notorious to require an application.

Conclusion

I. The nation is in a deplorable condition.
II. It is governed by councils from which a reasonable man can expect no relief but death.
III. The true cause of our deplorable condition is due to government by men without wisdom or integrity.

BRIEF II

IN DEFENSE OF DARNAY[1]

Introduction

I. The arrest of Darnay arose from the fact that for several years he had been travelling between France and England.
II. He was tried for treason, it being declared that on these trips he had borne information to the French concerning the English forces in America.
III. The accused admitted that he had been a frequent traveller across the Channel, but was unwilling to explain the trips further than that they were of a private nature and involved the interests of others.
IV. Whether the facts charged, if proved, legally constituted treason was not in issue.
V. The accused, however, denied that he was guilty of treason, and

[1] Prepared from material in Dickens's "A Tale of Two Cities."

argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish the facts charged.

Body

Darnay was not guilty, because

A. The testimony which, if true, might be damaging was false, since

I. John Barsad's testimony was false, for

a. In the cross-examination, he was shown to be untruthful and altogether bad, for

1. He probably lied about his owning "property," for

(1) He would not specify the property which he swore he owned.

(2) He too willingly adopted the suggestion that he had acquired it by inheritance.

2. He admitted that he had been in a "debtor's prison," after denying that he had been in "prison."

3. He said that his profession was simply "gentleman."

4. He admitted that he had "received a kick at the top of a staircase and fell down of his own accord," after denying that he had been "kicked down-stairs."

5. He admitted that he had lived somewhat by play and sought to extol it.

6. He admitted that he owed the accused money, but denied that he was actuated by any other motive in this case than "sheer patriotism."

II. Roger Cly's testimony was false, for

a. There was the greatest probability that Barsad and Cly were in league and hired spies, for

1. They were both bad characters, since

(1) Cly had probably committed a theft, for

(*a*) He admitted having been maligned about stealing a plated mustard-pot.

(*b*) He admitted having examined Darnay's pockets.

2. They had known each other for "seven or eight years."

3. Their testimony was similar in respect to the motives assigned.

b. His testimony was made worthless by the resemblance of the accused to Carton.

B. The testimony which was true was not damaging, since

I. It was indefinite and could support the statement that Darnay was travelling on private business, since

a. Lorry's testimony was chiefly as to the prisoner's travelling, and the existence of a conversation between Darnay and Lucy Manette.

b. Lucy Manette's testimony about this conversation revealed nothing damaging, for
1. His remark that England's treatment of America was unjust was unimportant, for
(1) It was but a casual remark.
(2) It was unlikely that a traitor should express his sympathies openly and to a stranger.
2. His remark about George III was a "monstrous joke."

c. Doctor Manette's testimony was of no value, for
1. He remembered nothing.

d. The testimony of the "garrison and dockyard" witness proved nothing against the accused, since
1. He failed to identify the accused as the man in the coffee-house, for
(1) He could easily have mistaken Darnay for Carton.

Conclusion

The testimony of Barsad and of Cly was false, and Darnay was the victim of a plot. The testimony of the reputable characters corroborated Darnay's explanation that he was travelling on private business. Moreover, the trustworthy witnesses showed sympathy for the accused and a belief in his innocence. The evidence has, therefore, been insufficient to prove that Darnay conveyed the alleged information to the French, and thus to establish the charge of treason.

APPENDIX B

Questions and Exercises

I. In General

1. Explain the importance of imaginative suggestion in presenting an argument to an audience.

2. Distinguish between the following terms: the productive and reproductive imagination, an image and an idea, an image and a perception.

3. Write briefly a paragraph using other than visual imagery.

4. Illustrate the principle of description that the characteristics of an object which will most readily suggest the image of that object is the one most readily recalled by the particular audience.

5. Select a story or anecdote from your reading, and rewrite it so as to recall a person or situation, and also establish a point.

6. What are the tests of an effective image?

7. Write a brief address illustrating the perceptual and conceptual aspects of imagery on the following plan: Image some historic scene; draw inferences or lessons from it respecting human life or conduct; and image these conceptions within modern experience and also within the experience of the chosen audience, *e. g.*, Psalm 121.

8. Write a few paragraphs on "divided forces," illustrating the principles of unity and variety.

9. Compare the imagery of a eulogy and a philippic with respect to the appeal to the approving or the disapproving emotions.

10. Recalling a team-debate which you have recently heard, (*a*) suggest how the issue might have been more effectively presented by the use of an analogy, (*b*) state the main concepts of each of the three speeches, and consider how each might have been more effectively imaged, and (*c*) show how imaginative suggestion might have been used in some respect so as to heighten the final impression.

II. On Specific Speeches

James Otis on "Writs of Assistance."—What are the four reasons which Otis states in order, against general writs? Does the effectiveness of the speech really depend on these logical reasons, or on the process of imaging the idea of the "tyranny of the writs" on the mind of his hearers? What types of imagery does he use other than auditory? What adjectives does the speaker use which possess an emotional coloring? What association-reaction do you get personally from the phrase "A man's house is his castle"? How does the introduction to the speech predispose one to a feeling of opposition to the writs? Is the speech as a whole marked by sound thinking, by thorough thinking, and by effective presentation?

Patrick Henry in the Virginia Convention, March 28, 1776.—Make a brief of the argument proving the necessity of fighting. Viewing the central idea of the speech as the "vanity of hope," how does he image it on the mind of his hearers? How does he in opening, inhibit the suggestions of the speaker who has pre-

ceded him, so as to make the audience susceptible to his own suggestions, and to be able to state clearly the issue before the country? How much of the effect of the speech is due to his suggesting to his hearers specific past events or acts easily recalled? How much to his constructive imagination? Point out instances of Biblical allusions; of tonal imagery (euphonious or cacophonous); also of illustrative imagery, and classify the latter as visual, auditory, kinæsthetic, etc. What effect does his use of the interrogative form of sentence produce upon attention and interest? What use does he make of repetition and of positive assertion? Is the style too rhymical? Does the speech as a whole give a sufficient reason which may be recalled and stated for the action it would incite?

Samuel Adams on American Independence in Philadelphia, August 1, 1776.—In predisposing his hearers to his point of view, what common ground in thought and feeling does Samuel Adams seek to establish in the introduction to his speech? Does he image this idea logically as well as emotionally? In the body of the speech does he really deliberate on the matters he discusses, or seek simply to incite to action? By what means does he inhibit the effect of the talk of "our obligations to Great Britain"? In answering this first objection are his arguments both sound and effective? By what illustration or analogy, appealing to common experience, does he finally show that "the protection we received" does not annul our rights as men? Why does he so often use the rhetorical question in opening a line of thought and positive assertion in concluding it? Why does he seek to image the idea of the justice of independence before imaging its expediency? In opposing "the doctrine of dependence on Great Britain," point out his use of images of the present and of the past as a preliminary to the suggested image of the future (anticipation images). Logically, may not the underlying reasoning here be called, *a priori*, causal, or antecedent probability? Does the argument gain in force by associating it with the idea of a providential dispensation? What value do you give to the kinæsthetic (muscular) image of "chaining down the wolf without drawing his claws and paring his nails"? Note the force of the contrasted anticipation images, the one based on independence, the other on "an accommodation" which would mean "the ruin of the country." In appealing thus both

to the approving and to the disapproving emotions, was the speaker probably correct in assuming that men are influenced by their fears as well as their hopes? Was the pathetic overdone for those stirring times? Does he effectively turn the objections based on "dissensions in our popular system" by saying pithily: "Suffer yourselves to be chained down by your enemies that you may not be able to fight your friends"? Regarding the speech as a whole, can you truthfully characterize the argument as sound (being mostly causative or exemplative) and also effectively imaged, in that it is imaged within the general and individual experience of the delegates and audience of the Philadelphia State-house in the summer of 1776?

III. In Association-Reactions

I. Experiments in association-reactions are of value in studying the nature of the processes of association.

In a small group of students inclined to co-operate, such a list of words as the following[1] may be used:

1. table; 2. dark; 3. music; 4. sickness; 5. man; 6. deep; 7. soft; 8. eating; 9. mountain; 10. house; 11. black; 12. mutton; 13. comfort; 14. hand; 15. short; 16. fruit; 17. butterfly; 18. smooth; 19. command; 20. chair; 21. sweet; 22. whistle; 23. woman; 24. cold; 25. slow; 26. wish; 27. river; 28. white; 29. beautiful; 30. window; 31. rough; 32. citizen; 33. foot; 34. spider; 35. needle; 36. red; 37. sleep; 38. anger; 39. carpet; 40. girl; 41. high; 42. working; 43. sour; 44. earth; 45. trouble; 46. soldier; 47. cabbage; 48. hard; 49. eagle; 50. stomach.

The simplest method consists in asking the student to answer as quickly as possible the first word which comes to mind, on hearing the stimulus-word read. Then, before proceeding, the instructor may ask the group such questions as the following: (1) Was the reaction a percept or a concept? (2) If the former, was it a new or old image? (3) Name the principle of association expressing the relation of the reaction-word to the stimulus-word.

II. The experiment is also of interest if applied to sentences.

[1] This list of fifty is part of a list of words used in the Kent and Rosanoff tests, a full report of which may be found in the *American Journal of Insanity*, vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 and 2—1910.

Ask the student to hand in a list of aphorisms, epigrams, paradoxes, or other striking phrases. As before, the instructor may read the sentence, and ask the student to state as quickly as possible the first thing which comes to mind. The answer may be analyzed as before:

Illustration: Stimulus: "A rolling stone gathers no moss."
Reaction: 1. A tramp. 2. Aimlessness.
The first answer was obviously a perception, the second (in which more time was used) a conception.

Illustration: Stimulus: "Slavery closes the door of hope."
Reaction: Dante, "All hope abandon, etc.," plainly a memory image.

Illustration: Stimulus: "Distance lends enchantment to the view."
Reaction: 1. The future. 2. A girl. The former is, of course, conceptual, the latter perceptual, the association in the second case being that of specific and general, etc.

III. In trying these experiments with a group, it is interesting to note how the reactions differ among individuals, and also change with a change of mood; *e. g.*, Stimulus: "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." Reaction: 1. A pretty girl. 2. Ecclesiastes. The instructor should, therefore, in analyzing the general results of his experiments call attention to the different type of answers given when his subjects were in a lighter mood from those made in a serious frame of mind. It thus affords an excellent opportunity to show how the emotions of a hearer influence his reaction.

IV. Indeed, a preliminary study of audiences may be made by examining the reactions had from a single sentence stimulus. For example, we may classify the stimulus-sentence as the difficult or the easy; the abstract or the concrete; the novel, the familiar, or the stale; or we may consider the association awakened as stimulated by curiosity, surprise, antagonism, suspense, motive, sympathy, etc., and also the influence on interest, attention, and conviction.

V. For a study of the nature and force of imagery, (1) write a statement in plain language in the form of a reason for believing a proposition, and (2) express this reason in figurative language. Discuss each paper (or speech) fully in conference.

VI. For the stimulation of interest in the development of a vocabulary, the following is suggested as a word-recognition test. This list is from the "Stamford Revision of the Binet-Simon Tests," by Professor L. M. Terman, published by Houghton Mifflin Company:

1. orange; 2. bonfire; 3. roar; 4. gown; 5. tap; 6. scorch; 7. puddle; 8. envelope; 9. straw; 10. rule; 11. haste; 12. afloat; 13. eyelash; 14. copper; 15. health; 16. curse; 17. guitar; 18. mellow; 19. pork; 20. impolite; 21. plumbing; 22. outward; 23. lecture; 24. dungeon; 25. southern; 26. noticeable; 27. muzzle; 28. quake; 29. civil; 30. treasury; 31. reception; 32. ramble; 33. skill; 34. misuse; 35. insure; 36. stave; 37. regard; 38. nerve; 39. crunch; 40. juggler; 41. majesty; 42. brunette; 43. snip; 44. apish; 45. sportive; 46. hysterics; 47. Mars; 48. repose; 49. shrewd; 50. forfeit; 51. peculiarity; 52. coinage; 53. mosaic; 54. bewail; 55. disproportionate; 56. dilapidated; 57. charter; 58. conscientious; 59. avarice; 60. artless; 61. priceless; 62. swaddle; 63. tolerate; 64. gelatinous; 65. depredation; 66. promontory; 67. frustrate; 68. milksop; 69. philanthropy; 70. irony; 71. lotus; 72. drabble; 73. harpy; 74. embody; 75. infuse; 76. flaunt; 77. declivity; 78. fen; 79. ochre; 80. exaltation; 81. incrustation; 82. laity; 83. selectman; 84. sapient; 85. retroactive; 86. achromatic; 87. ambergris; 88. casuistry; 89. paleology; 90. perfunctory; 91. precipitancy; 92. theosophy; 93. piscatorial; 94. sudorific; 95. parterre; 96. homunculus; 97. cameo; 98. shagreen; 99. limpet; 100. complot.

In order to get the entire vocabulary by this test we should multiply the number of correct *definitions* by 180. The Binet tests are found to be "extremely useful in determining the mental age of backward children." For vocabulary-building among college students the following method is suggested. Ask the student to write down the figures 1 to 100 in order on a sheet of paper on different lines. Then the instructor may call out the words in order, with its number, requiring the student (who is put on his honor) to write yes or no after each number, indicating whether or not he knows the word sufficiently to use it. This test may be varied with different groups by requiring the student to write a sentence using each of the words.

Whitney says that "the vocabulary of a rich and long cultivated language like the English may be roughly estimated at 100,000 words, but 30,000 is a very large estimate for the num-

ber ever used in writing or speaking by a well-educated man; 3,000 to 5,000, it has been carefully estimated, cover the ordinary needs of a cultivated intercourse." [1]

It appears that the above vocabulary test is based on an assumed maximum of 18,000 words for an educated person. The fifteen or sixteen thousand words (derived from experiments with this list on Princeton juniors and seniors) would indicate a much higher average for the vocabulary of the educated, than Whitney's figures suggest, were we not to make the distinction that the proposed experiment is not a word-use test but a word-recognition test.

It may be recalled that there is a speaking vocabulary and a writing vocabulary, and that the latter is by far the larger. The visual symbols of speech are greater in number for the average person than the auditory; for most persons are visiles rather than audiles. But even for a writing vocabulary, we cannot determine by such a test as the preceding with any accuracy the words which one would naturally use in writing; for, in recording any such test, there is some suggestion that the words listed at least may be used, and some inclination awakened in the subject to make the effort. The above experiment is then offered as a word-recognition test to stimulate vocabulary-building, on which we may estimate (1) the comparative vocabulary size of the different men in a group, and (2) the percentage of 18,000 words recognized by each person.

APPENDIX C

The Special Study of Imagery

I. *Varied Imagery Appeals.*—Since the public speaker and debater must prefer the concrete to the abstract, the definite to the indefinite, the specific to the general, in presenting his ideas to others for decision and approval, it may well be a part of the work of the advanced student to investigate the various classes of imagery (visual, auditory, tactile, kinæsthetic, etc.) with a view to determining the peculiar force of the several kinds

[1] "Life and Growth of Language," by W. D. Whitney, p. 25.

of imagery. By such investigations and by frequent practice in writing themes illustrating the several classes of imagery, the student will learn both to extend his range and to diversify his means of suggestion. He should endeavor not only to visualize but also to *auralize*, to *kinæsthetize*, to *tactualize*, to *olfactorize*, and to *gustatorize*. In such ways will he learn to make the invisible visible, the inaudible audible, and to explore the mystery of the subconscious, so as to return to the threshold of consciousness with its treasures.

II. *Auditory Imagery and the Disagreeable.*—Adverting now to a particular phase of imaginative suggestion, I shall refer to auditory imagery in its peculiar connection with the unpleasurable emotions. I had asked a group of students to write a theme, using auditory imagery to the exclusion, if possible, of all other forms of imagery. The results were surprising, in that all the auditory images which they used dealt with the disagreeable. We at once recalled other instances in point, such as Patrick Henry's allusion to clanking chains on the plains of Boston, and John Randolph's reference to the ringing of the fire-bell as an alarm associated with negro uprisings, when it occurred to us that, if there was any vital connection between the emotions arising from the sense of danger and their auditory expression, it should appear in the stories of that master of mystery, Edgar Allan Poe. Turning then to his *Tales of Horror and Death*, Vol. VI (Funk and Wagnalls edition), we read on the first page:

"The sentence—the dread sentence of death—was the last of distinct accentuation which reached my ears. After that, the sound of the inquisitorial voices seemed merged in one dreamy, indeterminate hum. It conveyed to my soul the idea of revolution—perhaps in its association in fancy with the burr of a mill-wheel." And again, "I saw them writhe with a deadly locution. I saw them fashion the syllables of my name; and I shuddered because no sound succeeded." We were reading from "The Pit and the Pendulum," and were thus quickly rewarded. A little further on, we found the climax of a paragraph of fear (describing the sweep of the pendulum, razor-like, and heavy, and rapidly descending) expressed in the following sentence: "It was appended to a weighty rod of brass, and the whole hissed as it swung thro' the air." The tale ends thus: "There was a discordant hum of human voices! There was a loud blast as of many trumpets! There was a harsh grating as of a thousand thunders! The fiery walls rushed back! . . ."

Running through the thirteen tales contained in this volume and glancing at the last paragraph or two, we found that the climax in each tale contained auditory imagery. We hear the "long, wild, and con-

tinuous shriek of agony" of the subterranean night in "The Premature Burial," the "low laugh" and the "sad voice" and the "jingling of the bells" in the catacombs in "The Cask of Amontillado"; the loud din of "voices" in "The Tell-Tale Heart," including "the beating of his hideous heart"; the "reverberation" of blows, and "screams" and "howls," in "The Black Cat," which in "The Fall of the House of Usher" become a "fierce breath of the whirlwind" and "tumultuous shouting sounds." It was pleasing to pass then from the "shriek" and the "rattling sounds" of "Berenice" to the quieter ending of "Eleanora." "And once—but once again in the silence of the night—there came thro' my lattice the soft sighs which had forsaken me; and they modelled themselves into a familiar and sweet voice saying: 'Sleep in peace, for the spirit of Love reigneth and ruleth.'" "Ligeia" and "Morella" are no exceptions to the climactic use of auditory expressions in the field of the horrible. The last tale in the volume, "Shadow—A Parable," concludes as follows: "And then did we, the seven, start from our seats in horror and stand trembling and shuddering and aghast, for the tones in the voice of the shadow were not the tones of any one being, but of a multitude of beings, and varying in their cadences from syllable to syllable, fell duskly upon our ears in the well-remembered and familiar accents of many thousand departed friends."

Poe's tales, though making constant use of other imagery, thus confirm the value of auditory imagery for the expression of the emotions of fear and horror, and show its peculiar fitness to express great heights and depths of feeling. I find that Professor Scott has observed that "presentations which awaken auditory images are more productive of terror than those which awaken images of sight." Orators, novelists, and poets in general use visual imagery more than auditory. In this connection it is interesting to note that such a poet as Browning in "Childe Roland" uses an auditory climax in a poem which elsewhere is almost completely visual. Indeed, we are justified, I think, in speaking of the peculiar power of auditory imagery to express the climax of fear and terror.

The question at once arises as to why this should be the case. The first explanation which occurred to me was suggested by Poe also. On one occasion when the menacing danger, in "The Pit and the Pendulum," became too great, the prisoner closed his eyes, and on another he averted his head. It may well be that we have very little stored-up visual imagery of the disagreeable, because of our desire to avoid it and our ability to shut out the sight of it. We instinctively close our eyes to the disagreeable, but we cannot close our ears! In the second place, a large part of our time is spent in darkness, when the eye cannot see impending danger, and the ear must be relied on to give the warning. For such physical reasons it would seem that man may have developed, through the ages,

his peculiar auditory sensitiveness to danger, with its accompanying emotional apparatus. So the imagination of the artist would naturally describe by auditory suggestion scenes too horrible to be optically observed.[1]

Images of fear and horror may, of course, be other than auditory. For example:

"I have almost forgot the *taste* of fears
The time has been my senses would have *cooled* to *hear* a night-shriek!"

There are doubtless persons who will think of the phrase "to taste of fear" as unreal, just as there are persons who see a literal inaccuracy in Hamlet's taking up arms against a *sea* of trouble—a phrase, however, accurately marking the perturbation of his mental state when contemplating suicide. During the strong excitation of fear, indeed, all the senses will of course be affected, and the writer is unwilling to admit the unreality of a gustatory reaction from a disagreeble stimulus. How the mouth of a child expands, for instance, when fed with sugar, and draws up when it is given medicine! Again, does Shakespeare use this gustatory image:

"Cowards die many times before their death,
The valiant never *taste* of death but once."

A close study, either of Shakespeare's great tragedies or of Poe's tales of horror, will show innumerable ways in which the effect of fear on the human frame may be imaged. The mouth may be parched and dry, the throat choked, the cheeks blanched, the eyes start, the hair stand up, the voice speechless, the muscles powerless to move; and as the blood rushes with increasing force through the veins, the only conscious thing to engage us may be the sound of the beating of our own heart.

III. *Auditory Imagery and the Agreeable.*—Likewise, auditory imagery appealing to the pleasurable emotions is quite common:

[1] *The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking*, II, 2, 181, by H. F. Covington.

"Let music swell the breeze,
And ring from all the trees,
Sweet freedom's song!
Let mortal tongues awake,
Let all that breathe partake,
Let rocks their silence break,—
The sound prolong."
—*America.*

In the description of the dawn in Milton's "L'Allegro," we hear the "lark" startling the dull night, the "cock" with his lively din, and the "ploughman" whistling o'er the furrowed land. As an illustration in prose, the last sentence of Lincoln's First Inaugural contains auditory imagery:

The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot-grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

Here, such phrases as "the mystic chords of memory," "the chorus of the Union," etc., as well as the rhythmic beat of the line, produce a decidedly agreeable effect on the emotions. Tonal imagery has a less important place in prose than in poetry, and in argument than in some other prose forms, but even in argument it may play an important part. The word "muck," for instance, in the phrase "man with a *muck*-rake," expresses a disapproved idea in a word tonally unpleasant; so, too, "innocuous desuetude" and "profiteering." On the other hand, "selective draft" is a happy substitute for the rather harsh term "conscription."

It is a constant source of surprise to find how little auditory illustrative imagery is used even in spoken discourse. This may be due in part to the fact that the rhythm of speech makes it appeal to the ear. At all events, we should encourage a variety of appeal through diversified forms.

IV. *Mixed Imagery Types.*—Scientific investigations of an important character have already been made of mental imagery. The results tend to show marked differences in the kind of imagery used by different persons, and by the same persons under changed conditions. A report of the psychological experi-

ments conducted by Doctor Fernald, in which eleven trained students of imagery were the subjects, should be of interest.

In general:

The individual differences in imagery are too complex to be stated adequately in terms of difference in "type" unless this type is carefully explained for each individual case. An adequate statement of an individual's imagery type would involve an account of the kinds of imagery used in various representative situations, with an estimate of their relative importance and a discussion of the characteristics of such imagery under the varying conditions.[1]

The investigator, however, was able to divide her eleven subjects into two groups:

(1) The more versatile, who seem to use visual-auditory and vocal-motor forms with perfect ease, changing from one to another with change in the material, or using all forms in handling one kind of material.

(2) The other group consists of those subjects who have certain specially favored kinds of imagery which they use with considerable constancy in the various tests, and who practically omit, as far as actual use is concerned, certain other forms.[2]

Visual imagery, as might be supposed, was found to be most extensively and consistently used, with auditory imagery ranking next in order.

In the first place, one positive result, which is of considerable importance for our general diagnosis, is the discovery that none of our subjects report an absolute lack of *visual illustrative imagery*. Moreover, all but three report at least occasional instances of *auditory*, and these three express themselves not as absolutely certain of its absence, but rather as exceedingly dubious of its presence.[2]

Again:

Investigation shows a decided preponderance of visual imagery over the auditory for the majority of subjects. In no case did the auditory images surpass the visual in amount.[2]

[1] "Mental Imagery," by Mabel Ruth Fernald. *The Psychological Monographs*, vol. XIV, No. 58, p. 130.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–132.

Moreover:

Again and again where auditory imagery is suggested, only the visual image of the sounding object appears. In certain cases the significance of a phrase is even changed to favor the visual rather than the auditory. Thus, both G. and T. report, independently of one another, that the "low-crying birds" of passage were thought of as "low-flying birds" with appropriate visual imagery. G. also transformed the "drowsy tinklings" of No. 20 into twinklings of star lights.

In general, then, we may say, for the majority of our subjects, that, under the conditions of reading and listening, a greater susceptibility is shown to the suggestion of accompanying visual imagery than to that of accompanying sounds. We cannot state with certainty the explanation of this, but in all probability several causes conspire together to produce the effect. It may be true, as Segal, Meumann, and others have said, that *visual* is the prevailing form of concrete imagery throughout the thinking of the majority of persons, because visual objects have a much greater practical significance for most of us than do sounds. It may also be due to the fact that, while we constantly experience visual objects which give no sound, we seldom experience sounds without some sounding object which can be or has been seen. In the reading process, the fact that most of our subjects have a running accompaniment of auditory-vocal-motor verbal imagery may help to account for the deficiency in auditory concrete imagery, since one of these may inhibit the other. Another consideration seems pertinent, that sounds may get a fairly adequate representation through changes in the inflection in reading and through the onomatopoetic effect of many of the words—a representation which the visual entirely lacks.[1]

Other forms of imagery, as revealed in the above investigation, are commented upon specifically, as follows:

With regard to the other forms of possible imagery the best we can do is to note their presence or absence in the few cases of more or less vivid description. *Cold*, for example, is introduced in a very striking way in No. 7, yet only one subject reported any *temperature* imagery, though some observed organic reactions (shivering, etc.), or visual representation of its effects. *Cold* is also an element of the situation in No. 24, in connection with the wet, and in No. 28, in the reference to the wind, yet we find it mentioned by only one subject in the former case and then as questioned, and in the latter case only three report it. *Warmth* is mentioned in several passages but appears most vividly in

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 41–44.

No. 24, where it appears twice—in the reference to the heat of the night and in the account of the touch of the warm animal—yet none of the subjects report it for the first case and only four for the latter. For *contact*, No. 24 again gives us the best instance. Here there are two very striking references—the touching of the animal and the feeling of the tongue on the palm. Most of the subjects get at least one of these, and all commented on the cleverness of the description. *Olfactory* material is fairly well suggested in at least four selections, yet there is noticeably little imagery aroused. With *kinæsthetic* and *organic* material we have the same sort of problem that we had with the vocal-motor, that of distinguishing between imagery and actual reinstatement of sensations. Again, aside from the certainty that in many cases it is the latter, we have had to leave the problem unsolved.[1]

Two of the passages used in Doctor Fernald's tests are given below—(7) and (24). The first may illustrate the little-used imagery of *cold*, and the second of *warmth*, as well as many other kinds of imagery.

(7) "St. Agnes' Eve—ah, bitter chill it was!
The owl, for all his feathers, was a-cold;
The hare limp'd trembling through the frozen grass,
And silent was the flock in woolly fold;
Numb were the Beadsman's fingers while he told
His rosary, and while his frosted breath,
Like pious incense from a censer old,
Seem'd taking flight for heaven without a death,
Past the sweet Virgin's picture, while his prayer he saith."
—*Keats:* "St. Agnes' Eve," 1st stanza.[2]

(24) An oppressive slumber hung about the forest branches. In the dells and on the heights was the same dead heat. Here where the brook tinkled it was no cool-lipped sound, but metallic, and without the spirit of water. . . . The breathless silence was significant, yet the moon shone in a broad blue heaven. Tongue out of mouth trotted the little dog after him; couched panting when he stopped an instant; rose wearedly when he started afresh. Now and then a large white night-moth flitted through the dusk of the forest. . . . All at once the thunder spoke. . . . Then there were pauses, and the lightning seemed as the eye of heaven, and the thunder as the tongue of heaven, each alternately addressing him; filling him with awful rapture. . . . Lower down the lightened abysses of air rolled the wrathful crash; then white

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 41–44. [2] *Ibid.*, Appendix.

thrusts of light were darted from the sky, and great curving ferns, seen steadfast in pallor a second, were supernaturally agitated and vanished. Then a shrill song roused in the leaves and herbage. Prolonged and louder it sounded, as deeper and heavier the deluge pressed. A mighty force of water satisfied the desire of the earth. Even in this, drenched as he was by the first outpouring, Richard had a savage pleasure. Keeping in motion, he was scarcely conscious of the wet, and the grateful breath of the weeds was refreshing. Suddenly he stopped short, lifting a curious nostril. He fancied he smelt meadow-sweet. . . . He was sure he smelt it fresh in dews. . . . After two or three steps he stooped and stretched out his hand to feel for the flower, having, he knew not why, a strong wish to verify its growth there. Groping about, his hand encountered something warm that started at his touch, and he, with the instinct we have, seized it, and lifted it to look at it. The creature was very small, evidently quite young. Richard's eyes, now accustomed to the darkness, were able to discern it for what it was, a tiny leveret. . . . He put the little thing on one hand in his breast, and stepped out rapidly as before.

The rain was now steady: from every tree a fountain poured. So cool and easy had his mind become that he was speculating on what kind of shelter the birds could find, and how the butterflies and moths saved their colored wings from washing. . . . He was next musing on a strange sensation he experienced. It ran up one arm with an indescribable thrill, but communicated nothing to his heart. It was purely physical, ceased for a time and recommenced, till he had it all through his blood, wonderfully thrilling. He grew aware that the little thing he carried in his breast was licking his hand there. The small rough tongue going over and over the palm of his hand produced the strange sensation he felt.—(*Meredith:* "Richard Feverel," chap. XLII.)[1]

APPENDIX D

The Imagery of Argument and of Poetry

By contrasting the sermons of Jonathan Edwards relating to hell with the treatment by Dante of the same theme in the "Inferno," Doctor DeWitt makes clear the purely incidental function of imagery in argument and its prime function in poetry. He cites in illustration the passage when Dante was sailing through the Lake of Mud in the Fifth Circle of Hell. The

[1] *Ibid.*, Appendix.

latter, it will be recalled, made reply to Philippo Argenti: "Master, I should like to see him ducked in this broth before we depart from the lake."

There is nothing in Edwards which, so far as I can judge, equals this in its horrid imagery and suggestion. And yet men enjoy Dante and the "Inferno." They do not "execrate" him for a "monster," as Doctor Allen says they do Edwards. And in his great essay on Dante, Mr. James Russell Lowell makes this very scene the text of an eloquent laudation of Dante's moral quality, in which he says of him: "He believed in the righteous use of anger, and that baseness was its legitimate quarry." Why is it that the attitude of the general public, thus represented by Mr. Lowell, toward the hell of Dante is so different from the attitude of the same public toward the hell of Edwards? I think we shall find an answer to this question in what I may call Edwards's spiritual realism. Of course, Dante is a realist also. How often this quality of his poem has been pointed out to us! But Dante's is the realism of the artist, the poet who appeals to our imagination. Our imagination being gratified, we enjoy the picture and even the sensations of horror which the picture starts. Of all this there is nothing in Edwards. There is no picture at all. There is scarcely a symbol. Here and there there is an illustration. But the illustrations of Edwards are never employed to make his subject vivid to the imagination. They are intended simply to explicate it to the understanding. The free, responsible, guilty, and immortal spirit is immediately addressed; and the purely spiritual elements of the hell of the wicked, separated from all else, are made to appear in their terrible nakedness before the reason and the conscience. The reason and the conscience respond. We are angry because startled out of our security. And we call him cruel, because of the conviction forced on us that we are in the presence of a terrible, even if mysterious, spiritual reality. Edwards always spoke, not to the imagination, but to the responsible spirit. Men realized when he addressed them that because they are sinners their moral constitution judicially inflicts upon their personality remorse; and that remorse is an absolute, immitigable and purely spiritual pain, independent of the conditions of time and space and, therefore, eternal.[1]

Imagery is merely an instrument used in communicating our ideas to others. The chief function of Dante's imagery was to make vivid; that of Edwards generally to explicate. The latter, moreover, appealed to the reason, the understanding, and the

[1] "Jonathan Edwards, a Study," by John DeWitt.

responsible will. This, indeed, is "the serious business" of argument, as expounded by the philosopher Kant:

> The arts of speech are rhetoric and poetry. Rhetoric is the art of carrying on a serious business of the understanding as if it were a free play of the imagination; poetry the art of conducting a free play of the imagination as if it were a serious business of the understanding.
>
> The orator then promises a serious business, and in order to entertain his audience conducts it as if it were a mere play with ideas. The poet merely promises an entertaining play with ideas, and yet it has the same effect upon the understanding as if he had only intended to carry on its business.[1]

The same authority recognizes the impressiveness of persuasion, but condemns its use before judgments are formed:

> Rhetoric, in so far as this means the art of persuasion, *i. e.*, of deceiving by a beautiful show (ars oratoria), and not a mere elegance of speech (eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from poetry only so much as is needful to win minds to the side of the orator before they have formed a judgment and to deprive them of their freedom; it cannot, therefore, be recommended either for the law-courts or the pulpit.[1]

The legitimate use of persuasion has been previously discussed; rhetoric is not deceptive and need not, of course, be employed to "win minds to the side of the orator before they have formed a judgment." Verily, truth and justice may as well surrender in despair, if, for instance, we deprive the speaker of the right to induce in the hearer a willingness to listen including an interest in doing so, or the right to implant a wish to know what is true and just.

Indeed, though Kant always fears and often assumes the abuse of persuasion, he recognizes its use as legitimate and proper when employed "in a lively sympathy with what is truly good":

> The man who, along with a clear insight into things, has in his power a wealth of pure speech, and who with a fruitful imagination capable of presenting his ideas unites a lively sympathy with what is truly good, is the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, the orator without art but of great impressiveness, as Cicero has it; though he may not always remain true to this ideal.[1]

[1] "Kant's Kritik of Judgment," translated by J. H. Bernard, p. 207.

Further, we may agree with Kant in his appreciation and glorification of poetry, without accepting his implications as necessary, in so far as they involve the honesty of the orator. Oratory is no more illusory or deceptive than poetry. It is difficult to conceive, for instance, how the penumbrations of connotative words are more liable to mislead in prose than in the rhythmic beats of verse. Certainly, we may properly image a concept in prose; soundly as respects the truth, honestly as respects the individual who utters it, and effectively as respects the hearer, if driven home with all the sensible and supersensible instruments of utterance which God has given us to make the truth prevail! At all events, in debating, the preliminary analysis and investigation of all the material relating to a subject and the opportunity for the immediate detection and exposure of error by means of the rebuttals are sufficient preventives of misrepresentation. The debater who is careless or dishonest carries within him the seeds of his own destruction.

APPENDIX E

Addresses

I

"PEACE FOUNDED ON THE ROCK OF VINDICATED JUSTICE"[1]

Lloyd George's Guildhall Address

My Lord Mayor, my Lords, Ladies, and Gentlemen: The chancellor of the exchequer [Bonar Law] in his extremely lucid and impressive speech has placed before you the business side of this proposal, and I think you will agree with me, after hearing his explanation of his scheme, that he has offered for subscription a loan which possesses all the essential ingredients of an attractive investment. They are the most generous terms

[1] This address, which was delivered at the Guildhall, London, January 11, 1917, appealed primarily for subscriptions to the new war loan, but also touched largely upon questions in the peace discussions.

that the government can offer without injury to the taxpayer. I agree that the chancellor was right in offering such liberal terms because it is important that we should secure a big loan now, not merely in order to enable us to finance the war effectively, but as a demonstration of the continued resolve of this country to prosecute the war; and it is upon that aspect of the question that I should like to say a few words.

The German Kaiser a few days ago sent a message to his people that the Allies had rejected his peace offers. He did so in order to drug those whom he could no longer dragoon. Where are those offers? We have asked for them; we have never seen them. We were not offered terms; we were offered a trap baited with fair words. They tempted us once, but the lion has his eyes open. We have rejected no terms that we have ever seen. Of course, it would suit them to have peace at the present moment on their terms. We all want peace; but when we get it it must be a real peace.

The allied powers separately and in council together have come to the same conclusion. Knowing well what war means, knowing especially what this war means in suffering, in burdens, in horrors, they have still decided that even war is better than peace at the Prussian price of domination over Europe. We made it clear in our reply to Germany; we made it still clearer in our reply to the United States.

Before we attempt to rebuild the Temple of Peace we must see now that the foundations are solid. They were built before upon the shifting sands of Prussian faith; henceforth, when the time for rebuilding comes, it must be on the rock of vindicated justice.

I have just returned from a council of war of the four great allied countries upon whose shoulders most of this terrible war falls. I cannot give you its conclusions; they might be information to the enemy. There were no delusions as to the magnitude of our task; neither were there any doubts about the results.

I think I can say what was the feeling of every man there. It was one of the most businesslike conferences I ever attended. We faced the whole situation, probed it thoroughly, and looked its difficulties in the face, and made arrangements to deal with them. We separated feeling more confident than ever. All

felt that if victory were difficult, defeat was impossible. There was no flinching, no wavering, no faint-heartedness, no infirmity of purpose.

There was a grim resolution at all costs that we must achieve the high aim with which we accepted the challenge of the Prussian military caste and rid Europe and the world forever of her menace. No country could have refused the challenge without the loss of honor. None could have rejected it without impairing national security. No one would have failed to take it up without forfeiting something which is of greater value to every free and self-respecting people than life itself. Those nations did not enter into the war lightly. They did not embark upon this enterprise without knowing what it really meant. They were not enticed by the prospects of immediate victory.

Take this country. The millions of our men who enlisted in the army enlisted after the German victories of August, 1914, when they knew the accumulated and concentrated power of the German military machine. That was when they placed their lives at the disposal of their country. What about the other lands? They knew what they were encountering; that they were fighting an organization which had been perfected for generations by the best brains of Prussia—perfected with one purpose, the subjugation of Europe.

Why did they do it? I passed through hundreds of miles of the beautiful land of France and of Italy, and as I did so I asked myself this question: Why did the peasants leave by myriads these sunny vineyards and corn-fields in France? Why did they quit these enchanting valleys, with their comfort, their security, their charm, in order to face the grim and wild horrors of the battle-field? They did it for one purpose, and one purpose only. They were not driven to the slaughter by Kings. These are great democratic countries. No government would have lasted twenty-four hours that had forced them into an abhorrent war against their own free will. They embarked upon it because they knew the fundamental issue had been raised which no country could shirk without imperilling all that has been won in the centuries of the past and all that remains to be won in the ages of the future.

That is why, as the war proceeds and the German purpose becomes more manifest, the conviction is becoming deeper in

the minds of those people that they must work their way through to victory in order to save Europe from an unspeakable despotism. That was the spirit that animated the allied conference in Europe last week.

But I tell you one thing that struck me, and strikes me more and more each time I attend these conferences and visit the Continent: the increasing extent to which the allied peoples are looking to Great Britain. They are trusting her rugged strength and great resources more and more. She is to them like a great tower in the deep. She is becoming more and more the hope of the oppressed and despair of the oppressor; and I feel more and more confident that we shall not fail the people who put their trust in us.

But when that arrogant Prussian caste flung the signature of Britain in the treaty in the waste-paper basket as if it were of no account, they knew not the pride of the land they were treating with such insolent disdain. They know it now. Our soldiers and our sailors have taught them to respect it. You had an eloquent account from my colleague, the chancellor of the exchequer, of the achievements of our soldiers; our sailors are gallantly defending the honor of the country on the high seas. They have strangled the enemy's commerce; they will continue to do so in spite of all the piratical devices of the foe.

In 1914 and 1915, for two years, a small, ill-equipped army held up the veterans of Prussia, with the best equipment in Europe; in 1916 hurling them back and delivering a blow from which they are reeling. In 1917 the armies of Britain will be more formidable than ever in training, in efficiency, in equipment; and you may depend upon it, if you give them the necessary support, they will cleave a road to victory through the dangers and perils of the next few months.

But we must support them; they are worth it. Have you ever talked to a soldier who has come back from the front? There is not one of them who will not tell you how he is encouraged and sustained by hearing the roar of the guns behind him.

I will tell you what I want to do. I want to see checks hurtling through the air, fired from the city of London; fired from every city, town, and village and hamlet throughout the land; fired straight into the intrenchments of the enemy.

Every well-directed check, well loaded, properly primed, is a more formidable weapon of destruction than a twelve-inch shell. It clears a path to the barbed-wire entanglements for our gallant fellows to march through. A big loan helps you, insures victory; a big loan will help shorten the war; it will help save lives; it will help save the British Empire; it will help save Europe; it will help save civilization.

That is why we want the country to rise to this occasion and show that the old spirit of Britain, represented by those great men [pointing to the monuments in the hall] you have here, is still alive, alert, and as potent as ever.

I want to appeal to the men at home—yes, and to the women. I want to appeal to both; they have done their part nobly in this war. A man who has been a munitions minister for twelve months must feel a debt of gratitude to the women for what they have done. They have helped to win the war, and without them we could not have done it; but I want to make special appeal, or rather to enforce the special appeal of the chancellor of the exchequer.

Let no money be squandered in luxury and indulgence which can be put into the fight and which counts—every penny of it; every ounce has counted in this struggle. Do not waste it, do not throw it away; put it there to help the valor of our brave young boys. Back them up! Let every one contribute to assist them, with greater pride in it than in costly garments. It will become them; they will feel prouder of it to-day, and their pride will increase in the years to come, when the best garment they have got will have rotted, when the glisten and glitter of it will improve with the years. They can put it on in old age and say, "This is something I contributed in the great war," and they will be proud of it.

Men and women of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland! The first charge upon all your surplus money, over your needs for yourselves and your children, should be to help those gallant young men who tendered their lives to the cause of humanity. The more we get the surer the victory; the more we get the shorter the war; the more we get the less it will cost in treasure, and the greatest treasure of all is brave blood. The more we give the more you will be enriched by your contribution, by your sacrifices of extravagance.

I want to bring this home to every man and woman. This extravagance during the war has cost blood—valiant blood, the blood of heroes. It will be worth millions to save one of them—the big loan will save myriads of them. Help them not merely to win; help them to come home, to shout for the victory which they have won.

It means better equipment for our troops, it means better equipment for the Allies as well; and this I say for the fiftieth, if not the hundredth, time: this is a war of equipment. That is why we are appealing for your assistance. Most of us could not do more, but what we can do it is our duty, it is our pride, to do.

I said it was a war of equipment. Why are the Germans pressing back our gallant Allies in Rumania? It is not that they are better fighters; they certainly are not. The Rumanian peasant has proved himself to be one of the doughtiest fighters in the field when he has the chance—he never had much—and as for the Russian, the way in which, with bared breast, he has fought for two years and a half, with inferior guns, insufficient rifles, inadequate supplies of ammunition, is one of the tales of heroism of the world.

Let us help to equip them, and there will be another story to tell soon; but it is for us to do so, and that is why I am glad to follow the chancellor of the exchequer in the appeal he has made to the patriotism of our race—but with true Scottish instinct he put the appeal to prudence first. He had a good foundation for patriotism, and reserved that for his peroration. I am going to reverse the order, belonging to a less canny race. I want to say it is a good investment, after all; the old country is the best investment in the world. It was a sound concern before the war; it will be sounder and safer than ever after the war, and especially safer.

I do not know the nation that will care to touch it after this war. They had forgotten what we were like in those days, and it will take them a long time to forget these. It will be a safer investment than ever, and a sounder one.

Have you been watching what is going on? Before the war we had a good many shortcomings in our business, our commerce, our industry. The war is settling them all right in the most marvellous way. You ask a great business man like my

friend, Lord Pirrie, what is going on in those great factories throughout Great Britain and Ireland. Old machinery is scrapped; the newest, the best, and the latest is set up; slipshod and wasteful methods are scrapped, and hampering customs discontinued. Millions are brought into the labor-market to help to produce who were before purely consumers.

I do not know what the national debt will be at the end of this war, but I will make a prediction: whatever it is, what is added in real assets to the real riches of the nation will be infinitely greater than any debt we ever acquire. The resources of the nation in every direction have been developed and directed; the nation itself disciplined, braced up, quickened, has become a more alert people. We have thrown off the useless tissues; we are a nation that has been taking exercise. We are a different people.

I will tell you another thing: the Prussian menace was a running mortgage which detracted from the value of our national security. Nobody knew what it meant. We know too well now. You could not tell whether it meant millions or hundreds of millions or thousands of millions, or how many of them. You could not tell that it would not mean ruin.

That mortgage will be cleared off forever—better security on a better foundation, safer security, and at a better rate of interest. The world will then be able, when this war is over, to attend to its business in peace. There will be no war or rumors of war to disturb and to distract. We can build up, we can reconstruct, we can till, we can cultivate and enrich, and the burden and terror and waste of war will have gone.

The peace and security for peace will be that the nations will band themselves together to punish the first peacebreaker who comes out.

As to the armies of Europe, every weapon will be a sword of justice in the government of men; every arm will be a constabulary of peace. There were men who had hoped to see this achieved in the way of peace. We were disappointed. It was ordained that you should not reach that golden era except along the path which was paved with gold—yea, and cemented with valiant blood. There are millions who have given of the latter who are ready—nay, millions more ready, myriads more ready —for the sacrifice, if the country needs it.

It is for us to contribute the former. Let no man, no woman, in this crisis of the nation's fate, through indolence, greed, avarice, or selfishness, fail. If they are doing their part, then, when the time comes for the triumphal march through the darkness and terror of the night into the bright dawn of the morning of the new age, they will each feel that they have done their share.

II

"FORCE TO THE UTMOST"[1]

President Wilson's Speech

Fellow Citizens: This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free, and for the sacred rights of freemen everywhere. The nation is awake. There is no need to call to it. We know what the war must cost, our utmost sacrifice, the lives of our fittest men, and, if need be, all that we possess.

The loan we are met to discuss is one of the least parts of what we are called upon to give and to do, though in itself imperative. The people of the whole country are alive to the necessity of it, and are ready to lend to the utmost, even where it involves a sharp skimping and daily sacrifice to lend out of meagre earnings. They will look with reprobation and contempt upon those who can and will not, upon those who demand a higher rate of interest, upon those who think of it as a mere commercial transaction. I have not come, therefore, to urge the loan. I have come only to give you, if I can, a more vivid conception of what it is for.

The reasons for this great war, the reason why it had to come, the need to fight it through, and the issues that hang upon its outcome, are more clearly disclosed now than ever before. It is easy to see just what this particular loan means, because the cause we are fighting for stands more sharply revealed than at

[1] This address was delivered in the 5th Regiment Armory, Baltimore, April 6, 1918, at the opening of the Third Liberty Loan Campaign.

any previous crisis of the momentous struggle. The man who knows least can now see plainly how the cause of justice stands, and what is the imperishable thing he is asked to invest in. Men in America may be more sure than they ever were before that the cause is their own, and that, if it should be lost, their own great nation's place and mission in the world would be lost with it.

I call you to witness, my fellow countrymen, that at no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately. I should be ashamed in the presence of affairs so grave, so fraught with the destinies of mankind throughout all the world, to speak with truculence, to use the weak language of hatred or vindictive purpose. We must judge as we would be judged. I have sought to learn the objects Germany has in this war from the mouths of her own spokesmen, and to deal as frankly with them as I wished them to deal with me. I have laid bare our own ideals, our own purposes, without reserve or doubtful phrase, and have asked them to say as plainly what it is that they seek.

We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German power, as with all others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment, if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment. To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonor our own cause, for we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.

It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered—answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice, but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will. The avowal has not come from Germany's statesmen. It has come from her military leaders, who are her real rulers. Her statesmen have said that they wished peace, and were ready to discuss its terms whenever their opponents were willing to sit down at the conference table with them. Her present chancellor has said—in indefinite

and uncertain terms, indeed, and in phrases that often seem to deny their own meaning, but with as much plainness as he thought prudent—that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we had declared would be our own in the final settlement.

At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances. But action accompanied and followed the profession. Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We cannot mistake what they have done—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Rumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest.

They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are forgotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement, and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be free under their dominion!

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their western front if they were not there face to face with armies whom even their countless divisions cannot overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favorable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium and France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the East?

Their purpose is, undoubtedly, to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition, and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy—an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East.

In such a programme our ideals, the ideals of justice and hu-

manity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations, upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it.

That programme once carried out, America and all who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the world—a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden under foot and disregarded and the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning. Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind!

The thing is preposterous and impossible; and yet is not that what the whole course and action of the German armies has meant wherever they have moved? I do not wish, even in this moment of utter disillusionment, to judge harshly or unrighteously. I judge only what the German arms have accomplished with unpitying thoroughness throughout every fair region they have touched.

What, then, are we to do? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely purposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer.

I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world and make it fit for freemen like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat

the force of those who flout and misprize what we honor and hold dear.

Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

APPENDIX F

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APPENDIX G

Resolutions for Debate

Resolved:

That after the present war the United States should take steps to secure the adoption of the programme of the League to Enforce Peace.

That the federal government should adopt a permanent policy of price control.

That a war tax of twenty per cent should be levied on all incomes over two thousand dollars.

That after the war an international police force should be created to preserve peace.

That the successful prosecution of the war requires that all citizens of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey now residing in the United States be interned until peace is declared.

That the war-time scope of federal regulation should, in principle, be continued in times of peace.

That the administration be granted absolute censorship of the press in time of war.

That Congress should enact legislation providing for the compulsory arbitration of interstate public utility disputes as a permanent policy.

That the federal government should require compulsory arbitration (with power to enforce decision) of disputes between organized labor and interstate public service corporations, constitutionality granted.

That the States should adopt the cabinet-parliamentary form of government.

That the government, in financing the war for the future, should obtain a larger percentage of its funds from taxes than from bonds.

That the Japanese should be admitted to the United States and to citizenship therein on the same basis as foreigners of other nations.

That the federal courts should be deprived of the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional.

That conscription of labor should be adopted by the government.

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